The impact of regulation on money market funds by Aftab, Zary
1 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The Impact of Regulation on 
Money Market Funds 
 
By 
Zary Aftab 
 
ICMA Centre 
Henley Business School 
University of Reading 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Simone Varotto 
 
January 2019 
2 
 
Declaration of Original Authorship  
 
I confirm that this is my work and the use of all material from other sources has been 
properly and fully acknowledged.  
 
 
Zary Aftab 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Acknowledgements  
     I would like to express my warmest thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Simone Varotto, 
for his patience, encouragement and continuous guidance that he has provided 
throughout my PhD study. I feel truly blessed to have a supervisor who cared so 
much about my work, provided detailed and constructive feedback and responded 
promptly to my questions and queries. His immense knowledge and expert advice 
have been invaluable throughout all the stages of my work. I sincerely admire him 
for his kindness, integrity and exceptional sense of humour. After working with him 
for the last four years he has surely become my most trusted advisor.  
     I would like to thank Prof. Chris Brooks, Prof. Michael Clements, Dr. Alfonso 
Dufour, Dr. Miriam Marra, Dr Andreas Chouliaras, Dr. Konstantina Kappou, Dr. 
Carol Padgett and Dr. Tony Moore for their insightful comments, suggestions and 
support. Also, I am very grateful to ICMA Centre for giving me the opportunity to 
pursue a PhD.  
     I am very grateful to Dr. Lisa Schopohl for agreeing to be my internal examiner 
and Prof. Marcin Kacperczyk from Imperial College London for being my external 
examiner in the dissertation defence.  
     Furthermore, I appreciate my PhD friends and colleagues including Cai Liu, Satya 
Sahoo, Jaidev Singh, Chao Yin, Tiffany Thng, Yiwei Lei, Dina Ghanma, Vicky Lee, 
Ning Zhang, Ludovico Rossi, Erick Fung and Siqi Liu for the discussions, for the 
times we were working together, and for all the fun we have had in the last four 
years. 
4 
 
     Finally, I am grateful to my parents, Rehmat and Surriya for their constant support 
over the years, and my siblings, Fari, Jennifer and Joyce for their friendship and 
spiritual support.  
  
5 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation comprises three empirical studies that aim to investigate the role of 
financial regulation in curtailing the systemic risk posed by shadow banks. The focus 
of this work is on money market funds (MMFs), a type of shadow bank.  
In the first empirical study, we examine prime MMFs after the introduction of the 
minimum liquidity requirements mandated in the 2010 Amendments to rule 2a-7 of 
the US Investment Company Act of 1940. We show that liquidity requirements have 
considerably increased the resilience of prime funds. We also show that funds 
increase their liquidity to meet expected redemptions. But liquidity does not shelter 
risky funds from lower inflows in a crisis. 
In the second empirical study, we assess the response of MMFs and their investors 
to the 2016 Amendments to rule 2a-7. We show that following the segregation of 
retail and institutional prime MMFs required by the new rules, these funds have 
become different in their liquidity positions, maturity structure, competitiveness and 
risk management. Institutional prime MMFs maintain higher liquidity and tend to 
increase their liquidity actively as they increase the credit risk of their portfolios. On 
the contrary, retail prime MMFs have become more relaxed in their liquidity 
management, possibly because of lower market discipline that was previously 
enforced by the presence of institutional investors in their shareholder mix.  
In the third study, we look at the changes in MMFs after the introduction of floating 
net asset value (NAV) requirements as mandated by the 2016 Amendments. We 
show that the floating NAV is seen by institutional investors as a new indicator of 
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performance that they utilize to make investment decisions. Institutional investors 
prefer funds that maintain higher NAV in order to benefit from capital gains. 
Furthermore, we observe that to increase NAV, funds tend to keep liquidity low, 
invest in longer maturity, higher risk securities. So, to boost NAV a fund must take 
on more risk, which could lead to amplification of risk during crisis periods. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
The global financial crisis has exposed the hidden fragilities of shadow banks 
which are known to have played a major role in aggravating the crisis. Once 
considered a safe-haven, money market funds (MMFs) came under increased 
regulatory scrutiny after September 2008 when the Reserve Primary Fund’s net asset 
value (NAV) fell below $1.00 per share after the default of Lehman Brothers. This 
led to industry wide runs due to fears that other MMFs with similar portfolios might 
also “break the buck”1. Prime MMFs were particularly affected due to their higher 
risk investments in corporate debt instruments. The sizeable outflows from prime 
MMFs caused short-term funding markets to shrink considerably resulting in a credit 
crunch. In response, the US Treasury stepped in to guarantee investments in MMFs. 
Later, further support was provided by the Federal Reserve to stabilize the MMFs 
(Fed Board 2009; SEC 2009; PWG 2010). This led Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) to make amendments in rule 2a-7 that governs MMFs which 
became effective in May 2010. The 2010 Amendments aimed to mitigate credit, 
liquidity and interest rate risk to improve the resilience of MMFs. It required them 
to increase liquidity, decrease average portfolio maturity, and understand the 
behaviour of their investors and adjust liquidity accordingly. In addition, the 
amendments increased the transparency of MMFs by mandating them to report 
detailed portfolio holdings each month. 
                                                          
1 “Breaking the buck” occurs when the net asset value of a money market fund falls below $1. 
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Soon after, as the sovereign debt crisis worsened, MMFs that held securities of 
Eurozone banks came under increased redemption pressure which eventually led to 
$162 billion of outflows from June to August 2011. The substantial outflows risked 
straining money markets (FSOC 2011). These redemptions led to reduced lending to 
creditworthy non-European issuers (Chernenko and Sunderam 2014) and non-
financial US firms (McCabe et al. 2013), hence adversely affecting the economy. 
These events raised doubts on the efficacy of the reforms (Rosengren 2012). This 
motivated a second wave of reforms which became effective in October 2016. The 
new rules imposed additional restrictions on liquidity and portfolio concentration, 
and improved reporting requirements. In addition, the amendments separated non-
government institutional MMFs, which serve a more volatile shareholders base, from 
more stable non-government retail MMFs and required the former to float their 
NAV. This has resulted in a complete structural change in the money market fund 
industry.  
Little research has focused on whether these reforms have achieved their intended 
outcome. This dissertation aims to study the impact of the reforms on risk-taking, 
resilience and portfolio composition of MMFs and the response of fund shareholders 
to the new rules. We collate a unique dataset which includes detailed portfolio 
holdings of MMFs from January 2009 to April 2018.2 To the best of my knowledge 
                                                          
2 This dissertation utilizes several data sources to construct a very comprehensive dataset for analysis 
of US MMFs: 1) detailed portfolio holdings are extracted from N-Q, N-CSRS, N-CSR, N-MFP, N-
MFP1 and N-MFP2 forms filed monthly with SEC EDGAR database; 2) information about global 
ultimate owners of issuers from Wharton Research Data Services, Bloomberg, Global Legal Entity 
Identifier Foundation and Bureau van Dijk’s databases including Amadeus, Bankscope, Orbis Bank 
Focus and Osiris; 3) default probabilities of the issuers obtained from the Risk Management Institute 
of the National University of Singapore; 4) US Treasury bill yields data is collected from the Federal 
Reserve Economic Data. 
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this is the first document that offers a comprehensive study of the impact of both 
waves of reforms using detailed pre- and post-reform data.  
The first empirical study (chapter 3) focuses on the effectiveness of 2010 
Amendments to rule 2a-7. We specifically focus on two reforms: (1) The minimum 
liquidity requirement, which mandates MMFs to hold at least 10 percent of their net 
assets in daily liquid assets and 30 percent of their net assets in weekly liquid assets3, 
(2) The “know your investor” requirement, which encourages funds to assess the 
characteristics of their investors to determine their redemption behaviour and adjust 
their liquidity levels above the minimum requirements, accordingly.   
The study contributes to literature that study the impact of 2010 Amendments 
(Gallagher et al. 2015) and shows that the impact of minimum liquidity requirements 
on a MMFs portfolio characteristics shows that the rules have led to a safer asset 
mix, have made MMFs more resilient to unexpected outflows, and have reduced 
portfolio risk, but has put downward pressure on MMFs’ portfolio yields. We show 
that the MMFs with riskier securities tend to keep higher liquidity levels in crisis 
periods. In fact, some funds keep more liquidity than the required minimum, possibly 
to differentiate themselves as a safer fund, to attract risk-averse investors. 
Furthermore, we study the response of shareholders in a crisis scenario, when the 
MMFs holds riskier securities in combination with higher liquidity and find that 
higher liquidity does not shelter funds from redemptions which indicates that 
liquidity does not compensate for higher credit risk during a crisis. Even when the 
funds are equipped to meet redemptions, the investors are concerned about the 
                                                          
3 See appendix A1 for definitions of weekly and daily liquidity.    
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preservation of capital. My findings are contrary to Jank and Wedow (2015) who 
argue that MMFs with higher liquidity have lower outflows in bad times. In addition, 
we document that the “know your investor” requirement has encouraged MMFs to 
properly evaluate the characteristics of their shareholders and adjust their liquidity 
accordingly. We find that in crisis, the fund managers foresee the expected 
redemption patterns and increase the liquidity levels of funds as a precautionary 
measure. 
The chapter 4, in a manner like that of Cipriani et al. (2017), we investigate the 
impact of 2016 Amendments to rule 2a-7 which mandated liquidity fee and 
redemption gates for all non-government MMFs and use of floating NAV for all non-
government institutional MMFs. We observe that in response to the new rules, the 
majority of riskier sector (prime funds) have migrated to government funds. The 
institutional prime funds belonging to larger fund families were less likely to migrate 
possibly because if in danger of breaching regulatory threshold, they can obtain 
financial help from their sponsors to avoid charging liquidity fee or suspend 
redemptions (Baba et al. 2009; McCabe 2010; Brady et al. 2012; Kacperczyk and 
Schnabl 2013), whereas the MMFs with higher credit risk were more likely to 
convert to government funds. We show that institutional MMFs that remain prime 
try to completely avoid redemption gates and liquidity fees by hoarding liquidity and 
by dynamically changing liquidity with any increases in credit risk which is the 
opposite behaviour to that before the introduction of the new rules. We show that the 
loss of attractive money-like features and higher investor concentration have led to 
greater price competition among institutional funds as they seek to boost yields to 
15 
 
attract investors. Finally, we document that retail prime MMFs tend to stay prime 
funds to benefit from the complete segregation of retail prime MMFs from 
institutional prime MMFs and this has left these funds with a more stable shareholder 
base, which allows such funds to aggressively engage in yield seeking behaviour. 
This aspect has not been studied before.  
Chapter 5 aims to evaluate the response of institutional MMFs and their 
shareholders to the floating NAV mandated by 2016 Amendments.  Unlike previous 
papers who study floating NAV (Gordon and Gandia 2014; Hanson et al. 2015; 
Witmer 2016), we conduct empirical analysis using actual floating NAV data of 
institutional prime MMFs reported on N-MFP forms since October 2016, to 
investigate the drivers of floating NAV, performance-flow relationship using 
floating NAV as an indicator of performance and the impact of floating NAV on the 
risk-taking of MMFs. This analysis fills a gap in the literature because, to the best of 
my knowledge, this aspect has not been investigated using the actual floating NAV 
data of the MMFs. We contribute to literature and show that the MMFs with higher 
floating NAV, and therefore higher opportunity for capital gains, attract more 
inflows. This gives the MMFs incentive to boost their NAV. Earlier performance-
flow studies like Sirri and Tufano (1998), Koppenhaver and Sapp (2005), Chernenko 
and Sunderam (2014) focus on net yields of MMFs. Together with the findings that 
the MMFs that hold less liquidity, higher maturity riskier securities have higher 
NAV, indicates that a fund must hold risker portfolio to offer higher capital gains 
and attract shareholders. Furthermore, the study of the impact of floating NAV on 
risk-taking of funds reveals that it has two opposite effects. A fund must increase 
risk to boost capital gains, whereas, to retain investors, it must ensure less volatility 
16 
 
in NAV because investors run from the funds that have higher fluctuations in NAV. 
We observe similar behaviour in retail funds and show that the shareholders in 
constant NAV funds actively track shadow NAV of the funds and tend to withdraw 
from funds whose NAV fluctuates excessively because such funds have a higher risk 
of breaching the 50 basis points threshold that would require a fund to trade at a 
lower than $1.00 share price resulting in loss of principal. This implies that the 
constant NAV MMFs (which now serve a more stable retail shareholder base only) 
after complete segregation from institutional MMFs may still be subject to runs when 
in distress. 
In summary, the examination of the impact of recent reforms in US MMF 
industry shows that some new rules have made MMFs safer and more resilient to 
distress and has motivated funds to rein-in their portfolio risks. While the imposition 
of other rules (like floating NAV) produces countervailing effects and thus the 
impact of such rules remains unclear.  
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Chapter 2 Background and Literature 
Review 
 
This thesis relates to several strands of literature. Specifically, we contribute to 
performance-flow relationship in MMFs, financial stability of the MMFs, the impact 
of financial regulation on their risk-taking and run risk. In this section, we discuss 
the main themes that are discussed in this dissertation. In section 2.1, we provide a 
short background of shadow banks and MMFs. In section 2.2, we explore studies on 
performance-flow relationship that exists in the MMF industry and risk-taking 
incentives that arise from it. In section 2.3, we discuss systemic risk arising from 
excessive risk-taking of MMFs and its consequences. In section 2.4, we specifically 
discuss studies on the impact of MMF regulation. 
2.1 Shadow Banking  
 
The term “shadow banking” was coined by McCulley (2007) to collectively 
describe levered non-bank investment conduits, vehicles and structures. Since the 
onset of the global financial crisis, academics and policymakers have adopted the 
term. Pozsar et al. (2010) broadly define shadow banks as financial intermediaries 
that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation without access to central 
bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees. Examples of shadow banks include 
finance companies, asset-backed commercial paper conduits, limited-purpose 
finance companies, structured investment vehicles, credit hedge funds, money 
market funds, securities lenders, and government-sponsored enterprises. The shadow 
banking system has grown manifold in recent years. Figure 2.1 shows the evolution 
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of shadow banks and traditional banks. In 2015, shadow banks and banks were 
similar in size with total financial assets of 16.89 trillion dollars and 17.37 trillion 
dollars respectively. The expansion in the shadow banking sector is attributable to 
genuine demand (Sunderam 2015), financial innovation, regulatory arbitrage, and 
agency problems that exist in the financial markets (Pozsar et al. 2012).  
Figure 2.2: Total Financial Assets, US data 
 
This figure shows the total financial assets of US MMFs and US banks. Banks include the 
total financial assets of private depository institutions. (Source: Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve: Financial Accounts of the United States, the author’s own calculations). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shadow banks raise funds through deposit-like liabilities which are then 
transformed into assets such as loans and mortgages and other long-term assets, just 
like banks provide maturity/liquidity transformation in credit intermediation 
activities. Although such short-term instruments are highly liquid imitating bank 
deposits, the risk profile of investors is different because these are not backed by 
official backstops and guarantees, and lack regulatory supervision. Maturity and 
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liquidity transformation in combination with leverage gives rise to concerns because 
of the increased risk that short-term funding if undertaken in large quantities is 
susceptible to bank-like runs and hence can undermine the health of the wider 
financial system (FSB 2011).  
The shadow banking system is highly interlinked with the regular banking 
system. For instance, banks compose shadow banking chains, explicitly sponsor 
shadow banks, and facilitate shadow banking activities, and directly invest in the 
financial products issued by the shadow banks. These linkages raise systemic 
concerns. Such interconnectedness can magnify market reactions in times of low 
liquidity in the financial markets and can intensify loss of liquidity in the shadow 
banking sector as well as the banking sector through negative spill-over effects. This 
became evident during the global financial crisis when major investment banks 
failed, others were acquired by banks and became bank holding companies. ABCP 
conduits and money market funds suffered runs, securitization activity collapsed, a 
lot of shadow banks including specialized investment vehicles and collateralized 
debt obligations became non-existent. Adrian and Ashcraft (2012) point out that such 
issues arose from both the asset and liability side. Issues related to the asset side were 
the underwriting standards, and on the liability side the fragility of wholesale funding 
seemed to be the problem. In response to these fragilities, governments set up both 
liquidity and solvency guarantees because distress to such institutions had potential 
to spill over to other institutions and damage the real economy. A necessary pre-
requisite to counter such risk is to have reliable and relevant information about 
vulnerable areas of the financial system, especially focus is needed to be placed on 
elements where systemic risks are more likely to materialize. There are several 
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papers which provide a comprehensive overview of the shadow banking system, the 
related regulatory landscape and financial stability. See Pozsar (2008), Adrian and 
Shin (2009), Pozsar et al. (2010), Acharya et al. (2013), Adrian and Ashcraft (2012), 
Gorton and Metrick (2012), and Gennaioli et al. (2013). We focus on money market 
funds, a sizeable and important part of the shadow banking sector which has proved 
risky in both the global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis.  
Money market funds invest in short-term money market instruments. Depending 
upon the investment objective, a money market fund can be categorized as a 
government fund (if it invests at least 99.5 percent of its portfolio in government 
securities), a municipal fund (holding non-taxable municipal securities) and a prime 
fund (focusing primarily on corporate debt securities). Furthermore, based on the 
characteristics of a fund’s shareholder base, a fund is considered either a retail fund 
when the shareholder base consists of natural persons, or an institutional fund in 
which shareholders are corporations and institutions. These funds serve two main 
purposes. First, these are very important suppliers of short-term funding and hold 
large amounts of debt instruments issued by financial and non-financial institutions. 
The global MMF industry amounted to 4.7 trillion dollars, of which US MMFs 
account for 2.7 trillion dollars, which was 58 percent of the global money market 
fund industry in 2017. Second, they serve as a valuable cash management apparatus 
for individuals, firms, institutions and governments.  
In the US, MMFs are registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and 
regulated by the SEC under Rule 2a-7. This rule imposes liquidity and diversification 
requirements, maturity limits, portfolio quality restrictions, enhanced disclosure and 
stress testing requirements. Money market funds were established to counter limits 
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on the interest payable on bank deposits and limits on the amount of deposits insured. 
They offered higher interest rates and, by using collateral based overnight repurchase 
agreements, they created new instruments that closely resemble insured deposits, but 
without restrictions on the insured amount. Some researchers see MMFs as “narrow 
banks” that are reliable liquidity providers even in times of crisis (Miles 2001; 
Pennacchi 2006). Indeed, from 1983, when SEC rule 2a-7 was first introduced, until 
September 2008 when the Reserve Primary Fund lowered its share price below $1 
due to its exposure to Lehman Brothers, only one fund “broke the buck” in 1994.  
In this thesis, we specifically investigate US prime MMFs. These funds are 
important suppliers of credit to short-term credit markets, particularly because they 
are not restricted to invest solely in government securities. Their assets also include 
repurchase agreements, certificates of deposit, ABCP, commercial paper, bank notes, 
and corporate notes with remaining maturity of no more than 397 days. Figure 2.2 
illustrates the importance of prime MMFs relative to other financial institutions in 
the commercial paper market.  Previous crisis episodes have shown that distress in 
prime MMFs cause disruptions in the short-term credit markets, which are not 
completely offset by other credit suppliers (Chernenko and Sunderam 2014). As a 
result, prime MMFs were the primary focus of recent financial regulation. This 
dissertation investigates the impact of 2010 and 2016 Amendments to rule 2a-7 on 
prime MMFs.  
Notable examples of recent contributions on money market funds include 
Christoffersen (2001), Christoffersen and Musto (2002), Baba et al. (2009), McCabe 
(2010), Di Maggio (2016), Duygan-Bump et al. (2013), Bengtsson (2013), 
Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013), Chernenko and Sunderam (2014), Gallagher et al. 
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(2015), Strahan and Tanyeri (2015), Collins and Gallagher (2016), Pellegrini et al. 
(2017)  and Di Maggio and Kacperczyk (2017).  
Figure 2.2: Commercial Paper Holdings, US Data 
 
This figure shows the amount of Commercial Paper held by various types of institutions. 
MMF represents money market funds. Other shadow banks include total financial assets of 
ABS issuers, Security brokers and dealers, finance companies, Government Sponsored 
Enterprises and Agency and GSE- backed mortgage pools. Banks include the total financial 
assets of private depository institutions. Other includes non-profits, retirement and pension 
funds, life insurance companies and mutual funds. Rest of the world represents holdings of 
non-US investors. (Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve: Financial Accounts 
of the United States, the author’s own calculations). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
2.2 Performance-Flow and Risk-Taking 
 
Money market funds are valuable cash management apparatus for individuals, 
firms and governments. They have been understood to be deposit-like investments 
that provide higher returns than regular deposit-taking banks. Christofferson and 
Musto (2002) find that these returns are highly persistent and are almost entirely 
driven by relative fee charged by funds. Domian and Reichenstein (1998) agree that 
this persistence in returns is because of the lower expense ratios charged by the funds 
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and show that 87 percent of variation in net returns can be explained by the expense 
ratio and a dummy variable representing whether a fund exclusively invests in 
government securities. Di Maggio and Kacperczyk (2017) adds that the monetary 
policy regime also determines the returns of funds. They reveal that the returns of 
MMFs are heavily influenced by short-term interest rates and show that the 
performance of MMFs improve in high interest rate periods. Koppenhaver (1999) 
finds that returns are also affected by the portfolio characteristics of funds, and 
therefore influence the performance of the funds. For instance, increasing the share 
of commercial papers, which have considerably more credit risk than government 
securities could increase the return. Also, investing in longer maturities could also 
increase the performance of the funds. The knowledge of factors influencing a fund’s 
returns matters because studies show that superior performance brings higher fund 
flows.4 
My work is related to performance-flow relationship and risk-taking incentives 
in money market funds. Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013) show that the fund flows 
are extremely sensitive to changes in yields, which indicates that funds have a strong 
incentive to invest in risky assets because such instruments offer higher yields, to 
attract yield-chasing depositors. Moreover, they give account of increase in yields of 
riskier instruments showing that asset risk of MMFs changed in relation to safer 
instruments in the period from August 2007 to March 2008, providing unprecedented 
                                                          
4 The relationship between fund performance and fund inflows is the subject of an extensive literature 
that investigates mutual funds (Friend et al.1970; Smith 1978; Ippolito 1992; Chevalier and Ellison 
1997; Sirri and Tufano 1998; Del Guercio and Tkac 2002). 
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expansion in opportunities for MMFs to invest in riskier assets. Similarly, 
Christoffersen (2001) argues that fund flows increase sharply with increase in net 
performance of the fund. Sirri and Tufano (1998) study equity mutual funds and find 
that investors consider historical performance in making their investment decisions 
and tend to invest disproportionately more in funds that perform better than others. 
These results are in line with the findings of Jank and Wedow (2015) and 
Koppenhaver and Sapp (2005) that investors base their investment decisions on 
performance of the funds, which fosters fierce competition, creating incentive for 
managers to invest in riskier assets to increase performance of the funds and attract 
more inflows and build asset size. This performance-flow relationship is twice as 
strong when the interest rates are low than they are in normal times, so funds respond 
by adjusting their portfolio risk upwards (Di Maggio and Kacperczyk 2017). During 
crisis this relationship might invert. Chernenko and Sunderam (2014) find evidence 
that during the sovereign debt crisis, from June to August 2011, the relationship 
between net yield and fund inflows became negative, possibly because shareholders 
turn to safer funds during a crisis. These studies imply that funds have incentive to 
boost performance to attract shareholders, which in turn encourages MMFs to take 
on more risk to earn higher portfolio yields to be able to offer higher net yields.  
The extent to which funds engage in risk-taking depends on several other factors. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) and Diamond (1989) provide evidence that borrowers that 
have reputational concerns tend to refrain from taking excessive risk. Kacperczyk 
and Schnabl (2013) agree that a fund sponsor’s reputational concerns and its 
financial strength are important determinants of risk taking by money market funds. 
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They show that the funds with sponsors with higher reputational concerns engage in 
constrained risk-taking, while the funds with financially strong sponsors take on 
more risk. Further, during high systemic risk periods, stand-alone funds increase 
their risk relatively more, while in low systemic risk periods, the funds that are a part 
of conglomerates boost their risk-taking more. Similarly, Brady et al. (2012) argue 
that most of MMFs are backed by a sponsor, who are usually willing to provide 
financial support if a fund faces financial difficulties, makes funds act less cautious 
in choosing individual portfolio holdings. Often sponsors provide the needed support 
to avoid incurring huge reputational cost if their MMF fails. For instance, a failure 
could induce outflows in other funds managed by the same sponsor or damage their 
investment banking or commercial banking business both financially and in terms of 
reputation.  
Risk-taking of funds also depends upon the type of their shareholder base. 
Strahan and Tanyeri (2015) observe that fund managers not only observed the factors 
driving cross-sectional variation in fund flows but also respond by reallocating their 
portfolios according to the investor preferences. Gallagher et al. (2015) use a unique 
and granular database to investigate the impact of investor characteristics on 
competition for assets across prime MMFs and show that funds with a higher 
proportion of institutional investors have more incentive to differentiate on yield and 
consequently take on more risk.  
Other risk-taking incentives for MMFs include the following: The MMFs 
compete with other short-term markets like repurchase agreements. So, they must 
offer higher yields than other markets to stay competitive otherwise investors flee to 
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alternative investments. For instance, Gallagher et al. (2015) find evidence that, 
investors quickly move their investments from MMFs to repo markets if the latter 
offers higher relative yields. Furthermore, MMFs could be motivated to take on more 
risk to earn higher fee revenue because Jank and Wedow (2015) show that higher 
risk boosts an MMF’s expected fee revenue. Finally, lower interest rate environment 
could induce fund managers to engage in yield-seeking behaviour. For instance, Di 
Maggio and Kacperczyk (2017) study incentives of asset managers to chase yield by 
examining the response of money market fund managers to the zero lower bound 
interest rate policy and provide evidence that fund managers increased their portfolio 
risk by investing in riskier asset classes, to provide positive returns to their investors.  
In chapters 3 and 4, part of the analysis assesses the impact of regulation on 
funds’ performance and risk-taking behaviour. In chapter 5, we add a new 
perspective to MMF performance-flow literature by assessing the relationship 
between a fund’s ability to provide capital gains and the fund inflows. We assess the 
response of institutional shareholders to newly introduced rule which requires 
institutional MMFs to price their shares using floating NAV.   
 
2.3 Run Risk and Financial Stability 
 
Money market funds have been understood to be safe. Some researchers saw 
them as “narrow banks” that are excellent liquidity providers even in times of crisis 
and pointed that the runs on the funds should be unlikely (Gorton and Pennacchi 
1993; Miles 2001; Pennacchi 2006).  This is because these funds have kept true to 
the promise of price stability in the past. From 1983, when rules 2a-7 were first 
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introduced, until September 2008 when Reserve Primary Fund lost money due to the 
Lehman bankruptcy, only one fund broke the buck in 1994. It was a small fund, so 
the loss went unnoticed.  
Domain and Reichenstein (1998) emphasized that money market funds are 
essentially commodities with no meaningful differentiation in portfolios and did not 
recognize the risk and return dynamics in these funds. Historically, MMFs usually 
attracted inflows during crisis, so run risk never appeared to be a concern. For 
instance, Miles (2001) showed that MMFs attracted inflows and increased lending 
to borrowers during monetary policy shocks and concluded that MMFs are safer than 
depository institutions. Similarly, Pennacchi (2006) showed that MMFs received 
inflows during liquidity shocks when spread between commercial paper and treasury 
bills increased and suggested that insurance of shares of MMFs might prove more 
effective in improving market liquidity.  
During the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis, MMFs 
susceptibility to runs became clearer. This was evident in September 2008, when 
Reserve Management Company “broke the buck” and decided to liquidate Primary 
Fund’s entire portfolio, because of the failure of Lehman Brothers, which worsened 
already weak investor confidence in short-term credit markets. This triggered large 
scale investor redemptions in other MMFs. These massive outflows shrank short-
term funding markets considerably and credit supply contracted (Fed Board 2009; 
SEC 2009; PWG 2010; Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2010).  The damage caused by runs 
led to government interventions to support MMFs to stop outflows and restore 
investor confidence.  
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This episode was repeated during the sovereign debt crisis. In June 2011, as the 
Eurozone crisis worsened, concerns about substantial Eurozone bank exposures of 
US MMFs increased, which led shareholders of the funds to withdraw approximately 
$162 billion over the period of June to August 2011. The substantial outflows in 
prime MMFs with high Eurozone bank exposures strained US money markets 
(FSOC 2011). These redemptions squeezed short-term markets, leading to reduced 
lending to creditworthy non-European issuers Chernenko and Sunderam (2014). 
McCabe et al. (2013) contend that redemptions from prime MMFs caused a decrease 
in the supply of lending to US non-financial firms, hence adversely affecting the US 
economy. 
Many studies endeavour to provide reasons for such runs. Morris and Shin (1998) 
argue that while weak fundamentals might trigger a run, it is investors’ irrational 
beliefs that magnify the crisis leading to a self-fulfilling crisis. The initial 
redemptions induce worse-informed investors to believe that other investors have 
received a negative signal about the associated risk of an investment, which creates 
a deteriorating outlook, hence stimulating a run (Chari and Jagannathan 1988). 
Similarly, Schmidt et al. (2016) examine MMF flows during the 2008 crisis and 
study investor and portfolio characteristics that contribute to run risk and agree that 
the strategic complementarities i.e. the self-fulfilling expectations that other 
investors will run leads to more outflows.   
The intensity of such withdrawals also depends upon portfolio characteristics of 
funds (Koppenhaver 1999). MMFs that increase their returns (therefore increasing 
risk) by diversifying into a wider portfolio structure are more likely to encounter 
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large withdrawals (Jank and Wedow 2015). Indeed, investor redemptions from 
MMFs during the sovereign debt crisis were concentrated among risky funds, 
indicating that investors were aware of the portfolio quality of the funds and made 
their decisions to redeem investments accordingly (McCabe 2010; Schmidt et al. 
2016; Strahan and Tanyeri 2015). The investors have risk preferences for their 
portfolio holdings, so they rebalance their portfolios when these risk characteristics 
change (Jacklin and Bhattacharya 1988). Therefore, even extremely small changes 
in the fundamentals could lead to amplification of negative outcomes (Angeletos et 
al. 2007).  
Studies suggest that the extent of redemption pressure also depends upon 
characteristics of shareholder base of a fund. For instance, Wermers (2011) examines 
the crisis in the US MMF industry and finds that redemptions were larger for funds 
that were catering to institutional investors. McCabe (2010), Schmidt et al. (2016) 
and Chernenko and Sunderam (2014) concede that institutional investors were 
driving runs on the MMFs, because funds that were financed by money from 
institutions suffered more outflows. Gallagher et al. (2015) empirically analyse the 
behaviour of institutional investors during the global financial crisis, the sovereign 
debt crisis and the US debt ceiling impasse and demonstrate that institutional 
investors consistently withdraw more fervently in all three episodes. This could be 
attributed to the fact that such institutional investors have deeper understanding of 
the negative externalities that their actions pose on other investors (FSOC 2012; 
IOSCO 2012). In addition, such investors have higher capital at risk which motivates 
them to track the performance of MMFs as well as assess the risk inherent in the 
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portfolio holdings of such funds (Schapiro 2012). Furthermore, Schmidt et al. (2016) 
observe that the presence of retail investors in the fund has a significant relationship 
with the way institutional investors react during stress. They observe that 
institutional investors restrain their run-behaviour if a fund has a large proportion of 
retail investors in their shareholder mix.   
Some studies claim constant NAV funds are more prone to runs than floating 
NAV funds. Witmer (2016) examines both type of funds from US and Europe and 
concludes that constant NAV funds are more susceptible to runs. Hanson et al. (2015) 
agree that the use of floating NAV successfully removes strategic motives to run. On 
the other hand, Jank and Wedow (2015) assert that large withdrawals are possible 
for floating NAV funds as well because risky portfolio holdings of funds could cause 
investors to withdraw money in case of trouble because they still have potential to 
lose value. Gordon and Gandia (2014) agree that the use of floating NAV does not 
eliminate run-like behaviour. 
Literature provides evidence that the sponsor support can thwart runs in money 
market funds. For instance, McCabe (2010) analyses portfolio risk, sponsor risk and 
investor risk that a fund is subjected to and finds out that the sponsor support 
absorbed losses which increased investor confidence in 2007 during the ABCP crisis. 
Even though some of these funds suffered capital losses, the investors did not 
respond by withdrawing their funds, because they believed the sponsors would 
absorb the losses. They were correct to assume so. Brady et. al (2012) investigate 
sponsor support that prime money market funds received from 2007 to 2011 and find 
that sponsor support during this period was frequent and significant saved at least 31 
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prime funds from breaking the buck at multiple instances during the global financial 
crisis. Without the sponsor support the funds would have faced increased redemption 
pressure possibly resulting in lower net assets and higher losses for remaining 
investors.  
Higher portfolio liquidity can boost investor confidence in MMFs ability to 
service redemptions (SEC 2014). Wermers (2011) examines crisis in the US MMF 
industry and finds that redemptions were larger for funds that had invested less in 
liquid assets. These results are corroborated by Jank and Wedow (2015) who study 
German money market funds and show that the funds with higher liquidity during 
good times have lower inflows, while such funds have lower outflows in the bad 
times. In other words, the liquid funds are unattractive to investors in times of high 
market liquidity but become attractive when the market illiquidity is high. We 
contribute to this literature by assessing the role of liquidity in restraining run risk 
on funds. More specifically, in chapter 3, we examine the response of shareholders 
of MMFs to the funds that hold higher liquidity in combination with higher credit 
risk, during crisis.  
Runs have negative consequences for its investors as well as borrowers, leading 
to wider financial instability. Such heavy outflows in a fund could have negative 
effects on remaining investors (Edelen 1999; Nanda et al. 2000). During heavy 
redemption periods the funds could take a few days before their cash balances are 
fully restored, which may affect the investors who remain in the fund, because the 
funds become riskier. Strahan and Tanyeri (2015) who study MMFs’ response to 
investors withdrawals during the 2008 crisis and show that the funds with heavy 
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outflows relative to portfolio liquidity became temporarily riskier because they were 
forced to sell liquid securities to service redemptions. Moreover, heavy redemptions 
impose costs on funds by forcing them to sell assets at fire sale prices (Nanda et al. 
2000; Chen et al. 2010). Such flow-induced trading can significantly affect 
individual stock returns and can have adverse price pressure on stock prices, driving 
prices away from fundamentals and information-efficient benchmarks (Coval and 
Stafford 2007). This could result in loss of principal invested by shareholders. 
Furthermore, this could transmit distress from one part of the financial system to 
other connected parts.  
Ben-David et al. (2012) and Anand et al. (2012) show that during the global 
financial crisis, institutions sold more liquid assets instead of the “toxic” assets  which 
adversely effected related asset prices, thereby propagating the crisis from illiquid 
asset markets to liquid asset markets. Greenwood and Thesmar (2011) add that flow-
driven trades in mutual funds by an investor could give rise to contagion risk, 
especially if investors have correlated liquidity shocks, because flows can exert 
pressure on prices which causes portfolio values of other investors to fluctuate as 
well. Other related studies that aim to measure negative spill-over effects in terms of 
price impacts include Boyson et al. (2013), Aragon and Strahan (2012), and Lou 
(2012). 
Runs lead to capital constraints at a financial intermediary which could result in 
a credit crunch.  For instance, default from one firm can impair a bank’s accounts, 
constraining the supply of the credit to other firms (Bernanke and Blinder 1988; 
Holmstrom and Tirole 1997; Khwaja and Mian 2008; Chava and Purnanandam 2011; 
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Schnabl 2012). Chernenko and Sunderam (2014) investigate runs on US money 
market funds during sovereign debt crisis and show the negative spill overs of US 
MMFs risk-taking on non-European issuers (borrowers). They find that MMFs with 
greater exposure to Eurozone banks suffered more withdrawals between June and 
August 2011. Investors were more concerned about investments of MMFs in 
Eurozone banks, therefore, such MMFs suffered more. As a result, these MMFs had 
liquidity problems and were capital constrained which affected their ability to supply 
money to the non-European issuers. In other words, in the wake of the crisis in 
Eurozone countries, creditworthy non-European issuers were unable to raise capital 
from MMFs. Such a dynamic was more pronounced for MMFs with larger exposure 
to Eurozone banks. They show that relationships in short-term credit markets are 
important, which create a channel that could lead to transmission of distress to the 
broader economy. Because of the presence of such lending frictions, fragility in 
MMFs funding could lead to disruptions in credit supply to large, highly rated firms. 
These results are corroborated by Correa et al. (2016) who study the interaction 
between MMFs and global banks in the US and establish that MMFs were primary 
transmission vehicles of spill-over effects from the sovereign debt crisis to US credit 
markets. They show that MMFs decreased lending to US branches of the banks that 
were affiliated with euro-area parent banks, and in turn such banks decreased lending 
to US firms. Ivashina et al. (2016) agree and document that US MMFs reduced their 
exposure to European banks sharply when the sovereign debt crisis escalated. This 
caused a reduction in dollar lending by European banks relative to euro lending, 
which in turn constrained the funding available to the firms that were more reliant 
on Eurozone banks.  
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Gallagher (2015) challenges the narrative and argues that there is little evidence 
to support the claims about the presence of MMFs lending channel during the 
sovereign debt crisis. Collins and Gallagher (2016), show that of the $162 billion 
withdrawn from prime MMFs during the sovereign debt crisis between June-August 
2011, less than half of these outflows could be attributed to the MMFs’ exposure to 
Eurozone banks. Furthermore, they show that the outflows due to Eurozone holdings 
concerns were concentrated in June 2011. The outflows in July to early August 2011, 
were primarily due to the legislative impasse on the federal debt ceiling which raised 
concerns. Gallagher (2015) observes that the funds seem to have met redemptions 
by decreasing their financing to European banks and claims that these reductions 
were more than the total outflows during June 2011. However, Gallagher concedes 
that the issuers financed by funds with greater Eurozone holdings experienced a 
similar reduction in their short-term debt, but they decreased their short-term 
financing from other short-term sources while increasing their long-term debt, which 
indicates that the reduction was because of decrease in demand for short-term credit. 
Gallagher provides evidence that MMFs with higher exposure to Eurozone banks 
actually increased their lending to North American non-financial firms because these 
firms were safer investments.  
This dissertation contributes to run risk and financial stability literature by 
examining the role of money market fund regulation in reducing the runs on MMFs 
and promoting industry stability.  In chapter 3, we study the role of minimum 
liquidity requirements on restraining the runs on MMFs during crisis. In chapter 4, 
part of the analysis examines how 2016 Amendments have changed the liquidity and 
35 
 
risk management of both institutional and retail MMFs to foster stability. In chapter 
5, we investigate whether floating NAV induces financial stability by restricting risk-
taking incentives.  
 
2.4 MMF Regulation and its Impact 
 
Because of their systemic importance, MMFs have been subject to regulatory 
reforms in the US. In response to MMFs’ run episode during global financial, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission introduced reforms in May 2010, sought to 
improve the resilience and transparency of MMFs. It was aimed at increasing 
liquidity, decreasing average portfolio maturity, requiring fund managers to 
understand the behaviour of the funds’ investors, introducing stress testing 
procedures, and requiring funds to report detailed portfolio holdings data every 
month which were made available to the public after 60 days.  
 During the European debt crisis which saw large increases in sovereign credit 
spreads, MMFs faced heavy redemptions that squeezed short-term credit markets. 
This motivated introduction of 2016 Amendments. The new regulations, which 
became effective in October 2016, enable MMFs to impose liquidity fees or 
completely stop outflows through redemption gates when liquidity falls below a 
designated regulatory threshold. The rules also require all non-government 
institutional funds to use floating net asset values which explicitly exposes investors 
to capital losses. These reforms have induced a structural shift in the MMF industry.5  
                                                          
5The European MMFs have also been subject to similar systemic risk concerns and consequential 
regulation. The European Commission has proposed stable NAV funds to either convert to floating 
NAV funds or hold a 3 percent capital buffer and prohibits sponsor support unless it is approved by 
the appropriate regulator.  
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The focus of this thesis is to assess the impact of both MMF reforms and the 
response of investors to the new rules. There are several studies that discuss MMF 
reforms proposals (Birdthistle 2010; McCabe et al. 2012; Fisch and Roiter 2012; 
Fisch 2015; Hanson et al. 2015). However, the literature that empirically studies the 
post-reform impact of these regulations is limited. This section particularly discusses 
recent studies that discuss the potential effect of the MMF reforms.  
Gallagher et al. (2015) study the effect of enhanced portfolio disclosure mandated 
in 2010 Amendments by examining shareholder redemption behaviour and portfolio 
risk adjustments of MMFs during the sovereign debt crisis. They conclude that 
greater transparency has two opposing effects: On the one hand, it enables investors 
to properly monitor the portfolios of funds which encourages managers to restrain 
portfolio risks. Furthermore, this discipline imposed by sophisticated investors 
(institutional investors) benefits unsophisticated investors (retail investors) and 
restricts the fund managers to window-dress their portfolios to make them appear 
safer near disclosure dates (Morey and O’Neal 2006; Ortiz et al. 2012). On the other 
hand, availability of real time transparent information about fund portfolio can lead 
to pre-emptive runs during distress leading to increased frequency of negative 
feedback loops. The disclosure of detailed information in MMFs exacerbated the 
funding shock to euro-area banks during the sovereign debt crisis (Correa et al. 
2016). Aragon et al. (2013) and Shive and Yun (2013) agree that enhanced disclosure 
could lead to front-running in mutual funds. Furthermore, Villatoro (2009) and 
Verbeek and Wang (2013) find that it could also lead to herding behaviour because 
institutions might imitate each other’s portfolios.  
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Parlatore (2016) studies the consequences of MMF regulation including the 
prohibition of sponsor support, the adoption of a floating NAV and the imposition 
of capital buffers. Parlatore concludes that lack of sponsor support incentivizes funds 
to reduce risk to avoid fund liquidation, which in turn could result in fewer asset fire 
sales and more stable asset price and greater financial stability. The paper argues that 
capital buffers can have two opposing effects. On the one hand, they could raise cost 
of intermediation services, thereby decreasing the net returns for shareholders and 
the provision of liquidity by MMFs. On the other hand, capital buffers provide funds 
with the ability to absorb losses which would increase expected return, lower the 
probability of liquidation, make asset prices less volatile and reduce the risk of 
investment in MMFs which, together, could increase the total supply of liquidity. In 
addition, the paper concludes that adopting floating NAV for the whole industry 
could also boost the total supply of liquidity because investors would be attracted to 
MMFs as they can earn returns from floating NAV, but the risk should be kept low 
by restraining asset price volatility. Our paper is closely related to this. We 
empirically test the effect of floating NAV on MMF performance-flow relationship 
and risk-taking and find that funds with higher floating NAV attract more inflows 
and therefore have incentive to invest in riskier securities.  
Lenkey and Song (2017) investigate the effect of liquidity fee on runs on financial 
institutions when shareholders are asymmetrically informed about the fundamentals 
of the institutions. They find that fee reduces informed investors’ propensity to run, 
because it eliminates the first mover advantage. But it could also lead uniformed 
investors to become more cautious about the fundamentals of a firm and can cause 
them to run. Taken together, these results make impact of fee on runs unclear. Also, 
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fee could induce last-mover advantage transferring wealth from uninformed 
investors to the informed investors. Zeng (2017) contends that redemption fees in 
mutual funds curtail runs, whereas, Hanson et al. (2015) and Cipriani et al. (2017) 
claim that the imposition of a liquidity fee would encourage pre-emptive runs.  
Cipriani et al. (2017) is the only study that empirically investigates the post-
reform impact of 2016 Amendments on US money market funds. They show that 
money has flowed out of the MMFs that are subject to redemption gates and liquidity 
fee (i.e. institutional prime and municipal MMFs) to funds which do not have such 
requirements (i.e. government funds) because of the reforms, which indicates that 
shareholders are concerned about the deposit-like attributes of their investments. 
They also show that the strength of the outflows was higher for institutional investors 
because they are more information sensitive. Also, consistent with risk-appetite of 
prime MMFs, this money has flowed to the government agency MMFs which is a 
relatively riskier segment.  
Witmer (2018) studies whether funds hold excess liquidity to guard against 
shareholder redemptions. The paper finds that there is wide variation in the level of 
liquidity across MMFs. Funds with more volatile shareholder base, institutional 
shareholders and longer maturity assets hold higher liquidity to avoid runs and 
reduce transaction costs associated with investor redemptions. Moreover, external 
prime funds (i.e. those with retail or institutional shareholders) hold more liquidity 
than internal prime funds (i.e. those where the shareholders are the funds owned by 
the same sponsor) because the former are more vulnerable to runs. Finally, the paper 
argues that funds with higher liquidity have lower redemptions during a crisis.  
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This dissertation contributes to above literature by comprehensively studying the 
impact of MMF reforms. In chapter 3, we assess whether minimum liquidity 
requirements imposed by 2010 Amendments have made the funds more resilient to 
redemptions. In chapter 4, we examine the response of MMFs and investors to 2016 
Amendments. In chapter 5, we investigate the post-reform impact of floating NAV 
requirement mandated by 2016 Amendments on the behaviour of funds as well as 
investors.   
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Chapter 3 Liquidity Management of 
Money Market Funds 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, we investigate the changes in MMFs after the introduction of the 
2010 Amendments especially focusing on the rules targeted at improving portfolio 
liquidity: (1) A minimum liquidity requirement, which endeavours to increase 
liquidity holdings of prime MMFs by imposing a floor on daily and weekly liquidity 
levels. Prime MMFs are expected to hold at least 10 percent of total net assets in 
daily liquid assets and 30 percent of total net assets in weekly liquid assets6; (2) A 
“know your investor” requirement, which urges MMFs to assess the characteristics 
of their investors in order to determine their redemption behaviour and adjust the 
liquidity levels above the minimum requirements accordingly.  It is of great interest 
to know whether these reforms have proved effective at reducing the instability of 
prime money market funds.  
Our contributions to the existing literature are as follows. First, we collate a 
unique dataset, which includes detailed portfolio holdings of MMFs before and after 
the 2010 Amendments. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to assess 
changes in MMF behaviour after reforms using detailed pre- and post-reform data. 
We find that those funds for which the new liquidity requirements were binding 
(constrained funds) reallocated capital initially invested in riskier, longer maturity 
securities to either very short-term securities and/or in government securities. This 
                                                          
6  See appendix A1 for definitions of weekly and daily liquidity.    
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leads to a safer asset mix and positions funds to be more resilient to unexpected 
outflows. In addition, following the reform we find that portfolio risk declined with 
a negative impact on the funds’ profitability.  
Second, with our pre-reform data we are able to do a counterfactual analysis to 
show how MMFs adjust their excess liquidity during the sovereign debt crisis, after 
reforms. We evaluate changes in daily and weekly excess liquidity and find that 
constrained funds increase daily excess liquidity twice as much as unconstrained 
funds and weekly excess liquidity more than three times as much. As a result, the 
daily and weekly excess liquidity profile of constrained and unconstrained funds has 
become similar. Interestingly, unconstrained funds increase excess liquidity even 
though they already hold much higher liquidity levels than constrained funds post 
reform. In this respect, unconstrained funds appear to aim to preserve their distinctive 
features (i.e. higher safety/liquidity) as a way to differentiate themselves from 
constrained competitors. We conjecture that this may be a strategy to attract wealthy 
and risk averse institutional investors. 
Third, we investigate whether fund managers understand the redemption 
behaviour of their investor base. The 2010 Amendments impose a “know your 
investor” requirement which requires funds to adjust their liquidity levels according 
to the expected behaviour of their shareholders. We extend previous studies by 
investigating the impact of expected outflows, as opposed to observed outflows. We 
show that higher expected outflows lead funds to keep higher liquidity as a 
precautionary measure which indicates that MMFs know their investors and respond 
accordingly.  
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Fourth, we extend the analysis of Jank and Wedow (2015), who look at liquidity 
and inflows for German funds in a crisis. With our sample of US prime MMFs we 
evaluate the role of daily and weekly liquidity in mitigating outflows if the portfolio 
is perceived to carry considerable credit risk. In the context of the sovereign debt 
crisis, we use the level of Eurozone bank holdings as a credit risk proxy. When the 
sovereign debt crisis worsened in 2011, credit default spreads of Eurozone banks 
started to increase sharply. This caused concerns about the solvency of Eurozone 
banks, which led to massive withdrawals from exposed funds. We find that higher 
daily and weekly liquidity does not compensate for higher credit risk in a crisis. In 
this sense, investors appear to have over-riding concerns about the preservation of 
capital even when the funds are better able to meet redemptions.  
Fifth, by analysing daily and weekly liquidity separately, we can investigate their 
distinctive features. The SEC introduced daily and weekly liquidity requirements to 
enable MMFs to survive severe illiquidity scenarios like the one that occurred after 
Lehman’s collapse. Under such circumstances, MMFs may not be able to rely on the 
secondary or dealer market for funding. Then, only a liquid asset base could help 
them to meet redemptions (SEC 2010, p. 57). A weekly liquidity requirement is 
added to a minimum daily liquidity as sustained redemptions can persist for several 
days. We find that larger funds tend to hold lower levels of weekly liquidity in 
tranquil periods. This may be because their wider reach among investors enables 
them to diversify the risk of redemptions with higher subscriptions. However, 
whether fund size can have an impact on weekly liquidity in a crisis is less clear as 
such diversification opportunities could disappear. Daily liquidity, on the other hand, 
appears to be treated more conservatively by larger funds that do not seem to behave 
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differently from smaller funds in both tranquil and crisis periods. Furthermore, we 
find that while MMFs with higher portfolio risk tend to hold higher weekly liquidity, 
the same relationship with portfolio risk is not found for daily liquidity. This is 
plausible because daily liquidity is more costly, i.e. less profitable, than weekly 
liquidity. Therefore, funds may prefer to adjust weekly liquid assets which have a 
longer maturity and, as a result, a higher yield. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we provide a 
description of the data. The empirical analysis and results are presented in section 
3.3. Section 3.4 concludes. 
 
3.2 Data Description  
 
The paper utilizes detailed portfolio holding reports of money market funds which 
are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission monthly (N-MFP), quarterly 
(N-Q), semi-annually (N-CSRS) and annually (N-CSR). These forms are publicly 
available from the SEC EDGAR database.  
The 2010 Amendments require MMFs to file a monthly report on form N-MFP, 
which includes a detailed schedule of portfolio holdings of money funds, starting 
from November 2010. This form provides information about fund-level variables 
like total net assets, assets of share classes, gross yield, and monthly shareholders 
subscriptions and redemptions. In addition, for each security held, it reports issuer 
name, amount of principal, yield, legal maturity date, and the CUSIP number. Before 
November 2010, portfolio holdings are available with quarterly frequency. The 
funds’ management companies were required to report portfolio holdings on the N-
Q form in the first and third quarter and on the N-CSRS form in the second and fourth 
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quarter. We use three different forms N-Q, N-CSRS and N-CSR reports filed by the 
funds to build a pre-reform dataset which gives us snapshots of portfolio data in each 
quarter from January to December 2009.7 The reporting on these forms, unlike N-
MFP, is not standardized, and therefore partly required manual extraction. Then we 
used an algorithm to create a standardized dataset. Restrictions on weighted average 
life (WAL) and daily/weekly liquidity did not exist before the SEC amendments to 
Rule 2a-7 in May 2010. As a result, they are not reported on the forms. Therefore, 
we calculate these variables ourselves (see appendix A1).  
To be able to measure the exposure of prime MMFs to Eurozone banks, which 
were the main source of instability in the summer of 2011 during the sovereign debt 
crisis, we aggregate issuer-level variables to the parent level. Then we assign a 
country to the parent and determine if the overall exposure to the parent firm is within 
the Eurozone. For instance, the securities issued by Bank of the West, Fortis funding 
LLC, Scaldis Capital LLC, Starbird funding corporation, as well the debt issued by 
BNP Paribas SA are all aggregated under the parent company BNP Paribas SA which 
is then associated with France and treated as a Eurozone exposure.8  
Our final dataset spans from January 2009 to December 2012. We divide the data 
into pre-reform (January 2009-December 2009)9,10 and post-reform (February 2011-
                                                          
7 N-Q, N-CSRS and N-CSR contain information about multiple funds managed by the same 
management company. We make sure to extract only the relevant data for prime money market funds.  
8 The N-MFP form does not specify the country and industry sector of the issuers, nor their parent 
company. We collect this information from a variety of other datasets. Since the CUSIP number of 
the issuers is given, we use it to link the data extracted from the N-MFP forms with other datasets. 
These include Amadeus, Bankscope, Osiris, and Bloomberg as well as the WRDS database for the 
CUSIP master file.    
9 In this period, only quarterly observations are available for each fund. In each quarter, the snapshot 
of portfolio holdings is provided for the reporting date. For consistency, other periods are also divided 
into four-month period.  
10 We choose this period for two reasons. First, before Q1 2009 in Q3-Q4 2008, during the time of 
Lehman’s bankruptcy, the funds were in distress. As we want to determine the characteristics of the 
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September 2011). Post reform is further divided into “Calm” (February 2011-May 
2011) and “Crisis” (June 2011 – September 2011) periods.11 See Figure 3.1 for a 
graphical timeline. Our final dataset excludes feeder funds (i.e. funds that invest in 
other funds), internal funds, municipal funds, and variable annuities12 which gives 
us a total of 186 prime funds in the post-reform period managing 1.3 trillion dollars 
in assets.  
We have done extensive sanitation checks and used alternative sources to correct 
data entry errors. For instance, the net yield of the funds provided on form N-MFP 
is occasionally incorrectly reported. We obtain the correct values for such funds from 
Bloomberg. US Treasury bill yields are sourced from the Federal Reserve Economic 
Data (FRED) database. 
 
3.3 Empirical Analysis 
3.3.1 Portfolio Composition Before and After the 2010 
Amendments  
The 2010 Amendments mandated prime funds to hold at least 30 percent of total 
assets in weekly liquid securities, 10 percent of total assets in daily liquid assets and 
capped the weighted average life (WAL) of the portfolio to 120 days. Before these 
reforms, no such requirements were in place. To meet these constraints, the funds 
                                                          
funds in normal pre-reform times we do not consider 2008. Second, we do not use the observations 
in Q1 2010 because the SEC reform was issued in February 2010. Although it became binding in May 
2010 it is possible that the funds brought their level of liquidity and WAL in line with the new 
requirements before then. So, including this period in the analysis could distort the results. 
11  Large MMFs redemptions started in June 2011 and continued until September 2011. See Figure 
3.5. 
12 The funds report their type in item 10 of the N-MFP form. We keep the fund in the data if it reports 
itself as “prime” fund. Item 7 reports if it is a feeder fund. Variable annuities are reported in item 9. 
We also exclude two funds that hold only cash over the period from February to September 2011. If 
a fund invests more than 95 percent in municipal securities, it is dropped from the final dataset.  
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had to make considerable changes in their portfolios. The liquidity floor seeks to 
enable prime funds to comfortably meet redemptions in the periods of distress. The 
WAL ceiling protects the fund against interest rate risk and spreads risk during high 
market volatility. In this section, we assess the extent of the changes in MMF 
portfolios after the 2010 Amendments and how such changes have influenced the 
liquidity and risk profile of the funds. In doing so one must keep in mind that during 
this period there were several other changes in the financial markets (for instance the 
introduction of the new Basel III regulations for banks) that might have impacted 
MMF portfolios. However, we still believe that the majority of the changes that we 
observe in liquidity and related measures is due to the minimum liquidity 
requirements in the 2010 Amendment because they placed direct demand on MMFs 
to change their liquidity to a certain level (for instance, increase weekly liquidity 
from 0% to 30%) and were binding.  
In our sample, there is a large cross-sectional variation in the pre-reform liquidity 
levels of the prime funds. Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 show the distribution of WAL, 
daily liquidity and weekly liquidity respectively, before and after the amendments. 
The funds are assigned to the “Unconstrained” group if the pre-reform average 
weekly liquidity is greater than the required minimum of 30 percent. Otherwise, they 
are classified as “Constrained”. We use weekly liquidity for the classification 
because it is the most stringent requirement.13 We have 70 constrained funds, and 30 
unconstrained funds. 
                                                          
13 Among the funds that already meet the weekly liquidity requirement in the pre-reform period, aall 
but one also meet the daily requirement. On the other hand, more than 50 percent of the funds that 
meet daily liquidity requirements in the pre-reform period do not meet the weekly requirement. 
Finally, most pre-reform funds meet the WAL requirement. 
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We examine the extent of changes in daily and weekly liquidity and WALft of 
funds after the reforms. Daily liquid assets, DLiqft, include US Treasury securities 
of any maturity and any security that can be liquidated within one business day (SEC 
2010, p.64). Weekly liquid assets, WLiqft, include any security that can be liquidated 
within five business days as well as US Treasury securities of any maturity and US 
government agency securities maturing within 60 days. Our DLiqft and WLiqft are 
conservative measures of liquidity because they do not take into account the cash 
holdings of the funds, as they are unavailable. In robustness tests we redefine DLiqft 
and WLiqft to include “other assets” as a proxy for cash.14 Our findings remain 
mostly unchanged. We expect DLiqft and WLiqft to increase, and WALft to decrease 
after the reforms, in response to the required liquidity floor and WALft ceiling for 
constrained funds. We decompose weekly liquidity holdings into US Treasury 
securities, Treasuryft, agency securities that mature within 60 days, AgcyLiqft, and 
liquid assets in the form of short-term securities that can be liquidated within five 
business days, NonGovLiqft. We do this to determine the type of instruments that the 
funds prefer to hold, as these may have consequences for the demand of such 
instruments.  
Table 3.1 reports the averages and statistical significance of liquidity and other 
variables that describe the composition of MMF portfolios. Results are shown for 
both the “constrained” and “unconstrained” funds before and after reforms. On 
average, the constrained funds have increased their post-reform weekly liquidity by 
22.4% of net assets, half of which is achieved by larger holdings of daily liquid assets 
                                                          
14 “Other Assets” are reported in Item 14 on the N-MFP form. It includes cash, receivables from 
brokers, receivables for fund shares sold, receivable for interest, and prepaid expenses. 
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(11.7%). The funds have adjusted to higher liquidity by holding more treasury 
securities (+2.8%) but mostly more short-term non-government securities (+21%) 
due to their higher yield.  
Before reforms, the average WALft is approximately 85 days, which is already 
less than 120 days.  This is because, even in the absence of the requirements, the 
fund managers were using weighted average life limits to reduce portfolio risk (SEC 
2010). However, there are several funds that had WALft. higher than 120 days. The 
constrained funds have decreased their WALft by approximately 19 days. They have 
also considerably increased their investments (+19.3%) in short-term securities 
maturing within three months, OA0-3m,ft, which is consistent with the large liquidity 
gains reported above. To the same effect, MMFs have decreased investments (-6.8%) 
in securities that mature from 9 to 13 months, OA9-13m,ft.  
An increase in liquid assets is expected to translate into lower portfolio yields. 
Thus, we examine the impact on the average excess yield of the constrained funds 
after the reforms. As expected, the funds are earning less excess yield on their short-
term investments Spread0-3m,ft. In response to such a decrease, it is possible that the 
funds increased investment in higher yielding securities, to compensate for the drop 
in the earnings. We test this hypothesis and find some evidence that the funds, on 
average, earn 37 bps higher excess yield from the investments in longer dated 
securities, Spread9-13m,ft, after the reforms. However, overall PortRiskft calculated as 
the difference between the gross yield of the fund’s assets and the 1-month Treasury 
bill rate has fallen. This indicates that the regulatory changes have indeed put 
pressure on the funds’ profitability. To test whether investors have withdrawn from 
prime funds because of the lower yields, we look at the variation in the funds’ net 
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assets following the reform. We find that the change is slightly negative but not 
statistically significant.  
We now turn to unconstrained funds. We observe that their weekly liquidity also 
increased but significantly less than for constrained funds. They seem to do so by 
holding higher daily liquidity and substituting agency securities with short-term non-
government securities which, again, is probably motivated by the higher yield of the 
latter. The increase in liquidity in unconstrained funds beyond the levels required by 
the new rules, suggests that those funds have a higher degree of risk-aversion. This 
is possibly to differentiate themselves from other riskier prime funds in order to be 
able to attract risk-averse shareholders who may use MMFs for safe cash parking 
rather than as investment vehicles. Unconstrained funds on average increase the 
WALft, but the average remains lower than that of the constrained funds. No major 
differences are found relative to constrained funds on the other portfolio 
characteristics. Column 8 shows the extent to which constrained and unconstrained 
funds have become (dis)similar, after the reforms. The overall message is that the 
two groups have moved towards similar liquidity levels and risk profile in the post-
reform period.  
In summary, we find that there have been considerable changes in the portfolio 
composition of MMFs. These changes have resulted in increased liquidity and have 
positioned funds to be more resilient in times of heavy outflows. This, however, has 
come to the cost of substantially lower portfolio yields.  
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3.3.2 Impact on the Resilience of MMFs 
In the summer of 2011, the sovereign debt crisis worsened and began to spread 
from Greece, Ireland and Portugal to other Euro area countries. Credit default 
spreads of Eurozone banks increased sharply amidst concerns over their solvency. 
Consequently, investors started withdrawing from MMFs due to their holdings of 
bank assets. Chernenko and Sunderam (2014) find that MMFs with greater exposure 
to Eurozone banks suffered more outflows. As a result, these funds experienced 
liquidity problems. This affected their ability to provide short term funding to non-
European issuers, which were affected by a credit crunch. This crisis period provides 
a setting to test the resilience of MMFs after reforms. As investors’ withdrawals were 
most prominent in the period from June to September 2011 (Figure 3.5), we focus 
on this period for our counterfactual analysis. We construct a counterfactual excess 
liquidity measure, C_ExWLiqft (C_ExDLiqft ) which is defined as the lagged average 
weekly (daily) liquidity in excess of outflows. This variable captures the amount of 
excess liquidity that the funds would have maintained during the crisis, had they 
continued to hold the same level of weekly (daily) liquidity as before the reforms. 
We also calculate the actual excess weekly (daily) liquidity, ExWLiqft (ExDLiqft) 
which is the difference between the outflows and lagged weekly (daily) liquidity. 
We employ these to analyse the extent to which constrained and unconstrained funds 
have become more stable compared to the pre-reform period.  
Table 3.2 presents our results. Columns 1-3 show that, after the reforms, the 
constrained funds have 41 percent weekly excess liquidity after servicing 
redemptions. This would have been only 17 percent if the pre-reform level of 
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liquidity had been maintained, which points to a considerable increase of 24 percent 
in the liquidity cushion of prime MMFs. Daily excess liquidity has also increased by 
a substantial 13.5 percent to 22.3 percent.  Columns 4-6 show that the unconstrained 
funds have increased both daily and weekly excess liquidity as well. But their 
adjustments are lower in magnitude. Post-reform, these funds continue to have 
higher excess liquidity than constrained funds. These results confirm that both 
groups are more resilient when under sustained pressure from high redemptions, as 
compared to their pre-reform condition. 
On average, as columns 2 and 5 suggest, most funds, even in the absence of 
reforms held enough liquidity to service their redemption requests comfortably. 
However, it should be noted that the liquidity requirements are set in response to the 
redemption behaviour of investors during the global financial crisis, a time when the 
funds experienced much higher distress than the episode under study. However, 
when we look at the distribution of excess liquidity across all funds, instead of the 
average fund, we observe that at least 18 (9) funds with higher proportion of assets 
invested in Eurozone banks would have had a shortfall in daily (weekly) liquidity 
after servicing redemptions, had they kept pre-reform liquidity levels. But these 
marginal funds managed to have positive actual excess daily and weekly liquidity 
which could largely be attributed to the 2010 Amendments because of their binding 
minimum liquidity requirements.  
3.3.3 Factors Influencing MMF Liquidity Holdings 
The 2010 Amendments have a general liquidity requirement which requires that 
the fund management and board of directors consider the redemption behaviour of 
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their investors. This is called the “know your investors” rule. Depending upon the 
volatility of shareholder redemptions, a fund must hold greater liquidity than that 
required by the daily and weekly minimum levels mandated by the 2010 
Amendments. Consistent with this requirement, most funds in our sample hold more 
liquidity than the regulatory minimum.  
In this section, we assess the factors that influence the funds’ decision to hold 
higher liquidity than required with the following monthly fixed effects model, 
WLiqft = αf   + β1 FlowVolft-1+ β2 ExpOutflowsft-1+ β3 ExpInflowsft -1  
   + β4 PortVolft -1 + β5 InstShareft-1 + β6 Sizeft-1 + εft  eq. (1) 
 
The dependent variable is weekly liquidity, WLiqft measured as before. The main 
explanatory variables include FlowVolft, which measures the risk the funds face due 
to shareholders’ behaviour (uncertainty of inflows/outflows) and PortVolft, which 
measures the extent to which a fund’s excess yield changes from month to month. 
Since we expect those funds that anticipate higher outflows to hold more liquidity 
we also employ ExpOutflowsft to capture a fund’s expected redemption levels. In 
addition, we analyse how the funds adjust their liquidity levels if they expect more 
subscriptions, ExpInflowsft.  
The literature argues that investors respond differently in tranquil and crisis times 
(Jacklin and Bhattacharya 1988; Jank and Wedow 2015). Therefore, we divide our 
sample into “Calm” (September-December 2012)15 and “Crisis” (June-September 
2011) periods. We assess how the above-mentioned factors influence the weekly and 
                                                          
15 Ideally, we would like to analyze the period from February to May 2011 as the “Calm” period, as 
we later would in the rest of paper, it is not possible to do so here because we use November 2010 to 
May 2011 to calculate the explanatory variables used in the regression analysis. Therefore, instead 
we use September to December 2012 for the “Calm” period. 
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daily liquidity of the funds.  In all regressions, we control for fund size, Sizeft and 
institutional share, InstShareft. 
Table 3.3 displays our results for weekly liquidity. We estimate eq. (1) first using 
fund fixed effects (columns 1 and 3) and then with fund and time fixed effects 
(columns 2 and 4) for both crisis and calm periods. We find that during the crisis 
prime MMFs with riskier portfolios and higher expected outflows increase their 
weekly liquidity levels. This is in line with Witmer (2018) who finds that funds that 
are more vulnerable to runs hold more liquidity. 
 This demonstrates that funds with higher portfolio risk and redemption risk have 
a more cautious attitude in stressful times and respond by actively adjusting their 
liquidity levels. Interestingly, the funds with higher flow volatility have lower 
liquidity levels, which is counterintuitive. A possible explanation is that the funds 
that have witnessed larger changes in net inflows in the past are those who faced 
larger redemptions which left them with lower liquidity.  
Next, we look at the “Calm” period. We choose this to be between September and 
December 2012 because we need several months of data to compute portfolio 
volatility and we aim to avoid any overlap between the crisis and calm periods. 
Similar to the crisis period, funds that expect higher outflows hold more liquidity to 
meet redemptions. However, differently from the crisis period, the coefficient of 
PortVolft is now negative, probably indicating that portfolio risk is not believed to 
pose serious liquidity shortages. The funds that serve investors with highly 
unpredictable investment behaviour are left with lower liquidity during calm periods 
as well. The coefficients of Sizeft and InstShareft are insignificant.  
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In Table 3.4 we repeat the analysis for daily liquidity. Results are similar to those 
for weekly liquidity with a few exceptions. During crises, consistent with previous 
findings, funds keep more daily liquid assets if they expect higher outflows and hold 
a riskier portfolio. The funds serving a more volatile shareholder base tend to have 
lower daily liquidity. Finally, we find some evidence that funds with bigger size 
seem to have more liquidity, but it disappears when we control for time fixed effects.   
Our results are robust to an alternative definition of weekly and daily liquidity 
which includes cash (see appendix A2 and A3) and to the addition of a lagged 
dependent variable among the regressors to control for possible persistence in 
liquidity levels (see appendix A4 and A5). In addition, because we estimate the 
variables ExpOutflowsft and ExpInflowsft using a regression, our results might suffer 
from generated regressor bias (Pagan 1984). We correct for this by calculating 
standard errors using the bootstrap procedure to address the uncertainty related to the 
first-stage regression and find that our results are robust (see appendix A6 and A7).   
3.3.4 Investors’ Response to Liquidity   
In this section, we examine the redemption behaviour of MMF shareholders in 
response to the level of fund liquidity. We investigate whether higher liquidity 
signals health, boosting investor confidence in the fund and providing protection 
against panic-driven runs.  
There is abundant literature on the negative effects of outflows on remaining 
investors in the fund (Edelen 1999; Nanda et al. 2000).  Therefore, there is an 
incentive to withdraw earlier than others which leads to “self-fulfilling runs”. Jank 
and Wedow (2015), with a sample of German money funds, show that the funds with 
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lower liquidity have lower outflows in bad times, but also experience lower inflows 
during good times. In other words, liquidity, which may come at the cost of lower 
yields, may or may not be attractive to investors depending on market conditions. 
However, Jank and Wedow (2015) do not differentiate between low risk and high 
risk funds. It is plausible to expect that investors may respond differently to liquidity 
when the fund is riskier. We extend their analysis by studying the role of fund 
liquidity in tandem with the level of credit risk in the funds. We estimate the 
following monthly panel fixed effects, 
NetInflowsft = αf   + β1 WLiqft -1+ β2 EZBft -1+ β3 Low EZBf * WLiqft-1  
 + β4 High EZBf * WLiqft-1 + β5 WALft-1  + β6 InstShareft-1  
 + β7 NetYieldft-1 + β8 ExRatioft-1 + β9 NetInflowsft-1 + εft   eq. (2) 
 
The dependent variable across all regressions is NetInflowsft. All other variables 
are defined as before. Table 3.5 shows the results. We estimate eq. (2) using fund 
fixed effects in columns 1 and 3 and add time fixed effects as well in columns 2 and 
4 for both crisis and calm periods. We find that during tranquil times (columns 1 and 
2) fund liquidity and net inflows have a negative but not statistically significant 
relationship. We use Eurozone bank exposure, EZBft as a measure of portfolio credit 
risk. Consistent with the results of Chernenko and Sunderam (2014) the funds with 
higher EZBft share in their portfolio, attract more investors in good times as this 
would generate higher yields. We also interact the fund’s liquidity with dummies 
that identify low and high exposure to Eurozone banks. We do so to test whether 
investors’ response to liquidity varies depending on the level of credit risk. However, 
the coefficient of both interaction terms is not statistically significant. Consistent 
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with the performance-flow relationship documented in the literature,16 we observe 
that a fund receives higher inflows if it has invested in longer term securities, as 
measured by the weighted average life (WALft) of the fund. Furthermore, the 
proportion of institutional investors among the fund’s shareholders is negative and 
highly significant. A possible explanation is that such investors use these funds for 
temporary cash management, and hence withdraw more frequently than other 
investors to meet short-term liquidity needs.  
We repeat the analysis between June and September 2011 when the sovereign 
debt crisis worsened. In line with the findings of Jank and Wedow (2015) and Witmer 
(2018) the coefficient of liquidity is negative in calm periods and positive in a crisis 
(model 3 and 4). This suggests that, in a crisis, liquidity helps contain redemptions 
while this is not the case in normal market conditions. However, although the sign 
of the liquidity coefficient is as expected, in our analysis it is not statistically 
significant probably due to our smaller sample size. 
The exposure to Eurozone banks now turns negative and significant, which 
shows that funds with higher credit risk consistently face higher redemption pressure 
during the crisis.  Moreover, higher liquidity does not appear to reduce outflows 
when the exposure to Eurozone banks is high. In fact, the coefficient of the 
interaction term High EZB*WLiq is negative and significant. But when we look at 
the overall effect of liquidity in high credit risk funds through a Wald test on 
WLiq*(1+ EZB) we confirm that net inflows do not appear to be related to liquidity 
                                                          
16 See, for instance, Chernenko and Sunderam (2014), Christoffersen (2001), Christoffersen and 
Musto (2002), Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2013), Jank and Wedow (2015) and Collins and Gallagher 
(2016). 
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(see appendix A10). More specifically, if the source of risk is fund-specific, higher 
liquidity does not help to contain redemptions.  
In addition, we look at how net inflows are affected by management fees, as 
proxied by the funds’ expense ratio. We find the expense ratio to influence net 
inflows positively during the crisis. This may be because higher fees identify actively 
managed funds which may give more confidence to investors about the funds’ ability 
to outperform their peers under uncertain market conditions (Morningstar 2015).  
We repeat the above analysis with daily liquidity. Results are reported in table 
3.6 and are in line with those obtained with weekly liquidity. An exception is the 
negative and significant coefficient of daily liquidity in the calm period. This 
suggests that daily liquidity is not regarded positively by investors when the markets 
are stable. Higher liquidity leads to lower returns and investors seek riskier 
investments to boost yields. However, the result is not confirmed in our robustness 
tests. These are based on revised liquidity measures that include cash holdings.  All 
the other main results are confirmed (see appendix A8 and A9).  
The design of the model is so that one might argue that the sub-sample periods 
(Calm and Crisis) have been defined based on the dependent variable so that in one 
period we mainly explain inflows and in the other we mainly explain outflows (see 
Figure 3.5). So, the distribution of the left-hand-side variable across the sub-sample 
periods may not be comparable. To alleviate this concern, we plot the distribution of 
NetInflowsft (see appendix A11) and find that the distribution of net inflows is evenly 
distributed (bell-shaped) in both Calm and Crisis period. This is because NetInflows 
in Figure 3.5 are not relative to fund size but are stated in aggregate dollar terms. 
However, the dependent variable used here is calculated relative to the lagged net 
58 
 
assets of the funds. Therefore, the dependent variable in this setting is fit for purpose. 
However, to be cautious we conduct further robustness tests using a nested model 
instead of considering sub-sample periods separately and find that the our results are 
confirmed (see appendix A12 and A13). 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This paper explores the changes in the behaviour of MMFs after the introduction 
of new liquidity requirements that are designed to improve the stability of money 
market funds. We see substantial changes in the composition of the funds’ portfolios, 
after reforms. As expected, portfolio liquidity has increased while asset maturity has 
declined. This has led to a safer asset mix and equipped funds to withstand high 
redemption pressure. The finding is corroborated by our counterfactual analysis that 
explores what would have happened if the funds had maintained the same level of 
liquidity they had before the reforms. We observe that during the sovereign debt 
crisis MMFs met redemption pressure easily and had excess liquidity left unused. 
However, the liquidity shocks during the sovereign debt crisis were mild in 
comparison with the post-Lehman events in 2008. So, whether MMFs could 
withstand harsh scenarios remains to be tested. In addition to this, even though higher 
liquidity has reduced portfolio risk it has also put a downward pressure on portfolio 
returns which reduces the overall profitability of MMFs. This may have 
consequences for their ability to survive especially in an environment with near zero 
interest rates.  
We also see that MMFs seem to be relatively acquainted with the redemption 
behaviour of their shareholder base and keep higher liquidity when expecting higher 
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redemption pressure. On the other hand, when we investigate the response of 
investors to higher fund liquidity, we find it to be neutral. Instead investors respond 
to the fund’s credit risk. This suggests that investors’ behaviour may be driven more 
by their concerns about the preservation of capital rather than the funds’ ability to 
meet redemptions.  
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Figures 
Figure 3.1: Timeline (Jan 2009 – Dec 2012) 
 
Before reform period includes January to December 2009. Reform period starts from the announcement of reforms in February 2010 to full 
implementation in November 2010. After reform period starts in November 2010, when the N-MFP form data become available, and ends in 
December 2012.  
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of Weighted Average Life (WAL) Before and After the 2010                     
Amendments 
 
This figure shows box-and-whisker plots of WALft across funds by each quarter during Before Reform 
period (January–December2009), and by monthly frequency for a subsample (February – September 
2011) during After Reform period. Rectangles show the interquartile range (IQR), which represent the 
25th to 75th percentile, and the horizontal line in the middle of the rectangle is median. The ends of the 
lines below and above the rectangle represent the minimum and maximum values from Q1 − 1.5 * IQR 
to Q1 and from Q3 to Q3 + 1.5 * IQR, respectively. The observations falling outside of this range, are 
outliers denoted with a dot. (Source: N-Q, N-CSR, N-CSRS, and N-MFP forms data, authors’ own 
calculations.)   
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of Daily Liquidity Before and After the 2010 Amendments 
 
This figure shows box-and-whisker plots of Daily Liquidity (DLiqft) across funds by each quarter during 
Before Reform period (January–December2009), and by monthly frequency for a subsample (February 
– September 2011) during After Reform period. Rectangles show the interquartile range (IQR), which 
represent the 25th to 75th percentile, and the horizontal line in the middle of the rectangle is the median. 
The ends of the lines below and above the rectangle represent the minimum and maximum values from 
Q1 − 1.5 * IQR to Q1 and from Q3 to Q3 + 1.5 * IQR, respectively. The observations falling outside 
of this range, are outliers denoted with a dot. (Source: N-Q, N-CSR, N-CSRS, and N-MFP forms data, 
authors’ own calculations.) 
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Weekly Liquidity Before and After the 2010 Amendments 
 
This figure shows box-and-whisker plots of Weekly Liquidity (WLiqft) across funds by each quarter 
during Before Reform period (January – December2009), and by monthly frequency for a subsample 
(February – September 2011) during After Reform period. Rectangles show the interquartile range 
(IQR), which represent the 25th to 75th percentile, and the horizontal line in the middle of the rectangle 
is the median. The ends of the lines below and above the rectangle represent the minimum and 
maximum values from Q1 − 1.5 * IQR to Q1 and from Q3 to Q3 + 1.5 * IQR, respectively. The 
observations falling outside of this range, are outliers denoted with a dot. (Source: N-Q, N-CSR, N-
CSRS, and N-MFP forms data, authors’ own calculations.) 
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Figure 3.5: Aggregate Net Inflows of the US MMFs (Nov 2010 – Dec 2012) 
 
This figure demonstrates aggregate net inflows of money market funds during the sovereign debt crisis 
(June-September 2011) and two calm periods used in this paper (February-May 2011 and September-
December 2012). Aggregate Net Inflows are the sum of money market funds’ net inflows each month. 
(Source: N-MFP forms data, authors’ own calculations).  
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Tables 
Table 3.1: Portfolio Characteristics Before and After 2010 Amendments 
 
The table presents averages of the variables before reforms (“Before” is the period from January-December 2009 with quarterly reported data compiled from the forms N-Q, N-
CSRS and N-CSR filed with SEC), and after reforms (“After” is the period from February-May 2011 with monthly data compiled from the form N-MFP filed with SEC). 
Constrained funds are the funds that held less than 30 percent average weekly liquidity before reforms. Unconstrained funds represent the funds that held more than or equal to 
30 percent average weekly liquidity before reforms. “C-U” represents the difference between the “Constrained” and “Unconstrained” group. Diff is the difference between “After” 
and “Before” reform variables. . DLiqft represents daily liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It includes any security that matures or have a demand feature that 
allows it to be converted to cash within one business day and US Treasury securities of any maturity. WLiqft represents weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net 
assets. It includes (1) any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash within five business days, NonGovLiq ft (2) US government agency 
securities that matures within sixty days, AgcyLiqft, (3) US Treasury securities of any maturity, Treasuryft. WALft is Weighted Average Life calculated as average days to maturity 
weighted by the investment weight of each security. OA0-3m,ft and OA9-13m,ft measure the aggregate investment weight of portfolio securities maturing within 0-3 months maturities 
and 9-13 months, respectively.   Spread0-3m,ft measures the difference between weighted issuer yield of securities maturing within 3 months, and 3-month treasury bill. Spread9-
13m,ft   measures difference between weighted issuer yield of securities maturing within 9-13 months and 12-month treasury bill. PortRiskft measures difference between gross 
yield of the fund portfolio and 1-month Treasury bill. NetAssetsft is the value of net assets reported on monthly and quarterly forms. It is equal to the total value of the fund’s 
securities plus other assets less liabilities. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Constrained Funds (C) Unconstrained Funds (U) “C-U” 
 Before After Diff Before After Diff Before After Diff 
Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
DLiqft % 11.51*** 23.21*** 11.70*** 25.94*** 32.14*** 6.203** -14.43*** -8.925*** 5.502* 
WLiqft % 19.11*** 41.53*** 22.42*** 39.17*** 45.45*** 6.280** -20.06*** -3.918 16.14*** 
Treasuryft % 2.317*** 5.164*** 2.848*** 3.024*** 2.959*** -0.0644 -0.707 2.205 2.912* 
AgcyLiqft % 3.921*** 2.597*** -1.324 11.34*** 6.034*** -5.305** -7.418*** -3.437*** 3.980** 
NonGovLiqft % 12.87*** 33.84*** 20.97*** 24.48*** 35.51*** 11.03*** -11.60*** -1.664 9.941*** 
WALft (days) 84.60*** 65.95*** -18.65** 44.08*** 60.57*** 16.49*** 40.51*** 5.380 -35.13*** 
OA0-3m,ft % 67.43*** 86.77*** 19.34*** 81.98*** 88.96*** 6.984*** -14.55*** -2.194* 12.35** 
OA9-13m,ft % 9.190*** 2.342*** -6.848*** 10.40* 3.313*** -7.086 -1.209 -0.971** 0.238 
Spread0-3m,ft (bps) 43.13*** 21.42*** -21.71*** 35.03*** 19.95*** -15.07*** 8.102 1.467 -6.635 
Spread9-13m,ft (bps) 58.46*** 95.07*** 36.61* 37.93*** 81.85** 43.92 20.53 13.22 -7.306 
PortRiskft (bps) 53.13*** 28.02*** -25.12*** 43.55*** 25.31*** -18.25*** 9.578 2.707 -6.871 
NetAssetsft ($ bn) 5.389*** 5.359*** -0.0306 3.914*** 4.572*** 0.658 1.475 0.787 -0.688 
No of funds 70 70 70 30 30 30 100 100 100 
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Table 3.2: Excess Liquidity During the Sovereign Debt Crisis – Counterfactual Analysis 
 
The table shows averages of the stated variables during the sovereign debt crisis (June-September 2011). ExDLiqft is the excess daily liquidity calculated as the 
difference between lagged daily liquidity and Outflowsft. C_ExDLiqft is counterfactual excess daily liquidity calculated as the difference between average pre-
reform daily liquidity and Outflowsft. ExWLiqft is the excess weekly liquidity calculated as difference between lagged weekly liquidity and Outflowsft. Outflowsft 
are the negative net inflows during the crisis period. C_ExWLiqft is counterfactual excess weekly liquidity which the funds would have had in the absence of 
reforms. It is calculated as the difference between average pre-reform weekly liquidity and Outflowsft.  “C-U” represents difference between the constrained and 
unconstrained group. Diff is the difference between excess liquidity and counterfactual liquidity. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 Constrained Funds (C) Unconstrained Funds (U) “C-U” 
 ExDLiqft C_ExDLiqft Diff ExDLiqft C_ExDLiqft Diff ExDLiqft C_ExDLiqft Diff 
Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
Daily % 22.34*** 8.985*** 13.46*** 31.58*** 25.31*** 6.365** -9.233*** -16.33*** 7.095** 
 (1.452) (0.878) (1.649) (2.390) (2.174) (3.061) (2.694) (1.955) (3.201) 
          
 ExWLiqft C_ExWLiqft Diff ExWLiqft C_ExWLiqft Diff ExWLiqft C_ExWLiqft Diff 
          
Weekly % 40.53*** 16.58*** 24.05*** 47.39*** 39.91*** 7.580** -6.858*** -23.32*** 16.47*** 
 (1.318) (1.365) (1.978) (2.344) (3.126) (3.378) (2.515) (2.916) (3.717) 
          
No of funds 70 70 70 30 30 30 100 100 100 
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Table 3.3: Know Your Investor (Weekly Liquidity) 
 
This table presents results for panel regressions. We include time fixed effects in Columns 1 and 3, we additionally 
control for fund fixed effects in Columns 2 and 4. The analysis is divided into “Crisis” (June- September 2011) and 
“Calm” (September-December 2012) period. Ideally, we would like to analyse the period from February-May 2011 
for “Calm” period, as we later would in the rest of paper, it is not possible to do it here because we use November 
2010 – May 2011 to calculate the explanatory variables used in the regressions. The dependent variable is WLiqft. It 
represents weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It includes any security that matures or has 
a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash within five business days, US government agency securities 
that mature within sixty days, and US Treasury securities of any maturity. FlowVolft is rolling standard deviation of 
NetInflowsft of a fund with fixed window of seven months (window starts from November 2010). NetInflowsft is the 
difference between monthly subscriptions and redemptions scaled by lagged net assets. The ExpOutflowsft are the 
forecasted outflows. ExpInflowsft are forecasted inflows. PortVolft is rolling standard deviation of PortRiskft of a fund 
with fixed window of seven months. Sizeft is log of net assets. InstShareft is the percentage of a fund’s net assets held 
by institutional shareholders. All variables except WLiqft and Sizeft are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. In all 
regressions, the standard errors are clustered by funds. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
 
 Crisis (June-Sept 2011) Calm (Sept-Dec 2012 
DEP VAR: WLiqft (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
FlowVolft-1 -0.4587** -0.8166*** -0.2015* -0.1852* 
 (0.1942) (0.2114) (0.1071) (0.1110) 
ExpOutflowsft-1 3.0549*** 1.5903* 3.0788** 2.9516** 
 (0.9795) (0.9169) (1.3818) (1.3990) 
ExpInflowsft-1 1.6272 1.7885 6.8922 7.1770 
 (1.2483) (1.1559) (4.9981) (4.6476) 
PortVolft-1 0.8089 1.4093*** -0.8091* -1.0770* 
 (0.5616) (0.5130) (0.4766) (0.5655) 
InstShareft-1 -0.4703 -0.1653 0.1186 0.1571 
 (0.2873) (0.2883) (0.2311) (0.2345) 
Sizeft-1 9.9034 6.4598 -1.5892 -2.0843 
 (6.2114) (5.7791) (6.0458) (6.4534) 
     
Constant -127.1064 -78.7742 80.8676 88.5106 
 (128.8224) (118.7510) (124.1131) (133.1175) 
     
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects N Y N Y 
Adjusted R2 0.8334 0.8468 0.8960 0.8995 
N 560 560 560 560 
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Table 3.4: Know Your Investor (Daily Liquidity) 
 
This table presents results for panel regressions. We include time fixed effects in Columns 1 and 3, we additionally 
control for fund fixed effects in Columns 2 and 4. In some regressions, we add time fixed effects to control for global 
risks. The analysis is divided into “Crisis” (June- September 2011) and “Calm” (September-December 2012) period. 
Ideally, we would like to analyse the period from February-May 2011 for “Calm” period, as we later would in the rest 
of paper, it is not possible to do it here because we use November 2010 – May 2011 to calculate the explanatory 
variables use in the regressions.  Therefore, instead we use September-December 2012 for “Calm” period.  The 
dependent variable is DLiqft. It represents daily liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It includes any 
security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash within one business day and US 
Treasury securities of any maturity. FlowVolft is rolling standard deviation of NetInflowsft of a fund with fixed window 
of seven months (window starts from November 2010). NetInflowsft is the difference between monthly subscriptions 
and redemptions scaled by lagged net assets.The ExpOutflowsft are the forecasted outflows. ExpInflowsft are 
forecasted inflows. PortVolft is rolling standard deviation of PortRiskft of a fund with a fixed window of seven months. 
PortRiskft measures difference between gross yield of the fund portfolio and 1-month Treasury bill. Sizeft is log of net 
assets. InstShareft is the percentage of a fund’s net assets held by institutional shareholders. All variables except DLiqft 
and Sizeft are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered by funds. 
Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Crisis (June-Sept 2011) Calm (Sept-Dec 2012 
DEP VAR: DLiqft (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
FlowVolft-1 -0.2548 -0.5220*** -0.2066* -0.2032* 
 (0.1949) (0.1975) (0.1235) (0.1166) 
ExpOutflowsft-1 2.3594*** 1.3401* 0.3974 0.1220 
 (0.8891) (0.7990) (1.1097) (1.1336) 
ExpInflowsft-1 0.9645 0.4171 2.0704 1.8162 
 (0.9145) (0.8803) (1.3019) (1.4208) 
PortVolft-1 0.8473 1.2535** -0.5932 -0.9368* 
 (0.5244) (0.5859) (0.4074) (0.5497) 
InstShareft-1 -0.0077 0.1061 0.2767 0.3359** 
 (0.2957) (0.2643) (0.1740) (0.1655) 
Sizeft-1 10.4631* 9.3625 7.0843* 6.3957 
 (6.0377) (5.7108) (3.8627) (4.2376) 
     
Constant -192.2726 -180.4398 -135.3105* -125.1017 
 (124.0374) (116.3412) (78.4758) (86.4692) 
     
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects N Y N Y 
Adjusted R2 0.791 0.808 0.848 0.851 
N 560 560 560 560 
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Table 3.5: Investor Response to Weekly Liquidity  
 
The table presents results of panel regressions. We include fund fixed effects in Columns 1 and 3, we additionally 
control for time fixed effects in Columns 2 and 4.  The analysis is divided into “Calm” (February-May 2011) and 
“Crisis” (June- September 2011) period. The dependent variable is NetInflowsft. NetInflowsft is the difference between 
monthly subscriptions and redemptions scaled by lagged net assets. WLiqft represents weekly liquid assets of a fund 
as a percentage of its net assets. It includes any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be 
converted to cash within five business days, US government agency securities that mature within sixty days, and US 
Treasury securities of any maturity. EZBft is share of a fund’s portfolio invested in Eurozone banks that were part of 
2011 stress tests.  We divide the funds into low, medium and high terciles based on fund portfolio invested in Eurozone 
banks, Low EZBf and High EZBf represent funds with lowest and highest EZBft tercile, respectively. InstShareft is the 
percentage of a fund’s net assets held by institutional shareholders. WALft is Weighted Average Life calculated as 
remaining time to maturity of the investment, weighted by its investment weight in fund portfolio. NetYieldft is the 
value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of fund classes as reported on N-MFP forms. ExRatioft is the expense 
ratio of funds, calculated as a difference between gross yield and net yield. GrossYield is the value-weighted average 
of issuer yields. NetInflowsft, NetYieldft and ExRatioft are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile to remove outliers. In 
all regressions, the standard errors are clustered by funds. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
 
 Calm (Feb-May 2011)  Crisis (Jun-Sept 2011) 
DEP VAR: NetInflowsft (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
WLiqft-1 -0.0392 -0.0523 0.0215 0.0497 
 (0.0652) (0.0666) (0.0645) (0.0622) 
EZBft-1 0.2493*** 0.2336** -0.2800* -0.3114* 
 (0.0887) (0.0952) (0.1456) (0.1633) 
Low EZBf  *  WLiqft-1 0.0537 0.0571 -0.0260 -0.0175 
 (0.0483) (0.0471) (0.0269) (0.0243) 
High EZBf  *  WLiqft-1 -0.0323 -0.0344 -0.0432*** -0.0345** 
 (0.0283) (0.0280) (0.0156) (0.0158) 
WALft-1 0.0770** 0.0728** 0.0346 0.0207 
 (0.0376) (0.0365) (0.0608) (0.0593) 
InstShareft-1 -1.3844*** -1.3876*** -1.2073** -1.0699** 
 (0.1977) (0.1985) (0.5210) (0.5105) 
NetYieldft-1 0.2184 0.2227 -0.2985 0.1172 
 (0.3087) (0.3192) (0.4043) (0.4204) 
ExRatioft-1 0.1612 0.1761 0.3114** 0.5058*** 
 (0.1288) (0.1365) (0.1526) (0.1528) 
NetInflowsft-1 -0.1096 -0.1280* 0.0917 0.0587 
 (0.0729) (0.0721) (0.0829) (0.0764) 
     
Constant 79.2503*** 80.3660*** 77.6241** 61.1075* 
 (13.6314) (13.8027) (35.4433) (34.6894) 
     
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects N Y N Y 
Adjusted R2 0.0770 0.0863 0.0882 0.131 
N 639 639 654 654 
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Table 3.6: Investor Response to Daily Liquidity  
 
The table presents results of panel regressions. We include fund fixed effects in Columns 1 and 3, we 
additionally control for time fixed effects in Columns 2 and 4.  The analysis is divided into “Calm” 
(February-May 2011) and “Crisis” (June- September 2011) period. The dependent variable is 
NetInflowsft. NetInflowsft is the difference between monthly subscriptions and redemptions scaled by 
lagged net assets. DLiqft represents daily liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It 
includes (1) any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash 
within one business day (2) US Treasury securities of any maturity. EZBft is share of a fund’s portfolio 
invested in Eurozone banks that were part of 2011 stress tests.  We divide the funds into low, medium 
and high terciles based on fund portfolio invested in Eurozone banks, Low EZBf and High EZBf 
represent funds with lowest and highest EZBft tercile, respectively. InstShareft is the percentage of a 
fund’s net assets held by institutional shareholders. WALft is Weighted Average Life calculated as 
remaining time to maturity of the investment, weighted by its investment weight in fund portfolio. 
NetYieldft is the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of fund classes as reported on N-MFP 
forms. ExRatioft is the expense ratio of funds, calculated as the difference between gross yield and net 
yield. GrossYield is the value-weighted average of issuer yields. NetInflowsft, NetYieldft and 
ExRatioft are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile to remove outliers. In all regressions, the standard 
errors are clustered by funds. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Calm (Feb-May 2011)  Crisis (Jun-Sept 2011) 
DEP VAR: NetInflowsft (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
DLiqft-1 -0.2424** -0.2303** 0.0540 0.0703 
 (0.1050) (0.1062) (0.0582) (0.0574) 
EZBft-1 0.2423*** 0.2060** -0.2623* -0.2975* 
 (0.0852) (0.0916) (0.1462) (0.1608) 
Low EZBf  *  DLiqft-1 0.0863 0.0881 -0.0275 -0.0165 
 (0.0697) (0.0681) (0.0430) (0.0384) 
High EZBf  *  DLiqft-1 -0.0567 -0.0566 -0.0606*** -0.0536** 
 (0.0496) (0.0477) (0.0214) (0.0218) 
WALft-1 0.0565 0.0588 0.0420 0.0205 
 (0.0383) (0.0368) (0.0581) (0.0562) 
InstShareft-1 -1.3043*** -1.2984*** -1.1913** -1.0491** 
 (0.2077) (0.2118) (0.5252) (0.5152) 
NetYieldft-1 0.1918 0.1877 -0.2633 0.1715 
 (0.3211) (0.3260) (0.3957) (0.4155) 
ExRatioft-1 0.2017 0.2034 0.3231** 0.5326*** 
 (0.1347) (0.1367) (0.1513) (0.1554) 
NetInflowsft-1 -0.1179 -0.1277* 0.0941 0.0596 
 (0.0729) (0.0722) (0.0826) (0.0761) 
     
Constant 79.5386*** 79.6795*** 74.7206** 58.8725 
 (14.3400) (14.8374) (36.2219) (35.6690) 
     
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects N Y N Y 
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.107 0.0879 0.133 
N 639 639 654 654 
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Appendix A 
 
A1. Variables Definitions 
 
 
VARIABLE  
 
DEFINITION 
AgcyLiqft (%) The percentage of net assets invested in US government 
agency securities maturing within sixty days. 
C_ExDLiqft (%) =
 DailyLiquidAssetsf,pre−reform̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
NetAssetsf,pre−reform
 −  
Outflowsf,t 
NetAssetsf,t−1
. 
DailyLiquidAssetsft include any security that matures or has 
a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash within 
one business days and US Treasury securities of any 
maturity. 
C_ExWLiqft (%) =
 WeeklyLiquidAssetsf,pre−reform̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
NetAssetsf,pre−reform
 −  
Outflowsf,t 
NetAssetsf,t−1
. 
WeeklyLiquidAssetsft include any security that matures or 
has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash 
within five business days, US government agency securities 
that mature within sixty days, and US Treasury securities of 
any maturity. 
ExRatioft (bps) = GrossYieldft − NetYieldft 
ExDLiqft (%) =
DailyLiquidAssetsf,t−1
netassetsf,t−1
 −  
Outflowsf,t 
netassetsf,t−1
. DailyLiquidAssetsft 
include any security that matures or has a demand feature 
that allows it to be converted to cash within one business 
days and US Treasury securities of any maturity. 
 
ExWLiqft (%) =
WeeklyLiquidAssetsf,t−1
NetAssetsf,t−1
 −  
Outflowsf,t 
NetAssetsf,t−1
. 
WeeklyLiquidAssetsft include any security that matures or 
has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash 
within five business days, US government agency securities 
that mature within sixty days, and US Treasury securities of 
any maturity. 
 
ExpInflowsft (%) = FORECASTED NetInflowsft   if NetInflowsft ≥ 0                            
  FORECASTED NetInflowsft  = α +
 ∑ β1 NetInflowsf,t−n
N=7
n=1 +   ∑ β2 IssuerYieldf,t−n
N=7
n=1  
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ExpOutflowsft (%) = | FORECASTED NetInflowsft|   if NetInflowsft < 0                            
  FORECASTED NetInflowsft  = α +
∑ β1 NetInflowsf,t−n
N=7
n=1 +    ∑ β2 IssuerYieldf,t−n
N=7
n=1  
EZBft (%) =  
∑ OutstandingAmountfi t i∈EZB
∑ OutstandingAmountfit i
,  EZB =
Eurozone Bank Share, this includes banks that were part of 
July 2011 stress tests.  
FlowVolft   (%) = Rolling Standard deviation of NetInflowsft , calculated 
as fixed window of past 7-month observations. 
GrossYieldft (bps) Gross yield is the value-weighted average of issuer yields.   
=  
∑ IssuerYieldit  × OutstandingAmount it
n
i=1
∑ OutstandingAmount it
n
i=1
 
InstShareft (%) The share of fund’s assets in institutional share classes. We 
define institutional share class as the share classes that have 
minimum investment of $ 1,000,000 or that have 
“institutional” in the name of the class.   
IssuerYieldit (bps) The yield of invested security as reported on the form N-
MFP filed with SEC. 
DLiqft (%) It represents daily liquid assets of the fund as a percentage of 
total assets. DailyLiquidAssetsft include any security that 
matures or haa a demand feature that allows it to be 
converted to cash within one business days and US Treasury 
securities of any maturity. 
WLiqft (%) It represents weekly liquid assets of the fund as a percentage 
of total assets. WeeklyLiquidAssetsft include any security 
that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be 
converted to cash within five business days, US government 
agency securities that mature within sixty days, and US 
Treasury securities of any maturity. 
NetAssetsft ($) NetAssetsft is the value of net assets reported on N-MFP 
form. It is the total value of the fund’s securities and other 
assets less liabilities. 
NetInflowsft (%) =
(Subscriptionsft −  Redemptionsft) ∗ 100
NetAssetsft−1
    
NetYieldft (bp) NetYieldft is the value-weighted average of the 7-day net 
yields of fund classes as reported on N-MFP forms 
NonGovLiqft (%) It includes percentage of net assets invested in securities 
maturing within 5 days excluding government and agency 
securities.  
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OA0−3m,ft  (%) The percentage of net assets invested in securities with 
maturities, M≤90days 
OA9−13m,ft (%) The percentage of net assets invested in securities with 
maturities ranging, 270 ≤ M ≤397 days 
PortRiskft (bps) = GrossYieldft − TBILLt 
 ( TBILLt = 4-Week Treasury Bill:  Secondary Market Rate, 
Percent, Monthly) 
PortVol ft (%) = Rolling Standard deviation of PortRiskft , calculated as 
fixed window of past 7-month observations. 
Size ft = log(NetAssetsft) 
Spread0−3m,ft(bps) Spread0−3m,ft measures the difference between weighted 
issuer yield of securities maturing within 3 months and 3-
month treasury bill. 
Spread9−13m,ft Spread9−13m,ft measures the difference between weighted 
issuer yield of securities maturing within 3 months and 12-
month treasury bill. 
Treasuryft (%) The percentage of assets invested in US Treasury securities 
of any maturity. 
WALft  (days) =  
∑ AmortizedCost it     x   TTMit  i
∑ AmortizedCost iti
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A2: Know Your Investor (Weekly Liquidity with Cash) 
This table presents results for panel regressions. We include time fixed effects in Columns 1 and 3, 
we additionally control for fund fixed effects in Columns 2 and 4. In some regressions, we add time 
fixed effects to control for global risks. The analysis is divided into “Crisis” (June- September 2011) 
and “Calm” (September-December 2012) period. Ideally, we would like to analyse the period from 
February-May 2011 for “Calm” period, as we later would in the rest of paper, it is not possible to do 
it here because we use November 2010 – May 2011 to calculate the explanatory variables use in the 
regressions.  Therefore, instead we use September-December 2012 for “Calm” period.  The dependent 
variable is DLiqft. It represents daily liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It includes 
any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash within one 
business day and US Treasury securities of any maturity. FlowVolft is rolling standard deviation of 
NetInflowsft of a fund with fixed window of seven months (window starts from November 2010). 
NetInflowsft is the difference between monthly subscriptions and redemptions scaled by lagged net 
assets.The ExpOutflowsft are the forecasted outflows. ExpInflowsft are forecasted inflows. PortVolft 
is rolling standard deviation of PortRiskft of a fund with a fixed window of seven months. PortRiskft 
measures difference between gross yield of the fund portfolio and 1-month Treasury bill. Sizeft is log 
of net assets. InstShareft is the percentage of a fund’s net assets held by institutional shareholders. All 
variables except DLiqft and Sizeft are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. In all regressions, the 
standard errors are clustered by funds. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 Crisis (June-Sept 2011) Calm (Sept-Dec 2012 
DEP VAR: WLiqft (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
FlowVolft-1 -0.1234 -0.4300** -0.2684** -0.2473** 
 (0.1722) (0.1842) (0.1127) (0.1153) 
ExpOutflowsft-1 2.4292** 1.2389 0.6875 0.7092 
 (0.9445) (0.9013) (1.1987) (1.2223) 
ExpInflowsft-1 1.5513 1.5744 3.4031** 3.1342** 
 (1.1539) (1.1178) (1.3268) (1.2190) 
PortVolft-1 0.6323 1.1854** -0.6544 -1.0110* 
 (0.5621) (0.5329) (0.4689) (0.5567) 
InstShareft-1 -0.1131 0.0931 0.0198 0.0436 
 (0.2493) (0.2598) (0.2017) (0.2179) 
Sizeft-1 8.3473 6.0762 0.9405 0.2342 
 (5.6484) (5.3510) (6.3267) (6.5294) 
     
Constant -118.7629 -88.2366 33.3392 47.1712 
 (117.7341) (111.0752) (129.9848) (134.9401) 
     
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects N Y N Y 
Adjusted R2 0.802 0.812 0.87 0.873 
N 560 560 560 560 
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A3: Know Your Investor (Daily Liquidity with Cash) 
This table presents results for panel regressions. We include time fixed effects in Columns 1 and 3, 
we additionally control for fund fixed effects in Columns 2 and 4. In some regressions, we add time 
fixed effects to control for global risks. The analysis is divided into “Crisis” (June- September 2011) 
and “Calm” (September-December 2012) period. Ideally, we would like to analyse the period from 
February-May 2011 for “Calm” period, as we later would in the rest of paper, it is not possible to do 
it here because we use November 2010 – May 2011 to calculate the explanatory variables use in the 
regressions.  Therefore, instead we use September-December 2012 for “Calm” period.  The dependent 
variable is DLiqft. It represents daily liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It includes 
any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash within one 
business day and US Treasury securities of any maturity. FlowVolft is rolling standard deviation of 
NetInflowsft of a fund with fixed window of seven months (window starts from November 2010). 
NetInflowsft is the difference between monthly subscriptions and redemptions scaled by lagged net 
assets.The ExpOutflowsft are the forecasted outflows. ExpInflowsft are forecasted inflows. PortVolft 
is rolling standard deviation of PortRiskft of a fund with a fixed window of seven months. PortRiskft 
measures difference between gross yield of the fund portfolio and 1-month Treasury bill. Sizeft is log 
of net assets. InstShareft is the percentage of a fund’s net assets held by institutional shareholders. All 
variables except DLiqft and Sizeft are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. In all regressions, the 
standard errors are clustered by funds. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 Crisis (June-Sept 2011) Calm (Sept-Dec 2012 
DEP VAR: DLiqft (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
FlowVolft-1 -0.1505 -0.4444** -0.2085 -0.1974 
 (0.1855) (0.1896) (0.1511) (0.1393) 
ExpOutflowsft-1 1.6813** 1.5438** -3.1208* -3.0298* 
 (0.7240) (0.7444) (1.6063) (1.6658) 
ExpInflowsft-1 1.7225* 1.2963 4.2692* 3.8854 
 (0.9154) (0.9900) (2.4975) (2.5031) 
PortVolft-1 0.4385 0.9679* -0.5202 -1.0664* 
 (0.5436) (0.5821) (0.4604) (0.6001) 
InstShareft-1 -0.0607 0.0488 0.2205 0.2739 
 (0.3213) (0.2959) (0.2333) (0.2309) 
Sizeft-1 11.5545* 11.5018* 10.0191** 8.8662** 
 (6.3570) (5.8398) (4.2732) (4.4671) 
     
Constant -212.0374 -221.7516* -191.2327** -169.9666* 
 (131.3038) (121.0897) (87.5544) (92.3198) 
     
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects N Y N Y 
Adjusted R2 0.832 0.847 0.862 0.865 
N 560 560 560 560 
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A4: Know Your Investor (Weekly Liquidity with lagged dependent variable) 
 
This table presents results for panel regressions. We include time fixed effects to control for global 
risks. The analysis is divided into “Crisis” (June- September 2011) and “Calm” (September-
December 2012) period. Ideally, we would like to analyse the period from February-May 2011 for 
“Calm” period, as we later would in the rest of paper, it is not possible to do it here because we use 
November 2010 – May 2011 to calculate the explanatory variables use in the regressions.  Therefore, 
instead we use September-December 2012 for “Calm” period.   The dependent variable is WLiqCft. 
It represents weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It includes cash (proxied 
by “other assets” reported on N-MFP) any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows 
it to be converted to cash within five business days, US government agency securities that mature 
within sixty days, and US Treasury securities of any maturity. FlowVolft is rolling standard deviation 
of NetInflowsft of a fund with fixed window of seven months (window starts from November 2010). 
NetInflowsft is the difference between monthly subscriptions and redemptions scaled by lagged net 
assets. The ExpOutflowsft are the forecasted outflows. ExpInflowsft are forecasted inflows. PortVolft 
is rolling standard deviation of PortRiskft of a fund with a fixed window of seven months. Sizeft is log 
of net assets. InstShareft is the percentage of a fund’s net assets held by institutional shareholders. All 
variables except WLiqCft and Sizeft are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. In all regressions, the 
standard errors are clustered by funds. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 Crisis (June-Sept 2011) Calm (Sept-Dec 2012 
DEP VAR: WLiqft (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
ExpOutflowsft-1 2.8361*** 1.5561* 3.4643** 3.2422** 
 (0.9790) (0.9189) (1.5728) (1.5739) 
ExpInflowsft-1 1.7722 1.8241 6.8265 7.1818 
 (1.2831) (1.1740) (5.4541) (4.9796) 
PortVolft-1 0.7382 1.3581** -0.8110 -1.0530* 
 (0.5326) (0.5203) (0.4936) (0.5823) 
FlowVolft-1 -0.4692** -0.8099*** -0.2319** -0.2118** 
 (0.1835) (0.2077) (0.0985) (0.1040) 
InstShareft-1 -0.4506 -0.1620 0.1563 0.1877 
 (0.2803) (0.2864) (0.2232) (0.2267) 
Sizeft-1 9.8840 6.4992 -2.0922 -2.4330 
 (6.1215) (5.7578) (6.2232) (6.6082) 
WLiqft-1 0.0808 0.0270 -0.1329 -0.1057 
 (0.0645) (0.0578) (0.0806) (0.0831) 
     
Constant -131.6863 -80.9322 95.9732 99.3015 
 (127.1301) (118.6495) (128.0355) (136.4441) 
     
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects N Y N Y 
Adjusted R2 0.776 0.791 0.861 0.864 
N 560 560 560 560 
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A5: Know Your Investor (Daily Liquidity with lagged dependent variable) 
This table presents results for panel regressions. We include time fixed effects to control for global 
risks. The analysis is divided into “Crisis” (June- September 2011) and “Calm” (September-
December 2012) period. Ideally, we would like to analyse the period from February-May 2011 for 
“Calm” period, as we later would in the rest of paper, it is not possible to do it here because we use 
November 2010 – May 2011 to calculate the explanatory variables use in the regressions.  Therefore, 
instead we use September-December 2012 for “Calm” period.  The dependent variable is DLiqCft. It 
represents daily liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It includes cash cash (proxied 
by “other assets” reported on N-MFP) any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows 
it to be converted to cash within one business day and US Treasury securities of any maturity. 
FlowVolft is rolling standard deviation of NetInflowsft of a fund with fixed window of seven months 
(window starts from November 2010). NetInflowsft is the difference between monthly subscriptions 
and redemptions scaled by lagged net assets.The ExpOutflowsft are the forecasted outflows. 
ExpInflowsft are forecasted inflows. PortVolft is rolling standard deviation of PortRiskft of a fund with 
a fixed window of seven months. Sizeft is log of net assets. InstShareft is the percentage of a fund’s 
net assets held by institutional shareholders. All variables except DLiqCft and Sizeft are winsorized at 
1st and 99th percentile. In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered by funds. Significance levels 
are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Crisis (June-Sept 2011) Calm (Sept-Dec 2012 
DEP VAR: DLiqft (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
ExpOutflowsft-1 2.2192** 1.3335* 0.6146 0.5028 
 (0.8663) (0.7918) (1.0886) (1.1976) 
ExpInflowsft-1 1.0702 0.4555 0.3102 1.7682 
 (0.9446) (0.8976) (2.7633) (3.1352) 
PortVolft-1 0.7516 1.1555* -0.6716 -0.9741* 
 (0.5210) (0.5872) (0.4059) (0.5548) 
FlowVolft-1 -0.2686 -0.5109*** -0.2089* -0.2030* 
 (0.1795) (0.1876) (0.1255) (0.1189) 
InstShareft-1 0.0647 0.1324 0.3063** 0.3269* 
 (0.3090) (0.2739) (0.1485) (0.1780) 
Sizeft-1 9.7080 9.1100 7.2334* 6.2485 
 (5.9402) (5.6667) (4.1998) (4.3881) 
DLiqft-1 0.0981 0.0614 0.0425** -0.0242 
 (0.0829) (0.0760) (0.0210) (0.0317) 
     
Constant -183.5320 -178.1567 -140.9185* -120.8194 
 (121.0716) (114.8052) (84.9440) (89.9820) 
     
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects N Y N Y 
Adjusted R2 0.791 0.807 0.850 0.851 
N 560 560 560 560 
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A6: Know Your Investor (Weekly Liquidity with bootstrapped errors) 
This table presents results for panel regressions. We include time fixed effects in Columns 1 and 3, 
we additionally control for fund fixed effects in Columns 2 and 4. In some regressions, we add time 
fixed effects to control for global risks. The analysis is divided into “Crisis” (June- September 2011) 
and “Calm” (September-December 2012) period. Ideally, we would like to analyse the period from 
February-May 2011 for “Calm” period, as we later would in the rest of paper, it is not possible to do 
it here because we use November 2010 – May 2011 to calculate the explanatory variables use in the 
regressions.  Therefore, instead we use September-December 2012 for “Calm” period.  The dependent 
variable is DLiqft. It represents daily liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It includes 
any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash within one 
business day and US Treasury securities of any maturity. FlowVolft is rolling standard deviation of 
NetInflowsft of a fund with fixed window of seven months (window starts from November 2010). 
NetInflowsft is the difference between monthly subscriptions and redemptions scaled by lagged net 
assets.The ExpOutflowsft are the forecasted outflows. ExpInflowsft are forecasted inflows. PortVolft 
is rolling standard deviation of PortRiskft of a fund with a fixed window of seven months. PortRiskft 
measures difference between gross yield of the fund portfolio and 1-month Treasury bill. Sizeft is log 
of net assets. InstShareft is the percentage of a fund’s net assets held by institutional shareholders. All 
variables except DLiqft and Sizeft are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. In all regressions, the 
standard errors are clustered by funds. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 Crisis (June-Sept 2011) Calm (Sept-Dec 2012 
DEP VAR: WLiqft (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
FlowVolft-1 -0.4587** -0.8166*** -0.2015 -0.1852 
 (0.2019) (0.2203) (0.1277) (0.1387) 
ExpOutflowsft-1 3.0549*** 1.5903* 3.0788* 2.9516* 
 (0.9627) (0.8764) (1.6450) (1.6640) 
ExpInflowsft-1 1.6272 1.7885 6.8922 7.1770 
 (1.2230) (1.0887) (5.5552) (5.1944) 
PortVolft-1 0.8089 1.4093** -0.8091 -1.0770* 
 (0.5556) (0.5499) (0.5003) (0.6009) 
InstShareft-1 -0.4703 -0.1653 0.1186 0.1571 
 (0.2921) (0.2980) (0.2355) (0.2348) 
Sizeft-1 9.9034 6.4598 -1.5892 -2.0843 
 (6.8426) (6.3189) (5.9232) (6.4304) 
     
Constant -127.1064 -78.7742 80.8676 88.5106 
 (138.4347) (124.4361) (121.1377) (133.3507) 
     
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects N Y N Y 
Adjusted R2 0.8334 0.8468 0.8960 0.8995 
N 560 560 560 560 
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A7: Know Your Investor (Daily Liquidity with bootstrapped errors) 
This table presents results for panel regressions. We include time fixed effects in Columns 1 and 3, 
we additionally control for fund fixed effects in Columns 2 and 4. In some regressions, we add time 
fixed effects to control for global risks. The analysis is divided into “Crisis” (June- September 2011) 
and “Calm” (September-December 2012) period. Ideally, we would like to analyse the period from 
February-May 2011 for “Calm” period, as we later would in the rest of paper, it is not possible to do 
it here because we use November 2010 – May 2011 to calculate the explanatory variables use in the 
regressions.  Therefore, instead we use September-December 2012 for “Calm” period.  The dependent 
variable is DLiqft. It represents daily liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It includes 
any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows it to be converted to cash within one 
business day and US Treasury securities of any maturity. FlowVolft is rolling standard deviation of 
NetInflowsft of a fund with fixed window of seven months (window starts from November 2010). 
NetInflowsft is the difference between monthly subscriptions and redemptions scaled by lagged net 
assets.The ExpOutflowsft are the forecasted outflows. ExpInflowsft are forecasted inflows. PortVolft 
is rolling standard deviation of PortRiskft of a fund with a fixed window of seven months. PortRiskft 
measures difference between gross yield of the fund portfolio and 1-month Treasury bill. Sizeft is log 
of net assets. InstShareft is the percentage of a fund’s net assets held by institutional shareholders. All 
variables except DLiqft and Sizeft are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile. In all regressions, the 
standard errors are clustered by funds. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 Crisis (June-Sept 2011) Calm (Sept-Dec 2012 
DEP VAR: DLiqft (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
FlowVolft-1 -0.2548 -0.5220** -0.2066 -0.2032 
 (0.1911) (0.2123) (0.1632) (0.1560) 
ExpOutflowsft-1 2.3594*** 1.3401* 0.3974 0.1220 
 (0.7540) (0.7088) (1.1273) (1.1501) 
ExpInflowsft-1 0.9645 0.4171 2.0704 1.8162 
 (0.8447) (0.8037) (1.4017) (1.4559) 
PortVolft-1 0.8473* 1.2535** -0.5932 -0.9368* 
 (0.4916) (0.5745) (0.4443) (0.5652) 
InstShareft-1 -0.0077 0.1061 0.2767* 0.3359** 
 (0.3497) (0.3237) (0.1675) (0.1619) 
Sizeft-1 10.4631 9.3625 7.0843* 6.3957 
 (6.9788) (6.6223) (3.7143) (4.0986) 
     
Constant -192.2726 -180.4398 -135.3105* -125.1017 
 (147.1772) (135.4477) (77.5191) (86.7373) 
     
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects N Y N Y 
Adjusted R2 0.791 0.808 0.848 0.851 
N 560 560 560 560 
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A8: Investor Response to Weekly Liquidity (with cash) 
The table presents results of panel regressions. We include fund fixed effects in Columns 1 and 3, we 
additionally control for time fixed effects in Columns 2 and 4. The analysis is divided into “Calm” 
(February-May 2011) and “Crisis” (June- September 2011) period. The dependent variable is 
NetInflowsft. NetInflowsft is the difference between monthly subscriptions and redemptions scaled by 
lagged net assets. WLiqCft represents weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. 
It represents weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It includes cash (proxied 
by “other assets” reported on N-MFP) any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows 
it to be converted to cash within five business days, US government agency securities that mature 
within sixty days, and US Treasury securities of any maturity.  EZBft is share of a fund’s portfolio 
invested in Eurozone banks that were part of 2011 stress tests.  We divide the funds into low, medium 
and high terciles based on fund portfolio invested in Eurozone banks, Low EZBf and High EZBf 
represent funds with lowest and highest EZBft tercile, respectively. InstShareft is the percentage of a 
fund’s net assets held by institutional shareholders. WALft is Weighted Average Life calculated as 
remaining time to maturity, TTMit of the investment, weighted by its investment weight in fund 
portfolio. NetYieldft is the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of fund classes as reported 
on N-MFP forms. ExRatioft is the expense ratio of funds, calculated as a difference between gross 
yield and net yield. GrossYieldis the value-weighted average of issuer yields. NetInflowsft, NetYieldft 
and ExRatioft are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile to remove outliers. In all regressions, the 
standard errors are clustered by funds. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 
 Calm (Feb-May 2011)  Crisis (Jun-Sept 2011) 
DEP VAR: NetInflowsft (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
WLiqCft-1 -0.0146 -0.0272 0.0276 0.0378 
 (0.0661) (0.0681) (0.0698) (0.0681) 
EZBft-1 0.2465*** 0.2355** -0.2768* -0.3182* 
 (0.0898) (0.0964) (0.1457) (0.1654) 
Low EZBf  *  WLiqCft-1 0.0461 0.0496 -0.0272 -0.0174 
 (0.0472) (0.0461) (0.0240) (0.0222) 
High EZBf  *  WLiqCft-1 -0.0324 -0.0336 -0.0431*** -0.0356** 
 (0.0278) (0.0272) (0.0149) (0.0157) 
WALft-1 0.0822** 0.0784** 0.0367 0.0160 
 (0.0356) (0.0343) (0.0595) (0.0598) 
InstShareft-1 -1.3836*** -1.3897*** -1.2075** -1.0754** 
 (0.2006) (0.1992) (0.5205) (0.5098) 
NetYieldft-1 0.2294 0.2418 -0.2964 0.1070 
 (0.3069) (0.3169) (0.4108) (0.4295) 
ExRatioft-1 0.1679 0.1915 0.3162** 0.5046*** 
 (0.1310) (0.1398) (0.1558) (0.1564) 
NetInflowsft-1 -0.1088 -0.1277* 0.0916 0.0587 
 (0.0735) (0.0727) (0.0823) (0.0761) 
     
Constant 77.7502*** 78.6178*** 77.1016** 62.4855* 
 (13.6779) (13.7316) (34.4413) (33.7645) 
     
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects N Y N Y 
Adjusted R2 0.0755 0.0844 0.0889 0.131 
N 639 639 654 654 
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A9: Investor Response to Daily Liquidity (with cash) 
The table presents results of panel regressions. We include fund fixed effects in Columns 1 and 3, we 
additionally control for time fixed effects in Columns 2 and 4. The analysis is divided into “Calm” 
(February-May 2011) and “Crisis” (June- September 2011) period. The dependent variable is 
NetInflowsft. NetInflowsft is the difference between monthly subscriptions and redemptions scaled by 
lagged net assets. DLiqCft represents daily liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It 
represents daily liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It includes cash cash (proxied 
by “other assets” reported on N-MFP) any security that matures or has a demand feature that allows 
it to be converted to cash within one business day and US Treasury securities of any maturity. EZBft 
is share of a fund’s portfolio invested in Eurozone banks that were part of 2011 stress tests.  We divide 
the funds into low, medium and high terciles based on fund portfolio invested in Eurozone banks, 
Low EZBf and High EZBf represent funds with lowest and highest EZBft tercile, respectively. 
InstShareft is the percentage of a fund’s net assets held by institutional shareholders. WALft is 
Weighted Average Life calculated as remaining time to maturity of the investment, weighted by its 
investment weight in fund portfolio. NetYieldft is the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields 
of fund classes as reported on N-MFP forms. ExRatioft is the expense ratio of funds, calculated as a 
difference between gross yield and net yield. GrossYieldft is the value-weighted average of issuer 
yields.  NetInflowsft, NetYieldft and ExRatioft are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile to remove 
outliers. In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered by funds. Significance levels are indicated 
by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Calm (Feb-May 2011) Crisis (Jun-Sept 2011) 
DEP VAR: NetInflowsft (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
DLiqCft-1 -0.0993 -0.0907 0.0695 0.0568 
 (0.0872) (0.0888) (0.0667) (0.0647) 
EZBft-1 0.2485*** 0.2307** -0.2644* -0.3112* 
 (0.0889) (0.0963) (0.1443) (0.1609) 
Low EZBf  *  DLiqCft-1 0.0714 0.0724 -0.0353 -0.0217 
 (0.0689) (0.0674) (0.0349) (0.0318) 
High EZBf  *  DLiqCft-1 -0.0588 -0.0579 -0.0615*** -0.0564*** 
 (0.0415) (0.0399) (0.0202) (0.0213) 
WALft-1 0.0773** 0.0764** 0.0450 0.0172 
 (0.0359) (0.0342) (0.0574) (0.0566) 
InstShareft-1 -1.3534*** -1.3574*** -1.1931** -1.0595** 
 (0.2064) (0.2068) (0.5189) (0.5081) 
NetYieldft-1 0.2195 0.2272 -0.2583 0.1432 
 (0.3094) (0.3173) (0.4084) (0.4243) 
ExRatioft-1 0.2072 0.2160 0.3339** 0.5226*** 
 (0.1378) (0.1422) (0.1573) (0.1574) 
NetInflowsft-1 -0.1112 -0.1265* 0.0938 0.0598 
 (0.0742) (0.0728) (0.0822) (0.0758) 
     
Constant 77.5022*** 77.7979*** 74.0685** 60.7504* 
 (14.2345) (14.3789) (34.5257) (33.7875) 
     
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects N Y N Y 
Adjusted R2 0.0836 0.0901 0.0894 0.132 
N 639 639 654 654 
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A10: Wald Tests 
The table presents p-values for Wald tests conducted for the sum of coefficients of daily/weekly 
liquidity and their interactions with Low and High Eurozone bank share, EZBft tercile reported in 
table 3.5 and 3.6 in section 3.3.4, for models with only fund fixed effects and with both fund and time 
fixed effects. 
Wald test Fund FE only Fund /Time FE  
Daily Liquidity   
  DLiqft-1 + [Low EZBf  *  DLiqft-1] 0.3777 0.2742 
  DLiqft-1 + [High EZBf  *  DLiqft-1] 0.4030 0.2731 
Weekly Liquidity   
  WLiqft-1 + [Low EZBf  *  WLiqft-1] 0.8682 0.42 
  WLiqft-1 + [High EZBf  *  WLiqft-1] 0.9703 0.5194 
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A11: Distribution of Net Inflows in Calm and Crisis 
The figure presents the distribution of NetInflowsft. The left-hand panel shows distribution for “Calm” 
period (February-May 2011) and the right-hand panel shows distribution for “Crisis” period (June- 
September 2011). NetInflowsft is defined as the difference between monthly subscriptions and 
redemptions scaled by lagged net assets. 
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A12. Investor Response to Weekly Liquidity (Nested Model) 
The table presents results of panel regressions. The dependent variable is NetInflowsft. NetInflowsft is the 
difference between monthly subscriptions and redemptions scaled by lagged net assets. CRISISt  dummy takes 
the value of 0 from February-May 2011 for “Calm” period, and 1 from June- September 2011 for crisis period. 
EZBft is share of a fund’s portfolio invested in Eurozone banks that were part of 2011 stress tests. We divide the 
funds into low, medium and high terciles based on fund portfolio invested in Eurozone banks, Low EZBft and 
High EZBft represent funds with lowest and highest EZBft tercile, respectively. WLiqft-1 represents weekly liquid 
assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It includes any security that matures or has a demand feature 
that allows it to be converted to cash within five business days, US government agency securities that mature 
within sixty days, and US Treasury securities of any maturity. InstShareft is the percentage of a fund’s net assets 
held by institutional shareholders. WALft is Weighted Average Life calculated as remaining time to maturity of 
the investment, weighted by its investment weight in fund portfolio. NetYieldft -1 is the value-weighted average 
of the 7-day net yields of fund classes as reported on N-MFP forms. ExRatioft -1 is the expense ratio of funds, 
calculated as a difference between gross yield and net yield. GrossYield is the value-weighted average of issuer 
yields. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile to remove outliers. In all regressions, the standard 
errors are clustered by funds. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
DEP VAR: NetInflowsft (1) (2) 
EZBft-1 0.1507** 0.142* 
 (0.0713) (0.0811) 
EZBft-1* CRISISt -0.3274*** -0.323** 
 (0.1253) (0.131) 
WLiqft-1 0.0062 -0.00294 
 (0.0514) (0.0519) 
WLiqft-1* CRISISt 0.0148 0.0363 
 (0.0588) (0.0582) 
Low EZBft  *   WLiqft-1 * CRISISt 0.0067 0.00803 
 (0.0226) (0.0223) 
High EZBft  *   WLiqft-1 * CRISISt -0.1078** -0.0917** 
 (0.0478) (0.0429) 
NetYieldft-1 0.2481 0.318* 
 (0.1593) (0.165) 
NetYieldft-1* CRISISt -0.3003** -0.226* 
 (0.1237) (0.123) 
ExRatioft-1 -0.0035 0.0138 
 (0.0672) (0.0726) 
ExRatioft-1* CRISISt 0.1497** 0.189*** 
 (0.0709) (0.0708) 
WALft-1 -0.0063 -0.00255  
(0.0307) (0.0311) 
InstShareft-1 -0.6247** -0.603** 
 (0.2666) (0.275) 
NetInflowsft-1 -0.2123*** -0.198*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0399) 
CRISISt 1.9064 -1.149 
 (3.5139) (3.628) 
   
Constant 41.5019** 39.01** 
 (18.4921) (18.90)    
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects N Y 
Adj R-squared 0.0950 0.112 
Observations 1,293 1,293 
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A13. Investor Response to Daily Liquidity (Nested Model) 
The table presents results of panel regressions. The dependent variable is NetInflowsft. NetInflowsft is the 
difference between monthly subscriptions and redemptions scaled by lagged net assets. CRISISt  dummy takes 
the value of 0 from February-May 2011 for “Calm” period, and 1 from June- September 2011 for crisis period. 
EZBft is share of a fund’s portfolio invested in Eurozone banks that were part of 2011 stress tests. We divide the 
funds into low, medium and high terciles based on fund portfolio invested in Eurozone banks, Low EZBft and 
High EZBft represent funds with lowest and highest EZBft tercile, respectively. DLiqft represents daily liquid 
assets of a fund as a percentage of its net assets. It includes (1) any security that matures or have a demand feature 
that allows it to be converted to cash within one business day (2) US treasury securities of any maturity. 
InstShareft is the percentage of a fund’s net assets held by institutional shareholders. WALft is Weighted Average 
Life calculated as remaining time to maturity of the investment, weighted by its investment weight in fund 
portfolio. NetYieldft -1 is the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of fund classes as reported on N-
MFP forms. ExRatioft -1 is the expense ratio of funds, calculated as a difference between gross yield and net yield. 
GrossYield is the value-weighted average of issuer yields. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile 
to remove outliers. In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered by funds. Significance levels are indicated 
by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
DEP VAR:  NetInflowsft (1) (2) 
EZBft-1 0.1575** 0.145* 
 (0.0641) (0.0744) 
EZBft-1* CRISISt -0.3447*** -0.342*** 
 (0.1017) (0.106) 
DLiqft-1 -0.0745 -0.0652 
 (0.0928) (0.0918) 
DLiqft-1* CRISISt 0.1444 0.123 
 (0.0932) (0.0918) 
Low EZBft  *   DLiqft-1 * CRISISt 0.0232 0.0205 
 (0.0296) (0.0295) 
High EZBft  *   DLiqft-1 * CRISISt -0.2260*** -0.169** 
 (0.0679) (0.0660) 
NetYieldft-1 0.2653 0.327* 
 (0.1649) (0.171) 
NetYieldft-1* CRISISt -0.2758** -0.209 
 (0.1265) (0.127) 
ExRatioft-1 0.0122 0.0253 
 (0.0695) (0.0746) 
ExRatioft-1* CRISISt 0.1568** 0.198** 
 (0.0746) (0.0763) 
WALft-1 -0.0037 -0.00194  
(0.0313) (0.0317) 
InstShareft-1 -0.6094** -0.589** 
 (0.2711) (0.275) 
NetInflowsft-1 -0.2063*** -0.193*** 
 (0.0416) (0.0416) 
CRISISt 3.0579 0.0410 
 (2.6254) (2.946) 
   
Constant 39.1510** 37.06* 
 (18.6064) (18.81) 
   
Fund Fixed Effects Y Y 
Time Fixed Effects N Y 
Adj R-squared 0.102 0.115 
Observations 1,293 1,293 
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Chapter 4 Response of MMF Industry to 
the Loss of its Cash-like Nature 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, we focus on assessing the response of MMFs and their 
shareholders to 2016 Amendments. The most notable rules include: (1) the 
imposition of liquidity fee and redemption gates, which allows MMFs to charge a 
redemption fee or suspend redemptions entirely if the liquidity level of a fund drops 
below a certain threshold; (2) Segregation of institutional MMFs from retail MMFs; 
(3) and introduction of floating net asset value for institutional MMFs. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first paper that comprehensively evaluates the impact 
of the 2016 Amendments on the MMF industry.  
Our contributions to the existing literature are as follows: First, we show that in 
the transition period before the new reforms became effective (November 2015 to 
October 2016), the migration of total net assets (TNA) from non-government funds 
to government funds, also documented in Cipriani et al. (2017), is concentrated 
within the sector that has historically proven risky i.e. the prime funds. We do not 
observe significant outflows from municipal MMFs.  
Second, we investigate the characteristics that influence the decision to convert 
to a government fund. This has not been studied before. We document that the 
institutional prime funds that belonged to larger fund families were less likely to 
convert possibly because they can obtain financial backing from their sponsors (Baba 
et al. 2009; McCabe 2010; Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2013; Brady et al. 2012). 
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Specifically, a sponsor can inject liquidity into the fund if a possible breach in the 
regulatory liquidity threshold is anticipated. This would help a fund avoid charging 
a liquidity fee or suspending redemptions which can adversely impact the reputation 
of the sponsor. In addition, we show that funds with higher credit risk were more 
likely to convert as they face a higher probability of outflows (Chari and Jagannathan 
1988; Jacklin and Bhattacharya 1988; Chernenko and Sunderam 2014). This would 
lower the fund’s liquidity reserves and increase the likelihood of eliciting liquidity 
fees and redemption gates. Interestingly, we find that retail prime funds with higher 
risk tend to stay prime funds possibly because retail investors are significantly less 
likely to run during market distress (Gallagher et al. 2015) so such funds are more 
likely to engage in yield seeking behaviour. Furthermore, the complete segregation 
from institutional investors, now required of retail prime funds, will allow such funds 
to reach for yield as their investor base is more stable. 
Third, we examine the response of money market funds to liquidity fees and 
redemption gates. Previous literature explores the impact of liquidity fees on the run-
behaviour of MMF investors. Cipriani et al. (2014) suggest that liquidity fees make 
MMFs more fragile and vulnerable to pre-emptive runs. On the contrary, Lenkey and 
Song (2017) find that liquidity fees strengthen informed investors' incentives to 
remain invested until maturity. We add new perspective to the debate by providing 
empirical evidence of the efforts of institutional MMFs to completely avoid 
redemption gates and liquidity fees by hoarding liquidity and by actively adjusting 
liquidity in tandem with any increases in credit risk. We contrast this with the period 
before the reforms and observe the opposite behaviour. In the pre-reform period, 
MMFs decreased their liquidity simultaneously with an increase in the expected loss. 
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Fourth, this is the first paper that observes that after complete segregation of 
institutional and retail funds there is greater heterogeneity in portfolio composition 
in each type of fund. In addition, we observe distinct fund strategies to guard against 
credit risk and heightened institutional fund competition. Gallagher et al. (2015) 
suggest that greater concentration of institutional investors will result in increased 
demand for liquidity in such funds. We confirm this and show that, as compared to 
retail prime MMFs, institutional prime MMFs hold more liquid portfolios. This leads 
to a safer asset mix and positions funds to be more resilient to unexpected outflows. 
However, this has a negative impact on the institutional funds’ profitability. Further, 
Christoffersen (2001) suggests that institutional funds have stronger price 
competition than retail funds. We see that, within the MMF industry, greater investor 
concentration and the loss of previously attractive money-like features have 
strengthened price competition among institutional funds. This occurs as they 
endeavour to differentiate themselves by offering higher yields to attract investors.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 provides an overview of 
the new regulatory landscape. Section 4.3 describes the data. Section 4.4 presents the 
empirical analysis and results.  Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 Regulatory Landscape 
 
MMFs are regulated under rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
which restricts funds’ investments to short-term, high-quality debt securities. On July 
23, 2014, the SEC announced amendments to rule 2a-7 that governs money market 
funds. These amendments have introduced significant structural and operational 
changes. The SEC built these changes upon the reforms of March 2010 that dealt 
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with credit, liquidity and interest rate risks. The new reforms provided a two-year 
transition period to allow funds to operationally adapt to the new structure whilst 
also giving investors time to evaluate their investment options. The compliance date 
for the funds was October 14, 2016. 
MMFs are primarily divided into three types of funds based on the type of 
portfolio securities held. Prime MMFs invest in a variety of corporate debt securities 
including certificates of deposit, commercial paper, repurchase agreements and 
banker’s acceptances. A government MMF invests at least 99.5 percent (formerly 80 
percent) of its total assets in cash, government securities and/or repurchase 
agreements that are fully collateralized by cash or government securities. A tax-
exempt (also known as municipal) MMF holds non-taxable municipal securities that 
are not taxed by the federal government, nor, in some cases, state and municipalities. 
Depending upon risk characteristics, the new rules apply to each MMF sector 
differently (Table 4.1). Prime and municipal MMFs have structurally changed and 
must comply with several new rules while government MMFs are not significantly 
affected by the reforms.  
The new rules have introduced investor differentiation and floating NAV 
liquidity fee and redemptions gates, enhanced disclosure requirements and enhanced 
stress testing. Institutional funds have been the focus of the stricter regulations. 
Before October 2016, a management company could offer retail and institutional 
share classes for the same portfolio. However, the new reforms have fully segregated 
institutional funds from retail funds, which means that for one portfolio, a 
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management company can offer shares to either retail17 shareholders or institutional 
shareholders, but not both. Furthermore, institutional prime and municipal/tax-
exempt funds are required to transact at floating NAV. This means that a fund must 
use market-based values of their securities to value their portfolio so that the daily 
share prices of the funds now fluctuate with the market. This change addresses the 
first-mover advantage that institutional investors usually gain at the expense of retail 
investors, during a time of crisis. Before the reforms, these funds used the penny 
rounding method and a stable NAV of $1.00. Under the new rules, funds must now 
use basis point rounding with $1.0000 share price. Government and retail money 
market funds continue to use the amortized cost method and/or penny rounding 
method of pricing to maintain a stable NAV.   
In addition, the prime and municipal funds now have the ability to impose 
liquidity fees and redemption gates if certain liquidity thresholds are not met. The 
SEC explains that fees and gates are intended to enhance an MMF’s ability to 
manage heavy redemptions and make redeeming investors pay their share of the cost 
of the liquidity that they receive. Liquidity fee and redemptions gates apply to all 
non-government funds, although government funds can also use these tools at their 
discretion if they have already announced it in their prospectus. If the fund board 
deems it advisable, a money market fund can impose a liquidity fee of up to 2 percent 
of redemption amount when a fund’s weekly liquid assets18 fall below 30 percent of 
                                                          
17 A retail money market fund, under SEC 2016 new rules, is defined as a fund that has policies and 
procedures which would limit beneficial investors of the fund to natural persons (SEC 2014). 
18 Weekly liquid assets include cash, US Treasury securities, government agency securities with 
remaining maturities of 60 days or less, and securities that convert into cash within five business days. 
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its total assets. If the fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below 10 percent, then a fund 
is required to charge a one percent fee on all redemptions. However, if the fund board 
determines that charging a liquidity fee is not in the best interests of the fund or that 
a lower or a higher fee (up to 2 percent) is more effective in alleviating the situation, 
then it can choose to do so. Alternatively, the fund can suspend redemptions for up 
to 10 business days in a 90-day period if a fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below 30 
percent, at the discretion of the fund’s board. Any fee or gate must be lifted 
automatically after weekly liquid assets rise to or above 30 percent, but it can be 
lifted any time before then if the board deems that such a liquidity fee or gate is no 
longer in the best interests of the fund. A gate must be lifted within 10 business days.  
Additionally, the funds are required to provide daily disclosure on their website 
about the fund’s liquidity levels, shareholder inflows and outflows, market-based net 
asset values, use of liquidity fee, redemption gates and sponsor support. The funds 
must also report additional information relevant to assessing money market fund risk 
on the N-MFP2 form. They must also adhere to stronger diversification 
requirements, conduct stress tests to maintain at least 10 percent of weekly liquid 
assets and ensure minimal principal volatility.  
These amendments provide MMFs the tools to deal with heavy redemptions in 
times of distress, alleviate first mover advantage, and improve transparency of their 
risks. The extent to which the regulators have been successful in achieving this 
remains to be seen and is the focus of this paper. We aim to investigate the impact 
of the regulation by assessing the response of money market funds and their investors 
after the reforms.  
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4.3 Data Description 
 
We create a unique dataset comprising detailed portfolio holdings of US money 
market funds which are filed monthly with the SEC monthly over the period from 
January 2014 to March 2017. These filings are publicly available from the SEC 
EDGAR database. We use several other databases to link the issuers of the MMF 
portfolio securities with their parent issuers, countries of domicile and their 
annualized expected loss.  
The amendments to rule 2a-7 that were introduced in May 2010 require MMFs 
to file a monthly report on N-MFP form 19, which includes a detailed schedule of 
portfolio holdings of money market funds, starting from November 2010. Since 
April 2016, the compliance date for reporting requirements, the reporting of 
additional information is required under the new version of the form (N-MFP2).20 
Our sample includes information from both versions of the form. We calculate the 
variables that were not reported on N-MFP form ourselves, and use the information 
reported on the N-MFP2 form for the same variable, after the reforms.  For instance, 
weekly liquidity of a fund is reported on the N-MFP2 form from May 2016 onwards. 
Before this, levels were not required to be reported on the N-MFP form. We calculate 
the weekly liquidity21 ourselves before that period. 
                                                          
19This form provides information about fund-level variables like total net assets, gross yield, net yield 
and monthly shareholders subscriptions and redemptions. In addition, for each security held, it reports 
issuer name, amount of principal, yield, legal maturity date, and the CUSIP number. 
20 The additional information includes cash held, daily and weekly liquidity, floating net asset value, 
and identifiers of the security issuers and more. 
21Weekly liquidity represents weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total assets.  
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For our analysis, we aggregate issuer-level variables to the parent level. Then, 
we assign a country to the parent. For instance, the securities issued by Bank of the 
West, Fortis Funding LLC, Scaldis Capital LLC, Starbird Funding Corporation, as 
well the debt issued by BNP Paribas SA are all aggregated under the parent company 
BNP Paribas SA. The N-MFP form does not specify the parent company and country 
of incorporation of the issuers. We collect this information from a variety of other 
datasets22. We use identifiers of the issuers reported on the forms to link them to 
other datasets. For the securities for which identifiers are missing, we use the names 
of the issuers to merge them with external databases. Using the name of a company 
to link different databases can be tricky. The name of a company in one database 
often differs from the name used in the other. We employ the “fuzzy string matching” 
approach to join the databases. Fuzzy matching allows for non-exact matches to be 
joined. To accomplish this, we use the “n-gram” procedure which decomposes the 
text string into elements of n characters (grams) using a moving window. The n-gram 
algorithm is effective for data with misspellings and large string permutations. One 
caveat of fuzzy matching is the “false positive” challenge. The algorithm tends to 
match names from one database to another database even when the match is not 
completely accurate. To mitigate this concern, we check the matched data line by 
line, by hand, to ensure complete accuracy of the matched observations.  We are able 
                                                          
22We procure information about global ultimate owners (GUO) of issuers from Wharton Research 
Data Services (WRDS), Bloomberg, and Bureau van Dijk’s databases including Amadeus, 
Bankscope, Orbis Bank Focus and Osiris. Also, we obtain business card information from the Global 
Legal Entity Identifier Foundation (GLEIF). GLEIF maintains key reference information that clearly 
identifies legal entities participating in financial transactions. It provides “Level 1” data that has 
information on ‘who is who’, and “Level 2” data that describes ‘who owns whom’. After linking the 
issuers of MMF securities with Level 1 and Level 2 data, we have some issuers for which the 
information is still missing. 
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to obtain information about parents and country of incorporation for the majority of 
the issuers.   
Next, following Collins and Gallagher (2016) we calculate expected loss to 
maturity (ELM) using the default probabilities of issuers obtained from the Risk 
Management Institute (RMI) of the National University of Singapore (see appendix 
B1). The funds for which less than 75 percent of portfolio securities could be 
matched with the default probabilities are removed from the analysis. These 
represent only 5 percent of the funds. On average, 92 percent of the total net assets 
of the prime funds in our sample are matched with default probabilities. To calculate 
the yield spread of money market funds we use US Treasury bill yields which are 
collected from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database. We have 
performed extensive checks and used alternative sources to correct data entry errors. 
For instance, the net yield of the funds provided on the N-MFP form is occasionally 
incorrectly reported. We obtain the correct values for such funds from Bloomberg. 
Our final dataset spans from January 2014 to March 2017. The nature of the 
analysis requires the sample to be divided into several periods (Figure 4.1) depending 
upon the type of analysis done. We divide the data into before-reform (January 2014 
– June 2014) and after-reform (October 2016 – March 2017) to compare fund 
portfolio composition of the funds, the fund liquidity management and shareholder 
response to the new rules. The before-reform period covers the six months 
immediately before the approval of the reforms in July 2014. We select this period 
which is more than two years before the after-reform period to make sure it is not 
affected by the changes that funds undergo during the transition period to comply 
with the new rules. The after-reform period includes the six months from the final 
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compliance month i.e. October 2016 to March 2016. After the announcement of the 
reforms on July 23, 2014 there is approximately a two-year window for the funds to 
make the required changes by the compliance date. We divide this into pre-transition 
and transition periods. Based on graphical evidence (Figure 4.2), the transition period 
consists of one year from November 2015 to October 2016 when the fund industry 
was making the required structural changes. We select six months before this to be 
the pre-transition period (May 2015 to October 2015). This is utilized to test the 
characteristics of the funds that decide to change status from prime to government. 
 
4.4 Empirical Analysis 
 
The primary aim of this paper is to study the response of MMFs and their 
investors to the 2016 Amendments. The regulation is believed to have fundamentally 
altered the basic features that attracted short-term investors to MMFs i.e. intra-day 
liquidity and preservation of capital coupled with higher yield. The possibility of 
losing these qualities and the uncertainty surrounding the impact of the reforms have 
caused massive outflows from the non-government money market funds (Cipriani et 
al. 2017). Most of these assets have migrated to government money market funds. 
Figure 4.2 and Table 4.2 show that from January 2014 to March 2017, the TNA of 
the MMF industry remain constant at around $3 trillion. The TNA within the 
different types of MMFs have, however, changed dramatically. The TNA of prime 
money market funds have decreased by 67 percent from $1,794 billion to $599 
billion. The share of prime fund TNA has dropped by 39 percent down to only 20 
percent of industry TNA in March 2017. Municipal funds have dropped by 52 
percent to $135 billion. Government funds have increased dramatically to $1,226 
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billion, a 127 percent rise in March 2017. The market share of the government funds 
has increased by 43 percent to 75 percent of the industry TNA. This reduction in the 
TNA of prime funds and increase in government funds shows investors’ preference 
for liquidity and preservation of capital. Figure 4.3 shows the number of each type 
of fund from January 2014 to March 2017.  Prime funds and municipal funds have 
decreased while the number of government funds have increased significantly. This 
indicates that the migration of TNA from non-government MMFs is not only because 
of investors moving their money from prime funds to the existing government funds 
but also because of the funds’ decision to convert to government funds. In section 
4.4.1, we empirically test the statistical significance of the changes in the TNA of 
the funds. 
4.4.1 Changes in Total Net Assets of MMFs  
The 2016 Amendments to rule 2a-7 impose liquidity fee and redemption gates on 
all prime/municipal funds and floating NAV on institutional prime and municipal 
funds. However, these rules do not apply to government funds. Consequently, it 
appears that the non-government funds have transferred a massive amount of assets 
to government funds to evade the new rules which are presumed to thwart the ability 
of investors to make same day withdrawals or do so at a cost. Prime MMFs have 
been popular for providing same-day liquidity, preservation of capital, and higher 
yields. The possibility of losing these features has caused the industry to migrate 
from prime and municipal funds to government funds. An increase in the number of 
government funds (Figure 4.3) indicates that the funds have converted to this 
category. In this scenario, we expect that the funds would be converted within the 
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same family23. Cipriani et al. (2017) also find that most of this transfer is 
concentrated within the same fund family. To account for this, we conduct the 
analysis at a fund family level. 
We investigate the changes in the TNA of the funds after the 2016 Amendments 
using the following panel fixed effects model: 
Yfft =αff + β1 Reformt + µt + εfft                    eq. (1) 
where Yfft represents a fund family’s TNA calculated separately for each category of 
fund and the shareholder type it serves. For instance, we aggregate the TNA of all 
retail prime funds of a fund family separately from all institutional prime funds of 
the family and repeat the process for municipal and government funds of the family 
aggregating the TNA by either retail or institutional fund. So, Yfft represents six 
variables: NAPrimeIfft and NAPrimeRfft which are calculated as a sum of TNA of a 
fund family “ff” invested in all institutional prime funds and all retail prime fund, 
respectively; NAMuniIfft, NAMuniRfft, NAGovtIfft, NAGovtRfft calculated as a sum 
of TNA of a fund family “ff” invested in all institutional municipal funds, all retail 
municipal funds, all institutional government funds and all retail government funds, 
respectively. Before reforms, a fund with an institutional share greater than 99 
percent is identified as an institutional fund, otherwise it is a retail fund. Institutional 
share is the share of a fund’s ownership in institutional share classes. Following 
Chernenko and Sundaram (2014), a share class is considered institutional if it has a 
minimum investment of $ 1,000,000 has “institutional” in the name of the class. 
                                                          
23A fund family is an investment company which invests in one or more money market funds.  A fund 
family is identified by the CIK number of a fund manager as reported on the N-MFP form. Table 4.3 
shows that, in our sample, there is a total of 282 fund families before reforms and 226 families after 
reforms. 
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After reforms, a fund is identified as retail or institutional on the N-MFP2 form, so 
we utilize that information. αff represents fund family fixed effects and enables with 
control for possible endogeneity that might result from a correlation of unobserved 
fund family-specific attributes with the explanatory variables. We add time fixed 
effects, µt, to control for global risks. Reformt takes the value of zero before reforms 
(January 2014 – June 2014), which is the six-month period immediately before the 
reforms were introduced. It takes the value of one from October 2016 to March 2017, 
a period that comprises the six months after the reforms became effective in October 
2016. The industry becomes stable after the compliance date which makes it 
unnecessary to go beyond this six-month period. For consistency, both before- and 
after-reform periods are six months long. εfft is the error term clustered at the fund 
family level. 
Table 4.4 presents the regression results. Columns (1-4) show that β1 for both 
retail and institutional prime/municipal funds is negative and significant indicating 
that the TNA in these two types of funds has decreased significantly. Institutional 
prime and municipal funds’ decrease in TNA indicates the desire to avoid the 
requirements such as redemption gates, liquidity fee and the imposition of floating 
NAV. A liquidity fee is a fee charged against the redemption amount and retained 
by the fund.  It is intended to deter investors from withdrawing shares during stressful 
periods to avoid sudden heavy outflows, boost liquidity levels by injecting cash 
withheld from redemptions, and remove the first mover advantage. It results in a loss 
of capital and lower investor return. A redemption gate is a temporary suspension of 
the redemption of a fund’s shares.  It leads to a loss of liquidity and access to money. 
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While redemption gates and liquidity fees are mutually exclusive, the imposition of 
a liquidity fee can be followed by the imposition of redemption gates. 
The decrease in TNA of institutional funds is consistent with the fact that 
institutional investors are active and tend to withdraw from funds if there is a risk of 
losing unhindered access to money and of loss of capital (Jacklin and Bhattacharya 
1988; Chordia 1996; Greene et al. 2007).  Anecdotal evidence suggests that this 
decrease has partially occurred because of the decision of funds to convert 
themselves into government funds without investors having to withdraw the money. 
This decision is because the institutional funds are serving a more active and volatile 
shareholder base and are expected to be more prone to runs during distress (Wermers 
2011; Schmidt et al. 2016). Therefore, they will have a higher probability of 
imposing liquidity fees or redemption gates. This could taint the reputation of the 
fund family and fund sponsors. Unfortunately, we are not able to separate the impact 
of redemption gates and liquidity fees from the impact of floating NAV in 
institutional funds and other confounding effects.  However, it can be observed 
clearly from the decrease in TNA of retail prime/municipal funds because these 
funds are not subject to floating NAV. Therefore, the reduction in TNA of retail 
funds could be interpreted as the response of investors to redemption gates and 
liquidity fees. However, one must keep in mind that other changes in financial 
markets such as bank reforms (Basel III) may have indirectly influenced the decision 
of investors to some extent. Retail investors have historically been inactive investors. 
Then, one would expect these funds to have less reason to worry about imposing a 
redemption gate or liquidity fee, and therefore have lower reputational risk.  The 
reason for the decrease is possibly because the redemption gates/liquidity fees have 
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changed the nature of money market funds. During calm periods, these funds can be 
treated as money-like, but in distress periods, the investors either cannot redeem, if 
redemptions are suspended, or can withdraw at will, albeit at a possible loss of 
principal if a liquidity fee is imposed.  
Columns (5-6) show that both retail and institutional government funds have 
increased TNA, post reform. Government money market funds may, but are not 
required to, use liquidity fees and redemption gates. In addition, these funds are not 
required to float NAV and can continue to operate at stable NAV. These funds 
maintain the pre-reform nature of money market funds and hence seem to be more 
in-demand after the reforms. So, the transfer has occurred because of i) the investors’ 
decision to move to government funds and ii) the funds’ decision to change their type 
and portfolio composition to become government funds. Next, we empirically test 
whether the increase in the TNA of government funds is in fact due to migration of 
TNA from prime and municipal funds.  
4.4.2 Migration of Total Net Assets of MMFs to Government Funds  
In this section, we investigate the flows between different types of money market 
funds. We conduct the study using the changes in total net assets to capture both i) 
the withdrawals made by shareholders ii) the instances where a fund reclassifies itself 
from prime/municipal to government. Conversely, if we use redemptions and 
subscriptions we will miss out the transfer of TNA of a fund to government funds 
that was done by changing the category of funds through broker-dealers without 
requiring investors to withdraw their money. To capture this, the analysis is carried 
out at the fund family level. An increase in a fund family’s government TNA and a 
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decrease in prime and municipal net assets represents a fund reclassification. If the 
changes in the TNA of different types of MMFs is because of the reforms, then we 
would expect the migration of money to remain within the same fund family.  This 
analysis is similar to Cipriani et al. (2017), but we extend the analysis by examining 
the migration of money from retail/institutional prime and municipal funds 
separately to discover which funds respond more sharply.  
We run panel regressions including time and fund family fixed effects. Time-
fixed effects are included to control for global risks. Fund family fixed effects are 
added to observe the within-fund family variation in the total net assets. We run the 
following model over the transition period from November 2015 to October 2016, 
the time when the industry was adjusting to comply with new regulations, 
 
∆NAGovtfft =αff + β1 ∆NAPrimeIfft  + β2  ∆NAPrimeIfft-1  + β3 ∆NAPrimeRfft  + 
β4   ∆NAPrimeRfft-1 + β5 ∆NAMuniIfft  +β6 ∆NAMuniIfft-1 +  β7 ∆NAMuniRfft  + 
     β8   ∆NAMuniRfft-1 +  µt + εfft             eq. (2) 
 
The dependent variable, ∆NAGovtfft, is the monthly change in a fund family’s 
TNA held in government funds. We calculate TNA of each type of fund held by each 
family separately to clearly identify which funds convert to government funds. 
∆NAPrimeIfft and ∆NAPrimeRfft represent the first differences of a fund family’s 
TNA invested in institutional prime and retail prime funds, respectively. 
∆NAMuniIfft, and ∆NAMuniRfft, represent the first differences of a fund family’s 
TNA invested in institutional municipal funds and retail municipal funds, 
respectively. We control for lagged changes in all variables to account for delayed 
transfers.  
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Table 4.5 displays the results for changes in TNA of government funds of a fund 
family in relation to changes in TNA of its prime and municipal funds.  Column 1 
shows that contemporaneous changes in TNA of institutional prime funds, 
∆NAPrimeIfft, is highly statistically significant and is negatively related to changes 
in government TNA of the fund family. This indicates that a fund family’s decrease 
in institutional prime TNA had led to an increase in government TNA. This shows 
that the reforms have led to the migration of funds from prime to government fund. 
The coefficient of ∆NAPrimeIfft is -0.78 which is very high showing that most of the 
increase in government funds is driven by a decrease in a family’s institutional prime 
funds. Additionally, we control for its lagged changes, ∆NAPrimeIfft-1, to capture the 
variation in case there is a delay in transferring assets from one fund to another, i.e. 
the transfer is not contemporaneous. The coefficient is negative and significant, 
hence reinforcing the previous results. Next, the changes in retail prime total net 
assets, ∆NAPrimeRfft show that retail funds are also transferring TNA from prime to 
government. The coefficient is -0.12 which is very small as compared to institutional 
prime funds, suggesting lower variation in ∆NAPrimeRfft because of retail funds. 
The sum of the coefficients, β1 + β2 + β3 is equal to -1.01, indicating almost one-to-one 
migration of assets from prime funds to government funds. Cipriani et al. (2017) find 
a similar relationship.  
On the other hand, coefficients of municipal funds are insignificant. This is 
because municipal funds are inherently different from prime and government funds.  
First, these are not risky like prime funds because they only invest in municipal 
securities issued by local or state governments. Second, it is possibly harder for such 
funds to easily transfer to government funds because these must change status from 
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tax-exempt to taxable funds, as well as change their entire portfolio to government 
securities. Third, the shareholder base of these funds has not proven to be a volatile 
one, so there does not seem to be much incentive to change to a different type of 
fund. The municipal funds seem to be safer than government funds as evidenced 
from the fact that the investors withdrew heavily from government funds during the 
US debt ceiling impasse of 2011. The municipal funds have never been in trouble, 
historically. Cipriani et al. (2017) find that non-government funds migrate their TNA 
to government funds, but we clarify that such migration is statistically significant 
only for prime money market funds.   
It might be the case that a fund family’s increase (decrease) in one type of fund 
always results in a decrease (increase) in the other type. Therefore, we run a placebo 
regression, before reforms from January 2014 – June 2014.24  This is about two years 
before the SEC regulation compliance deadline and therefore is not influenced by 
the transition period. Column 2 shows that during this period, the slope coefficient 
on prime institutional funds’ contemporaneous, changes, ∆NAPrimeIff, and lagged 
changes, ∆NAPrimeIfft-1, is positive and highly significant. This indicates that, 
usually, an increase in government TNA is accompanied by an increase in the TNA 
of institutional prime funds of the same family. Therefore, it is only in the year before 
the compliance date that investors moved their assets from prime to government 
funds within the same family, which indicates that such migration is driven by the 
reforms. The analysis indicates that municipal funds have not changed dramatically 
after the reforms, so the rest of our paper focuses only on prime money market funds.  
                                                          
24 A regression for a one-year sample also produces similar results.  
104 
 
4.4.3 Factors that Influenced Decision of Prime MMFs to Change 
Category  
In this section, we attempt to understand the characteristics of the prime MMFs 
that predict a change to government funds, which has not been analysed before. We 
estimate a pooled probit model over the pre-transition period, from May 2015 – 
October 2015, the six months just before the funds started to make changes to comply 
with the new rules. We choose six months to be consistent with the choice of other 
periods in the paper.25 We estimate the following regression separately for 
institutional and retail prime funds: 
Changef = α + β1 NoOfFundsft + β2 Sizeft + β3 ELMft + β4 FlowVolft + 
           β5 ExRatioft +     β6 WLiqft + εft                                                               eq. (3) 
 
where Changef is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a fund, “f” exits 
prime fund by the compliance deadline of October 2016, otherwise 0. NoOfFundsft 
represents the size of a fund’s family as measured by the number of MMFs a fund 
family manages. Sizeft is the log of total net assets of a fund. ELMft is the expected 
loss at maturity which represents the credit risk of a fund (see appendix B1 for 
calculations). WLiqft is the weekly liquidity which represents a fund’s weekly liquid 
assets of the fund as a percentage of its total assets. FlowVolft is the flow volatility, 
calculated as rolling standard deviation of a fund’s NetInflowsft over a fixed window 
of the past six months, where NetInflowsft are calculated as the difference between 
subscriptions and redemptions. ExRatioft is the expense ratio of a fund, which 
represents the difference between gross yield (a fund’s portfolio yield) and net yield 
                                                          
25We conduct a robustness test on the period from July 2014 to October 2015 which includes the 
whole stretch of time from the approval of 2016 amendments to rule 2a-7 in July 2014 to October 
2015 which is a month before transition period starting in November 2015. We find that the results 
are robust (see appendix B3). 
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(yield paid to a fund’s investor). εft is the error term. We cluster standard errors by 
fund. We run the regression separately for institutional and retail funds. Institutional 
prime funds are subject to stricter requirements than retail prime funds, so we expect 
them to behave differently than retail funds.  
Table 4.6 summarizes the results.26 Columns 1 and 2 represent the coefficients 
and marginal effects of the probit model in eq. (3), for institutional prime funds, 
respectively. In column 2, NoOfFundsft is negative and highly significant. 
Institutional funds that belong to bigger fund families are less likely to change to 
government funds or quit.  Such funds, when in distress, can acquire financial 
support from their sponsor.  McCabe (2010) shows that sponsors’ support slowed 
the investor withdrawals in 2007.  Brady et al. (2012) find that at least 21 prime funds 
received support from their sponsors to avoid “breaking the buck” during the global 
financial crisis. A fund sponsor even though not contractually required to do so, often 
chooses to support an MMF to avoid reputational risk which can have a negative 
impact on the sponsor’s other businesses. Post reforms, the institutional prime funds 
became obligated to use floating NAV so breaking the buck is no longer a concern. 
However, they must impose liquidity fees and redemption gates when liquidity levels 
drop below a certain threshold. However, a fund can avoid liquidity fees and 
redemption gates by obtaining financial support from its sponsors to increase 
liquidity levels.   
The marginal effects of Sizeft are negative and significant indicating that the 
bigger funds are less likely to change their category. Judging from the fact that bigger 
                                                          
26The results are robust to a specification including time-fixed effects (see appendix B2). 
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funds are managing more net assets, these funds have demonstrably higher capability 
to attract and retain investors. Therefore, they are possibly more confident in their 
ability to continue to do so in the post-reform era. Other reasons could be that bigger 
funds are slower to change and are better at managing relationships with their 
shareholders which would allow them to predict outflows more accurately and hence 
be able to manage their liquidity more effectively. Next, the coefficient of ELMft 
which is a fund’s expected loss at maturity, a measure of portfolio credit risk, is 
positive and significant. Institutional prime funds with higher credit risk are more 
likely to change to government funds because funds with higher credit risk have a 
greater possibility to undergo distress (Chari and Jagannathan 1988; Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya 1988; Chernenko and Sunderam 2014), which could lead to higher 
outflows and lower liquidity with an increased likelihood of eliciting liquidity fees 
and redemption gates. Higher credit risk would also give rise to more volatility in a 
fund’s floating NAV which could lead to investor withdrawals because of potential 
loss in the principal invested. Therefore, converting to a government fund would lead 
to a more stable fund with no requirement for floating NAV, redemption gates or 
liquidity fees. The marginal effects of the expense ratio, ExRatioft, weekly liquidity 
WLiqft, and flow volatility, FlowVolft, are insignificant, indicating that these do not 
play a part in a fund’s decision to exit prime funds.  
Columns 3 and 4 represent the coefficients and marginal effects for retail prime 
funds. In Column 4, the coefficient of NoOfFundsft is insignificant indicating that, 
unlike with institutional funds, the size of a fund family is not a determining factor 
in the decision of a retail fund to change category. The coefficient on Sizeft shows 
that the bigger retail funds do not change their category in response to the reforms. 
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This is possibly because such funds have demonstrably higher capacity to attract 
inflows, retain investors and have possibly better relationships with shareholders 
with greater ability to manage outflows and hence liquidity levels. Interestingly, the 
funds with higher ELMft, tend to stay prime funds. This could be because retail funds, 
unlike institutional funds, do not have a very volatile shareholder base. In previous 
episodes of crisis, retail investors remained significantly less likely to withdraw 
during market stress (Gallagher et al. 2015). This is because retail investors do not 
usually have resources to assess the quality of a fund’s portfolio. Therefore, retail 
funds do not have the incentive to keep the credit risk of their portfolio low because 
they are managing slow money. Moreover, the new reforms prohibit institutional 
investors from investing in retail funds which means that the market discipline 
enforced by the institutional investors before reforms has been eliminated. Therefore, 
retail funds can invest in riskier assets without potentially adverse consequences. The 
marginal effects of FlowVolft is positive and significant. Retail funds with higher 
flow volatility are more likely to change to government funds because higher flow 
volatility results in unpredictability of inflows/outflows and hence more volatility in 
liquidity levels. The marginal effects of ExRatioft and WLiqft, are insignificant.  
4.4.4 Changes in Retail vs Institutional Prime Funds 
The requirement of redemption gates and liquidity fees means that after the 
reforms if a fund is subject to heavy withdrawals and its liquidity goes below a 
certain level it can restrict the redemptions for a maximum period of 10 days or 
charge a fee on redemptions. Several funds advertise that they do not plan to impose 
gates nor charge liquidity fees. Therefore, we expect funds to position themselves so 
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that they can avoid scenarios where they might be forced to restrict redemptions. We 
document changes in retail and institutional prime funds’ portfolio composition after 
the reforms. This is the first paper to engage in such analysis. 
Table 4.7 reports the averages and statistical significance of the variables that 
describe the composition of MMF portfolios before reforms (BR) from January 2014 
to June 2014 and after reforms (AR) from October 2016 to March 2017. “Diff” 
represents the difference between “AR” and “BR”. Column 3 shows the differences 
between the averages of the reported variables before and after reforms. The average 
size of an institutional prime fund, NetAssetsft has not changed significantly.
27 The 
funds have increased their weekly liquidity, WLiqft to 67 percent on average, to 
ensure that they do not the breach 30 percent threshold that could lead to imposition 
of redemption gates or liquidity fees. In addition, they have lowered weighted 
average life, WALft which leads to lower average maturity and a more liquid 
portfolio. The assets with longer maturities have largely decreased. On average, the 
expected loss of a fund, ELMft has increased by 2.85 bp indicating that funds are 
taking more risk. Post-reform, the increase in the regulatory burden has increased the 
cost of operations. The new rules have stripped funds of features such as preservation 
of capital and money-like liquidity, making MMFs less attractive than before. To 
attract investors a fund must earn higher yield (Sirri and Tufano 1998; Koppenhaver 
and Sapp 2005), to cover the increased expenses and pay a competitive yield to 
shareholders. To earn higher yield, it must invest in riskier securities (Kacperczyk 
                                                          
27The total net assets of MMFs are known to be positively skewed, which would lead to a biased 
mean. As a robustness test, we calculate the significance of the differences between the median net 
assets, which is also insignificant (see appendix B4). 
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and Schnabl 2013). Next, Spreadft indicates that institutional funds have, in fact, 
increased the portfolio gross yield net of the average government fund gross yield. 
(NetYieldft - GovtNY̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ft) indicates that after accounting for the increases in the treasury 
yield during the period under analysis, the funds are paying a higher yield after the 
reforms (+12.26 bp). Also, the funds are charging higher management fees to meet 
the added cost of the new regulations, as seen from the increase in the expense ratios, 
ExRatioft.  
Column 6 displays the differences in the averages of the variables for retail funds 
before and after the reforms. The retail funds have the similar response in sign and 
significance for all the variables, but the magnitude of the average values differ in 
most cases. Columns 7 and 8 compare these differences in institutional and retail 
funds before and after reforms. After reforms, institutional funds hold more WLiqft 
(+15.55%) than retail funds which is five times more than the difference before 
reforms. These funds also have lower WALft (-15.96 %) than their retail 
counterparts. There was no significant difference in WALft of the funds earlier. The 
difference in the liquidity of these funds is understandable as these have different 
liquidity management goals because of structural differences in the post-reform era. 
Institutional funds serve a more volatile shareholder base and are subject to the 
floating NAV requirement. They must strive to keep the NAV stable which translates 
into maintaining lower risk and a more liquid portfolio. Because they manage hot 
money, they also need higher liquidity to withstand heavy redemption pressure. 
Figure 4.4 shows the average proportion of the total portfolio securities invested in 
each maturity range for institutional and retail funds. The institutional funds seem to 
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have changed WLiqft and WALft by investing a higher proportion of assets in very 
short-term securities that mature within 5 days, and disinvesting in longer maturity 
securities. Conversely, retail funds decrease their short-term investments and invest 
more in securities with maturities >180 days (Figure 4.4) which explains the 
difference in liquidity and WALft. The expected loss, ELMft is not significantly 
different for both types of funds. However, Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show that the source 
of the ELMft for both types of funds is different. Figure 4.5 shows that the ELMft of 
institutional MMFs has increased from all regions including Asia and Pacific, 
Europe, North America and Other. This could be interpreted as a more cautious risk 
management strategy where the funds have diversified the credit risk. Institutional 
MMFs (Figure 4.6) have very slightly increased their investments in Europe, but they 
keep investing roughly the same proportion of their assets in each region as compared 
to before the reforms. Retail MMFs have decreased the total proportion of securities 
invested in Asia and Pacific and Europe and increased their investment in North 
America. 
Institutional funds are earning a lower yield spread, Spreadft, (-8.56 bp) than retail 
funds, which is four times lower than the difference before reforms. However, they 
still pay a higher net yield to their investors, NetYieldft - GovtNYt̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅. These funds are 
able to pay higher yields while earning lower Spreadft by charging lower fees than 
retail funds do. The expense ratio of institutional funds (-19.54 bp) is very low as 
compared to that of retail funds. Christoffersen (2001) demonstrates that 79 percent 
of institutional MMFs waive fees whereas only 55 percent of retail funds do so, 
implying that institutional funds have stronger price competition than retail funds. 
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The expense ratio of institutional funds is approximately seven times lower than the 
difference before reforms. Furthermore, retail funds have less incentive to charge 
lower fees because retail investors are less sensitive to fund performance and tend to 
remain invested in funds that charge higher fees (Christoffersen and Musto 2002). It 
seems that higher investor concentration, stricter rules and loss of the attractive 
features of MMFs have strengthened competition in institutional funds. However, 
other regulations such as those in Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act might be 
affecting the analysed measures as well. Unfortunately, it is not possible to separate 
the impact of these regulations from the impact of SEC regulation. 
In summary, we find that the institutional funds have changed their portfolio 
composition dramatically in the port-reform era. In addition to the structural changes 
imposed by the regulations, the two types of funds have become very different in 
their liquidity positions, maturity structure and competitiveness. Institutional funds 
are foregoing more management fee to pay higher yields to their investors and 
maintain their competitiveness. 
4.4.5 Liquidity Management at MMFs After 2016 Amendments  
In addition to the minimum regulations, in chapter 3, we show that portfolio 
composition and shareholder behaviour determine the levels of liquidity a fund 
holds. They document that higher flow volatility, expected outflows and riskier 
portfolios maintain higher liquidity suggesting that the funds keep a safety cushion 
if they have a higher chance of withdrawals. We extend the analysis by further 
investigating the relationship between contemporaneous changes in liquidity and 
credit risk of a fund. MMFs have several reasons to manage the weekly liquidity of 
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their portfolio actively. First, they must have a regulatory minimum of 30 percent of 
their total assets in weekly liquid assets. Second, new rules require funds to charge 
liquidity fees or suspend redemptions if the weekly liquid assets fall below this 
regulatory minimum. Third, if it has higher risk it must maintain a safety cushion to 
meet redemptions comfortably because during market distress, runs are more severe 
for MMFs that have lower portfolio liquidity (Wermers 2011). We thus test whether 
the funds are managing their liquidity according to their risk profile. The empirical 
model is specified as follows: 
 
∆WLiqft = αf   + β1 ∆ELMft + β2 ELMft-1 + β3 ∆NetInflowsft + 
                   β4 NetInflowsft-1 + εft                                                            eq. (4) 
 
where ∆WLiqft is monthly change in weekly liquidity of fund “f”. αf represents fund 
fixed effects. We include the change in the expected loss of a portfolio, ∆ELMft. This 
is the main regressor of interest. An increase in credit risk raises the likelihood of 
default, which could lead to heavy outflows and hence a higher need for liquid assets. 
Given that funds base their liquidity levels on the portfolio composition and 
redemption behaviour of their investors, we expect any increase in credit risk to be 
accompanied by a contemporaneous growth in liquidity, which should result in a 
positive β1. We include ELMft-1 to account for delayed adjustments in fund liquidity. 
A higher lagged credit risk should encourage funds to hold more liquid holdings. 
Therefore, we expect a positive β2. We add contemporaneous changes in net inflows, 
∆NetInflowsft in the regression to capture variation in liquidity caused by changes in 
funds’ net subscriptions. NetInflowsft is calculated as the difference between 
subscriptions and redemptions. Positive net inflows inject cash in the fund which 
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would result in higher liquidity, while negative net inflows decrease liquidity 
because funds must sell their liquid assets to meet redemptions. We add lagged net 
inflows, NetInflowsft-1 as a control variable to capture possible delays in rebalancing 
the portfolio to achieve the desired liquidity levels.  
One caveat of including ∆ELMft and ∆NetInflowsft as regressors is that there 
might be reverse causality between changes in liquidity, expected loss and net 
inflows. To address this problem, we instrument these variables with their predicted 
values.28 The analysis is conducted separately for institutional and retail funds. We 
further divide the sample into before-reform and after-reform to observe any changes 
in fund behaviour after the introduction of the new rules. 
Table 4.8 presents the results of eq. (4). Column 1 shows regression results for 
institutional prime funds before reforms. The coefficient of ∆ELMft is negative and 
significant indicating that an increase in expected loss results in a decrease of 
portfolio liquidity. In other words, a fund’s liquidity decreases contemporaneously 
as credit risk increases. This is possibly because a fund invests a large proportion of 
its assets in longer maturity instruments to increase the expected loss, which leads to 
a lower proportion of assets invested in short-term liquid assets. It is well 
documented that the funds increase their credit risk to earn higher yields 
(Koppenhaver 1999; Chernenko and Sunderam 2014) to attract more inflows. The 
                                                          
28For NetInflowsft, we estimate the following regression:  ∆NetInflowsf,t  = α +
∑ β1 ∆NetInflowsf,t−n
N=5
n=1 +  ∆NetYieldf,t−1 +  εf,t  where n is the number of lags. To obtain fitted 
values for ∆ELMft the following model is estimated:  ∆ELMf,t  = α + ∑ β1 ∆ELMf,t−n
N=5
n=1 +
  ∆WALf,t−1 +   εf,t. Using fitted values in eq. (4) helps address endogeneity concerns but could lead 
to biased coefficients. We conduct a robustness test by using bootstrapped standard errors and find 
that the results are robust (see appendix B5). Further, we employ a different lag specification to 
calculate the fitted values of the variables and show that the results are robust (see appendix B6). 
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liquid assets have inferior performance (Acharya and Pedersen 2005; Jank and 
Wedow 2015), so a decrease in liquidity boosts returns. MMFs endeavour to reach 
for yields because mutual fund investors react to performance (Sirri and Tufano 
1998; Koppenhaver and Sapp 2005). The lagged expected loss, ELMft-1 is 
insignificant. The control variable ∆NetInflowsft has a positive sign because net 
inflows boost cash reserves resulting in higher liquidity. The lagged net inflows, 
NetInflowsft-1 is insignificant.  One explanation would be that the funds have already 
allocated their cash to assets which would no longer result in any changes in the 
liquidity of a fund. 
In column 2, after reforms, the coefficient of ∆ELMft becomes positive and 
significant. Institutional prime funds grow their liquidity as they raise the credit risk 
of their portfolio. This indicates a more cautious investment management strategy. 
As a fund amplifies its riskiness, it simultaneously boosts its liquidity levels to guard 
against possible distress which could lead to shareholder redemptions. Thus, higher 
liquidity levels show preparedness that would help funds meet redemptions easily 
and mitigate the reputational risk of having to suspend redemptions. The lagged 
credit risk, ELMft-1 is also positive and significant, which reinforces the previous 
finding that funds are actively managing their liquidity in relation to the riskiness of 
their portfolio. Such a response is expected from funds that serve institutional 
investors because these funds are characterized by higher flow volatility (Gallagher 
et al. 2015) and higher likelihood of runs in distress (Schmidt et al. 2016), which 
results in higher demand for liquidity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
paper to show such a contrast in behaviour of institutional MMFs after the 
introduction of redemption gates, liquidity fees and floating NAV. In addition, our 
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results confirm the concern of Gallagher et al. (2015) that greater concentration of 
institutional investors will result in increased demand for liquidity in such funds.  
Column 3 displays the results for eq. (4) for retail prime funds, before reforms.  
As the expected loss increases, retail funds increase their portfolio liquidity which is 
a cautious investment strategy to maintain safe liquidity levels. All control variables 
are insignificant. In column 4, after reforms, the contemporaneous change in 
expected loss, ∆ELMft has an insignificant impact on the liquidity levels of the fund 
which is interesting. Unlike institutional funds, the retail funds do not seem to 
increase liquidity actively post reforms. This is possibly because the market 
discipline enforced by institutional shareholders is eliminated, because after reforms 
retail funds are only offered to “natural persons” who rebalance their portfolio less 
frequently. The control variables ∆NetInflowsft and NetInflowsft-1 are insignificant. 
In summary, in the post-reform period, institutional prime funds have become 
more active in their management of credit risk. They adjust their liquidity levels 
upwards simultaneously with any increases in their credit risk resulting in increased 
safety to control for possible redemption pressure. On the other hand, retail funds 
have become more relaxed in their liquidity management. 
4.4.6 Shareholders’ Response to New Rules  
The new rules have consequences for investors in money market funds. They 
could lose access to capital if redemption gates are applied or incur costs if liquidity 
fees are imposed. So, post reform the institutional investors must be more cautious 
of the credit risk and liquidity levels of the portfolio investments in the MMFs. 
Historically, heavy redemption pressure occurs when the fund’s securities become 
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riskier.29 Many fund families have taken actions to limit the possibility of a 
redemption trigger or avoid it altogether by converting their funds into government 
money market funds, which have no such requirement. 
In this section, we examine the response of each type of shareholder after 
reforms.  We estimate the following panel fixed effects regression: 
NetInflowsft = αf   + β1 ∆ELMft   + β2 ELMft-1   + β3 ∆WLiqft + β4 WLiqft- + 
     β5 Cft-1 + εft                                                        eq. (5) 
 
where the dependent variable NetInflowsft is calculated as a difference between 
monthly subscription and redemptions as a percentage of the lagged total net assets 
of fund “f”. αf represents fund fixed effects. ∆ELMft is the predicted change in the 
expected loss at maturity of a fund’s portfolio and is defined as before. ∆WLiqft is 
the predicted change in weekly liquidity. ELMft-1 and WLiqft-1 are lagged expected 
loss and weekly liquidity, respectively. We include but do not show the following 
control variables represented by Cft-1 matrix that could influence the behaviour of a 
fund’s shareholders: NetYieldft-1, which is the yield earned by funds’ shareholders, 
calculated as the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of the fund share 
classes as reported on N-MFP form; Sizeft, the log of total net assets of a fund;  
ExRatioft, the expense ratio of a fund calculated as the difference between the gross 
yield and the net yield of a fund. Standard errors are clustered by fund.  
                                                          
29For instance, the Lehman Brothers default in September 2008 triggered industry wide redemptions 
and the Reserve Primary funds “broke the buck”. In June 2011, during the sovereign debt crisis, 
investors withdrew heavily from the MMFs with high Eurozone bank exposures because such banks 
were expected to default due to their large holdings of sovereign debt.  Most of these withdrawals 
were made by institutional investors.   
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Table 4.9 presents the results.30 Column 1 shows the results for institutional 
prime funds before reforms. All the main explanatory variables are insignificant. 
This is plausible because MMFs hold high quality short-term debt instruments and 
are governed by rule 2a-7 which ensures stable NAV and low-risk portfolios. This 
enabled MMFs to offer attractive features such as preserving capital, providing 
intraday liquidity coupled with higher yields before reform. With such features, 
investors were not very concerned about the portfolio composition before reforms 
during calm periods. This has changed after reforms. In column 2, we examine the 
response of investors to credit risk and liquidity of a fund portfolio, after reforms. 
We find that investors respond negatively to higher credit risk portfolios. This is 
expected because post-reform, in the event of distress, investors can lose access to 
capital if redemption gates are applied or redeem their money at a cost if a fund 
decides to charge a liquidity fee.  Furthermore, we expect institutional investors to 
be watchful of the changing risk of a fund. We test this by using the contemporaneous 
changes in the expected loss of a fund as an additional regressor, ∆ELMft. The 
coefficient is negative and highly significant. So, institutional investors tend to 
disinvest from funds with higher credit risk. The contemporaneous changes of net 
inflows with changes in expected losses points to the cautious attitude of institutional 
investors to the risk of a portfolio. This prudent behaviour of institutional investors 
is corroborated by Gallagher et al. (2015) who find that after controlling for net 
yields, institutional investors react negatively to increases in gross yield which 
                                                          
30The results presented in table are robust to regression bias (see appendix B7), persistence of net 
inflows (we run a dynamic regression) (see appendix B8) and different specification of 
contemporaneous variables (see appendix B9). 
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represents risk. The weekly liquidity of a fund has become a critical indicator of a 
fund’s health and a determinant of whether a fund is at risk of suspension of 
redemptions. We find that the lagged weekly liquidity, WLiqft -1 is negative and 
highly significant which is consistent with previous studies (Jank and Wedow 2015) 
which find that MMFs with more liquid assets tend to have lower inflows. This is 
because higher liquidity results in lower portfolio yields and therefore reduced net 
yields.  
Columns 3 and 4 shows regression results for retail prime funds. The coefficient 
of lagged expected loss is negative and significant indicating that before reforms 
investors are cautious of the credit risk of a fund’s portfolio. However, ELMft-1 
becomes insignificant after the reforms. This is possibly because retail funds are 
deemed more stable after the reforms as institutional investors are completely 
prohibited from investing in such funds. Therefore, the “hot money” leading to the 
first mover advantage and a possible loss in value of NAV because of the higher 
unpredictability in inflows/outflows has been removed resulting in higher tolerance 
for risk. Weekly contemporaneous change in liquidity, ∆WLiqft  and lagged weekly 
liquidity, WLiqft -1 remain insignificant indicating that retail investors do not take 
liquidity levels into account. 
In summary, institutional investors are now more prudent about the credit risk of 
a fund portfolio. As a result, they withdraw from funds that take on more risk to try 
and avoid being squeezed by redemption gates and liquidity fees. Interestingly, we 
see that retail investors have become more liberal than before and do not respond 
negatively to the risk-taking of funds. This incentivizes retail funds to accumulate 
risk in order to gain higher yields. One must keep in mind that while the 2016 
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Amendments were the primary sources of regulatory restrictions on MMFs, other 
regulatory changes such as Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act might also have 
indirectly affected MMF investors’ decisions.  
4.5 Conclusion  
 
We utilize a unique dataset of detailed portfolio holdings of US money market 
funds filed monthly with the SEC from January 2014 to March 2017 to assess the 
response of MMFs and their investors to the amendments of rule 2a-7 which became 
effective on October 14, 2016. The most notable changes include the introduction of 
investor differentiation, floating net asset value, redemptions gates and liquidity fees. 
This paper investigates the changes in the MMF industry that have occurred after the 
2016 Amendments. We assess the response of institutional and retail money market 
funds and their investors after the reforms. We empirically show that the total net 
assets from prime MMFs have migrated to government MMFs within the same fund 
family indicating the preference of investors for the bank-like function of MMFs. In 
addition, we show that the institutional funds that held more credit risk were more 
likely to migrate, while surprisingly, retail funds with more risk stayed prime funds. 
We also find that the institutional funds have changed their portfolio composition 
dramatically in the post-reform period. The two types of funds have become very 
different in their liquidity positions, maturity structure and competitiveness. 
Institutional funds are foregoing more management fee to pay higher yield to their 
investors to maintain their competitiveness. Moreover, institutional funds have 
become more active in their management of credit risk. As they increase their risk, 
they tend to increase their liquidity to increase the liquidity safety net for a possible 
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redemption pressure. On the other hand, retail funds have become more relaxed in 
their liquidity management possibly because of the elimination of the market 
discipline that was enforced by the presence of institutional investors in their 
shareholder mix. We believe that these changes in the MMF industry could be 
attributed to the regulatory changes to rule 2a-7. However, based on the research 
design of this chapter it is not possible to clearly determine a causal effect between 
the regulatory changes and the observed changes due to multiple confounding effects 
that may have influenced the portfolio characteristics of funds and the response of 
investors to them.  
An interesting question that remains unexplored in this chapter is the influence 
of floating NAV in mitigating risk-taking and runs and the reaction of shareholders 
to this change from previously stable NAV.  
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Figures 
Figure 4.1: Timeline (Jan 2014 – Mar 2017) 
 
This figure shows the timeline for various sample periods used in this paper. Our final dataset spans from January 2014 to March 2017. The before-reform (BR) 
period includes January 2014 to June 2014, a six-month period just before approval of the new rules in July 2014. The after-reform period (AR) includes the 
six months from the final compliance month October 2016 to March 2016.  The transition period consists of a one-year interval from November 2015 to October 
2016 when the MMF industry was making the required structural changes. The pre-transition period is the six months, from May 2015 to October 2015. 
  
2017 2016 2015 2014 
SEC 2a-7 rules 
Compliance 
Oct 2016 
Transition 
Nov 15 – Oct 16 
After Reforms 
Oct 16 – Mar 17 
 
Before Reforms 
Jan 14 – Jun 14 
 
SEC 2a-7 rules 
Approved 
Jul 2014 
 
Pre-Transition 
May 15 – Oct 15 
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Figure 4.2: Aggregate Net Assets of the MMF Industry     
 
This figure shows the evolution of aggregate net assets by the type of MMF over whole sample period 
from January 2014 to March 2017. Prime funds include those funds that report their category as “Prime” 
in item A.10 of the N-MFP form, Government funds includes treasury, government/agency and exempt 
government funds, municipal funds include single state and other tax-exempt funds as reported in item 
A.10 of the N-MFP form. (Source: N-MFP form data; authors’ own calculations).  
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Figure 4.3: Number of Funds in the MMF Industry 
 
This figure shows the evolution of the number of funds by the type of MMF over whole sample period 
from January 2014 to March 2017. Prime funds include those funds that report their category as “Prime” 
in item A.10 of the N-MFP form Government funds includes treasury, government/agency and exempt 
government funds, municipal funds include single state and other tax-exempt funds as reported in item 
A.10 of the N-MFP form. (Source: N-MFP form data; authors’ own calculations).  
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Figure 4.4: Prime MMFs’ Portfolio Maturity Structure by Shareholder Type  
 
This figure displays the average percentage of a fund’s assets maturing within various time intervals by 
the shareholder type of prime MMF i.e. institutional vs retail. To arrive at this, we calculate the 
percentage of a fund’s assets maturing within certain time intervals and calculate the average of this in 
the before-reform and after-reform periods. The before-reform (BR) period includes January 2014 to 
June 2014. The after-reform period (AR) includes six months from the final compliance month, October 
2016, to March 2016.  (Source: N-MFP form data; authors’ own calculations).  
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Figure 4.5: Expected Loss (ELM) by Region  
 
This figure displays the average expected loss of the MMF industry within various regions for 
institutional and retail prime MMFs. To arrive at this, we calculate the ELM of a fund’s portfolio from 
each region, then calculate the average of ELM across all funds within a region for the before-reform 
and after-reform periods. Asia and Pacific includes Austraila, Japan, New Zealand, China, Hong Kong, 
India, Singapore, South Korea and Sri Lanka. Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and 
the United Kingdom. North America includes Canada and the United States. Other includes Mauritius, 
UAE and unclassified securities. The before-reform (BR) period includes January 2014 to June 2014. 
The after-reform period (AR) includes six months from the final compliance month, October 2016, to 
March 2016.  (Source: N-MFP form data; authors’ own calculations).  
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Figure 4.6: Investment Weight of MMFs’ Assets by Region 
 
This figure displays the aggregate assets holding proportion of MMFs invested in each region for 
institutional and retail prime MMFs. Asia and Pacific includes Austraila, Japan, New Zealand, China, 
Hong Kong, India, Singapore, South Korea and Sri Lanka. Europe includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. North America includes Canada and the United States. Other 
includes Mauritius, UAE and unclassified securities. The before-reform (BR) period includes January 
2014 to June 2014. The after-reform period (AR) includes six months from the final compliance month, 
October 2016, to March 2016.  (Source: N-MFP form data; authors’ own calculations).  
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Tables 
Table 4.1: 2016 Amendments by MMF Type 
 
This table summarizes the impact of key amendments in Rule 2a-7, effective from October 2016. *Liquidity fee and redemption gates are 
applied when a fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below the 30 percent of its total assets.   
 
Fund Type Investor Type Liquidity Fee* Redemption Gates* Floating NAV 
Prime Funds 
Municipal Funds 
Institutional  Up to 2% Up to 10 business days Floating  
Retail Up to 2% Up to 10 business days Stable at $1.00 
Government Funds Institutional  None None Stable at $1.00 
Retail 
 
 
*Liquidity fee and redemption gates are applied when a fund’s weekly liquid assets fall below the 30 percent of its total assets.   
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Table 4.2: Total Net Assets and Market Share by MMF Type 
 
This table presents aggregate net assets and market share of MMFs by fund type, before reforms in January 2014 (which is the start of our sample period) and 
after reforms in March 2017, the last month of the sample period. (Source: N-MFP form data; authors’ own calculations).  
 
 January 2014 March 2017 Change  
 Total Net Assets $bn % share $bn % share $bn % share 
Prime 1,794 59 599 20 -1,194 -39 
Municipal 279 9 135 5 -144 -5 
Government 969 32 2,195 75 1,226 +43 
Total 3,042   2,930   -112   
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Table 4.3: Number of Fund Families 
 
This table shows the number of funds families in our sample. Panel A contains the total number of fund families in our sample. Panel B displays the number of 
fund families with at least one fund in each stated category. A fund family is identified by the CIK number of a fund manager reported on N-MFP form. Prime 
funds include those funds that report their category as “Prime” in item A.10 of the N-MFP form. Government funds includes treasury, government/agency and 
exempt government funds, municipal funds include single state and other tax-exempt funds as reported in item A.10 of N-MFP form. The before-reform (BR) 
period includes January 2014 to June 2014. The after-reform period (AR) includes six months from the final compliance month i.e. October 2016 to March 
2016. (Source: N-MFP form data; authors’ own calculations).  
 
Panel A:  Total Number of Fund Families  
  BR AR Diff 
Total Fund Families 282 226 -56 
 
Panel B: Number of Fund Families with at least one Fund in Stated Category 
 BR AR Diff 
Prime  189 69 -120 
Municipal 88 55 -33 
Government 100 161 +61 
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Table 4.4: Changes in Total Net Assets of MMFs 
 
This table shows results of panel regressions including both fund family and time fixed effects. The dependent variable in each column represents the total net 
assets of a fund family invested in the respective category of fund and its type of shareholder base. NAPrimeIfft and NAPrimeRfft represent total net assets of a 
fund family “ff” invested in institutional prime and retail prime funds, respectively. NAMuniIfft, NAMuniRfft, NAGovtIfft and NAGovtRfft are total net assets of 
a fund family invested in institutional municipal funds, retail municipal funds, institutional government funds, and retail government funds, respectively. Reformt 
is a dummy variable which takes the value of zero before reforms (January – June 2014) and one in the after-reform period (October 2016 – March 2017). The 
standard errors are clustered by fund family. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Prime Municipal Government 
 Institutional Retail Institutional Retail Institutional Retail 
DepVar: NAPrimeIfft NAPrimeRfft NAMuniIfft NAMuniRfft NAGovtIfft NAGovtRfft 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Reformt -3.64*** -1.13*** -0.75** -1.55*** 4.29*** 0.14** 
 (0.75) (0.18) (0.30) (0.46) (1.27) (0.06) 
       
Constant 6.13*** 1.78*** 1.80*** 2.53*** 3.28*** 0.38*** 
 (0.42) (0.09) (0.15) (0.23) (0.62) (0.03) 
       
Time FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Family FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.31 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.06 
Observations 1,728 1,044 660 696 1,476 1,080 
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Table 4.5: Migration of Total Net Assets of MMFs to Government MMFs 
 
This table shows results of panel fixed effects regressions including both fund family and time fixed 
effects. The dependent variable, ∆NAGovtfft is the first difference of TNA of a fund family managed by 
its government funds. ∆NAPrimeIfft and ∆NAPrimeRfft represent the first differences of TNA of a fund 
family “ff” managed by its institutional prime and retail prime funds, respectively. ∆NAMuniIfft, and 
∆NAMuniRfft, are the first differences of TNA of a fund family “ff” managed by its institutional 
municipal funds and retail municipal funds, respectively. We include lags of all variables in the 
regression. Column (1) shows results for the transition period starting from November 2015 to October 
2016, which represents one year before the compliance date of the SEC 2016 reforms. Column (2) runs 
a placebo regression during before-reform period from January 2014 toJune 2014.The standard errors 
are clustered by fund family. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Transition Period Placebo Regression 
  (Nov 2015 – Oct 2016)  BR (Jan 2014 – Jun 2014) 
DepVar: ∆NAGovtfft (1)  (2) 
       
∆NAPrimeIfft  -0.78***  0.44*** 
 (0.24)  (0.07) 
∆NAPrimeIfft-1 -0.11*  0.44*** 
 (0.06)  (0.07) 
∆NAPrimeRfft  -0.12**  0.03 
 (0.05)  (0.03) 
∆NAPrimeRfft-1 -0.00  -0.03 
 (0.01)  (0.03) 
∆NAMuniIfft -0.42  0.11 
 (0.47)  (0.12) 
∆NAMuniIfft-1 -0.05  -0.10  
(0.35)  (0.13) 
∆NAMuniRfft 0.32  0.38 
 (0.56)  (0.27) 
∆NAMuniRfft-1 -0.21  0.22 
 (0.42)  (0.19) 
    
Constant 0.05  -0.03** 
 (0.07)  (0.01) 
    
Time FE Y  Y 
Family FE Y  Y 
Adjusted R2 0.26  0.21 
Observations 2,822  1652 
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Table 4.6: Factors that Influenced the Decision of Prime MMFs to Change Category 
 
This table shows results of probit models over the pre-transition period from May 2015 to October 
2015. The dependent variable, Changef is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if a fund changes 
its category from prime fund to government fund or quits the fund management industry, and 0 if the 
fund stays a prime fund. “Coef” represents the coefficients of the probit model. “Marginal” are the 
marginal effects of the probit model. NoOfFundsft represents the number of funds managed by the fund 
family of the fund. Sizeft is the log of total net assets of a fund. ELMft is the expected loss of a fund 
portfolio and is a proxy for credit risk (see appendix B1 for calculation). FlowVolft is the rolling standard 
deviation of a fund’s net inflows over a six-month fixed window. ExRatioft is the expense ratio of a 
fund calculated as the difference between the gross yield and the net yield of a fund. WLiqft is weekly 
liquidity calculated as percentage of a fund’s total assets invested in weekly liquid assets. Weekly liquid 
assets include cash, US Treasury securities, government agency securities with remaining maturities of 
60 days or less, and securities that convert into cash within five business days. Standard errors are 
clustered by fund. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  Institutional   Retail  
DepVar: Changef Coef Marginal  Coef Marginal  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
NoOfFundsft -0.19*** -0.04*** 0.02 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
Sizeft -0.17** -0.04** -0.58*** -0.13*** 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.16) (0.03) 
ELMft (bp)  0.17** 0.04** -0.16*** -0.03*** 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) 
FlowVolft ($) 0.00 0.00 0.10* 0.02* 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) 
ExRatioft (bp) -0.00 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) 
WLiqft (%) 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
     
Constant 3.89**  13.74***  
 (1.94)  (3.42)  
     
Pseudo R2 0.267   0.394  
Observations 724 724 396 396 
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Table 4.7: Changes in Retail vs Institutional Prime MMFs (Averages) 
 
This table presents averages of the variables before reforms (“BR” is the period from January 2014 to June 2014) and after reforms (“AR” is the period from 
October 2016 to March 2017). “Diff” is the difference between “AR” and “BR”. NetAssetsft is equal to the total value of a fund’s securities plus other assets 
less liabilities. ELMft is the expected loss of a fund which is a proxy for the credit risk of a fund (see appendix B1 for calculation). WLiqft is weekly liquidity 
calculated as percentage of a fund’s total assets invested in weekly liquid assets. Weekly liquid assets include cash, US Treasury securities, government agency 
securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or less, and securities that convert into cash within five business days. WALft is the Weighted Average Life, 
calculated as average days to maturity weighted by the investment weight of each security. Spreadft is calculated as the difference between the gross yield of 
the fund’s assets and the 1-month Treasury bill rate. ExRatioft is the expense ratio of a fund calculated as the difference between gross yield (a fund’s portfolio 
yield) and net yield (the yield paid to a fund’s investor). NetYieldft is the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of fund classes as reported on N-MFP 
form. This represents the difference between the gross yield of portfolio less management fee. GovtNY̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ t is the average net yield of government funds each 
month. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  Institutional  Retail Institutional – Retail 
  BR AR Diff BR AR Diff BR AR Diff 
Mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
NetAssetsft ($ bn) 6.41*** 6.17*** -0.23 9.82*** 6.95*** -2.87 -3.42*** -0.78 2.64 
WLiqft (%) 36.71*** 66.74*** 30.03*** 32.96*** 51.19*** 18.23*** 3.75*** 15.55*** 11.80*** 
WALft (days) 67.36*** 34.98*** -32.37*** 66.94*** 50.94*** -16.00*** 0.42 -15.96*** -16.38*** 
ELMft (bp) 5.54*** 8.39*** 2.85*** 6.07*** 8.43*** 2.36*** -0.53** -0.04 0.49 
Spreadft (bp)  7.77*** 23.58*** 15.81*** 10.02*** 32.14*** 22.12*** -2.25*** -8.56*** -6.31*** 
NetYieldft 2.69*** 32.10*** 29.40*** 1.62*** 27.48*** 25.86*** 1.08*** 4.62*** 3.54*** 
NetYieldft - GovtNY̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ t 1.68*** 13.94*** 12.26*** 0.60*** 9.19*** 8.59*** 1.08*** 4.75*** 3.67*** 
ExRatioft (bp) 12.29*** 24.03*** 11.75*** 15.14*** 43.57*** 28.43*** -2.85*** -19.54*** -16.68*** 
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Table 4.8: Liquidity Management at MMFs After the 2016 Amendments  
 
This table presents results for panel fixed effects regressions before reforms (“BR” is the period from 
January 2014 to June 2014) and after reforms (“AR” is the period from October 2016 to March 2017). 
The dependent variable ∆WLiqft the first difference of weekly liquidity, WLiqft. WLiqft is weekly 
liquidity calculated as percentage of a fund’s total assets invested in weekly liquid assets. Weekly liquid 
assets include cash, US Treasury securities, government agency securities with remaining maturities of 
60 days or less, and securities that convert into cash within five business days. ELMft is the expected 
loss of a fund and is a proxy for credit risk (see appendix B1 for calculation). ∆ELMft is the predicted 
value of change in expected loss of a fund. We use fitted values of change in expected loss in order to 
avoid endogeneity issues that could arise due to simultaneity bias resulting from possible bidirectional 
causality of changes in weekly liquidity ∆WLiqft and changes in expected loss, ELMft. NetInflowsft is a 
difference between gross subscriptions and redemptions. We use fitted values of ∆NetInflowsft to avoid 
endogeneity issues that could arise due to simultaneity bias resulting from possible bidirectional 
causality of changes in weekly liquidity, ∆WLiqft and changes in net inflows, ∆NetInflowsft. The 
standard errors are clustered by fund. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
 Institutional  Retail 
DepVar: ∆WLiqft (%) BR AR BR AR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
∆ELMft (bp) -1.54*** 0.72*** 1.06* 0.51 
 (0.55) (0.24) (0.61) (0.54) 
ELMft-1 (bp) 0.18 0.59** 0.48 0.03 
 (0.25) (0.27) (0.38) (0.25) 
∆NetInflowsft (%) 0.25** 0.06 0.16 -0.06 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.27) (0.20) 
NetInflowsft-1 (%) 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.03  
(0.10) (0.07) (0.27) (0.17) 
     
Constant -0.53 -6.15*** -2.46 -1.56 
 (1.32) (1.87) (2.12) (2.00) 
     
Fund FE Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Observations 693 284 398 206 
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Table 4.9: Shareholders’ Response to the 2016 Amendments 
 
This table presents results for panel fixed effects regressions before reforms (“BR” is the period from 
January 2014 to June 2014) and after reforms (“AR” is the period from October 2016 to March 2017). 
The dependent variable is NetInflowsft, calculated as a difference between gross subscriptions and 
redemptions of a fund. ELMft is the expected loss of a fund and is a proxy for credit risk (see appendix 
B1 for calculation). ∆ELMft is the predicted values of changes in loss of a fund. We use fitted values of 
change in expected loss in to avoid endogeneity which could lead to simultaneity bias resulting from 
possible bidirectional causality of NetInflowsft and changes in expected loss. WLiqft is the weekly 
liquidity calculated as total weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total assets. Weekly 
liquid assets include cash, US Treasury securities, government agency securities with remaining 
maturities of 60 days or less, and securities that convert into cash within five business days. ∆WLiqft is 
the predicted values of the changes in the weekly liquidity of a fund. We use fitted values of ∆WLiqft 
to avoid endogeneity issues that could arise from possible bidirectional causality of changes in weekly 
liquidity, ∆WLiqft and net inflows, NetInflowsft. We additionally control but do not report the following 
variables: NetYieldft which is the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of fund classes as 
reported on N-MFP form. This represents the difference between the gross yield of portfolio less 
management fee. ExRatioft which is the expense ratio of a fund calculated as the difference between 
gross yield (a fund’s portfolio yield) and net yield (the yield paid to a fund’s investor). Sizeft calculated 
as the log of total net assets of a fund. The standard errors are clustered by fund. Significance levels are 
indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Institutional Retail 
DepVar: NetInflowsft (%) BR AR BR AR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
∆ELMft (bp) -0.22 -1.17*** -0.47 -0.40 
 (0.45) (0.40) (0.69) (0.44) 
ELMft-1 (bp) -0.40 -0.45* -1.18** -0.28 
 (0.40) (0.23) (0.46) (0.21) 
∆WLiqft (%) 0.10 -0.03 0.13 -0.00 
 (0.10) (0.15) (0.21) (0.15) 
WLiqft -1 (%) 0.04 -0.16*** -0.08 -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.11) (0.06) 
     
Constant -2.78 0.96 5.34 -11.98** 
 (4.42) (6.24) (6.23) (5.26) 
     
Fund FE Y Y Y Y 
Controls  Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R2 0.0159 0.258 0.0228 0.0818 
Observations 606 291 359 209 
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Appendix B 
 
B1: Calculation of Expected Loss at Maturity (ELMft) 
We procure data from Risk Management Institute (RMI) who use the reduced form forward 
intensity model of Duan et al. (2012) to calculate default probabilities for over 66,000 
publicly listed firms around the world. RMI’s PDs have performed well for short-term 
maturity securities from developed countries. RMI’s 2017 technical report, shows the 
accuracy ratios for US, Canada, and Japan to be 0.94, 0.95, and 0.91 at 1-month horizon and 
0.87, 0.83, 0.83 at 1-year, respectively. We match monthly portfolio holdings of prime funds 
issuer-by-issuer and maturity-by-maturity. RMI generates daily forward-looking default 
probabilities (PDs) for issuers for maturities of 1, 3, 6, 12, and 24 months ahead. We match 
the remaining maturities of each security of an issuer with the issuer’s default probability at 
that maturity. We make several assumptions to match the default probabilities and maximize 
issuer coverage. We linearly interpolate default probabilities for every day between the 
maturities obtained from RMI to match the PD with the remaining maturities outside of 
those provided by RMI. We also need probabilities for securities with remaining maturity 
of less than one month. We assume that the security with remaining maturity of one day has 
no risk and therefore has PDit(ttmj = 1) = 0. This allows us to linearly interpolate between 
maturities from one day to 30 days. In addition, we assume that US Treasury, government 
agency and municipal issuers present minimal risk and therefore, have PDit(ttmj) = 0, for 
all values of ttmj. Then, we match annualized default probabilities with the parent firms of 
the issuers obtained from N-MFP form. Once we obtain all PDs, we use them to calculate 
the expected loss of a fund portfolio using the eq. B1. The funds for which less than 75 
percent of their securities could be matched with the default probabilities are removed from 
the analysis. These represent only 5 percent of the funds. On average, 92 percent of the total 
net assets of the prime funds in our sample here matched default probabilities.  
ELMft =  ∑ ∑ wij(1 − rri)PD̃it(ttmj)
J
j=1
I
i=1       eq. (B1) 
f = Fund 
t = Month 
I = Number of issuers in a fund’s portfolio 
J = Number of securities in a fund’s portfolio 
wit = Proportion of a fund’s total assets invested in security “j” issued by issuer “i". 
rri = Recovery Rate [Market convention is 0.40 for corporate issuers except Japanese 
banks for which it is 0.35] 
PDit(ttmj)  = Probability of default for issuer “i" in month “t” for security “j” with 
remaining time to maturity “ttm”. 
PD̃it(ttmj) = 1 − [1 − PDit(ttmj)]
360/ttmj = Annualized probability of default. 
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B2: Factors that Influenced Decision of Prime MMFs to Change Category (with 
Time FE) 
This table shows results of probit models over the pre-transition period from May 2015 to 
October 2015. We control for time fixed effects. The dependent variable, Changef is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if a fund changes its category from prime fund to 
government fund or quits the fund management industry, and 0 if the fund stays a prime fund. 
“Coef” represents the coefficients of the probit model. “Marginal” are the marginal effects of 
the probit model. NoOfFundsft represents the number of funds managed by the fund family of 
the fund. Sizeft is the log of total net assets of a fund. ELMft is the expected loss of a fund 
portfolio and is a proxy for credit risk (see appendix B1 for calculation). FlowVolft is the rolling 
standard deviation of a fund’s net inflows over a six-month fixed window. ExRatioft is the 
expense ratio of a fund calculated as the difference between the gross yield and the net yield of 
a fund. WLiqft is weekly liquidity calculated as percentage of a fund’s total assets invested in 
weekly liquid assets. Weekly liquid assets include cash, US treasury securities, government 
agency securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or less, and securities that convert into 
cash within five business days. Standard errors are clustered by fund. Significance levels are 
indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  Institutional   Retail  
DepVar: Changef Coef Marginal  Coef Marginal  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
NoOfFundsft -0.1876*** -0.0425*** 0.0256 0.0056 
 (0.0386) (0.0074) (0.0586) (0.0128) 
Sizeft -0.1652** -0.0374** -0.5703*** -0.1257*** 
 (0.0801) (0.0180) (0.1578) (0.0276) 
ELMft (bp)  0.1662** 0.0376** -0.1795*** -0.0396*** 
 (0.0801) (0.0183) (0.0625) (0.0130) 
FlowVolft ($) 0.0052 0.0012 0.0696 0.0153 
 (0.0232) (0.0052) (0.0495) (0.0109) 
ExRatioft (bp) -0.0041 -0.0009 -0.0403 -0.0089 
 (0.0200) (0.0045) (0.0299) (0.0065) 
WLiqft (%) 0.0110 0.0025 -0.0096 -0.0021 
 (0.0085) (0.0020) (0.0103) (0.0023) 
     
Constant 3.8303*  13.6663***  
 (1.9703)  (3.4233)  
     
Time FE Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R2 0.268   0.387  
Observations 724 724 396 396 
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B3: Factors that Influenced Decision of Prime MMFs to Change Category 
(Different Pre-Transition Period) 
 
This table shows results of probit models with time fixed effects over the pre-transition period 
from July 2014 to October 2015.  The dependent variable, Changef is a dummy variable which 
takes the value of 1 if a fund changes its category from prime fund to government fund or quits 
the fund management industry, and 0 if the fund stays a prime fund. “Coef” represents the 
coefficients of the probit model. “Marginal” are the marginal effects of the probit model. 
NoOfFundsft represents the number of funds managed by the fund family of the fund. Sizeft is 
the log of total net assets of a fund. ELMft is the expected loss of a fund portfolio and is a proxy 
for credit risk (see appendix B1 for calculation). FlowVolft is the rolling standard deviation of 
a fund’s net inflows over a six-month fixed window. ExRatioft is the expense ratio of a fund 
calculated as the difference between the gross yield and the net yield of a fund. WLiqft is weekly 
liquidity calculated as percentage of a fund’s total assets invested in weekly liquid assets. 
Weekly liquid assets include cash, US treasury securities, government agency securities with 
remaining maturities of 60 days or less, and securities that convert into cash within five 
business days. Standard errors are clustered by fund. Significance levels are indicated by *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  Institutional   Retail  
DepVar: Changef Coef Marginal  Coef Marginal  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
NoOfFundsft -0.1682*** -0.0383*** 0.0019 0.0005 
 (0.0349) (0.0070) (0.0506) (0.0123) 
Sizeft -0.1516** -0.0345** -0.5344*** -0.1304*** 
 (0.0768) (0.0171) (0.1530) (0.0284) 
ELMft (bp)  0.1233** 0.0281** -0.1415*** -0.0345*** 
 (0.0553) (0.0130) (0.0542) (0.0134) 
FlowVolft ($) -0.0073 -0.0017 0.0498 0.0122 
 (0.0240) (0.0055) (0.0350) (0.0088) 
ExRatioft (bp) -0.0358 -0.0082 0.0359 0.0088 
 (0.0236) (0.0053) (0.0365) (0.0088) 
WLiqft (%) 0.0088 0.0020 0.0123 0.0030 
 (0.0088) (0.0021) (0.0124) (0.0030) 
     
Constant 4.2333**  11.0548***  
 (1.9636)  (3.0274)  
     
Time FE Y Y Y Y 
Pseudo R2 0.267   0.335  
Observations 1,894 1,894 1,056 1,056 
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B4: Changes in Retail vs Institutional Prime MMFs (Medians) 
This table presents medians of the variables before reforms (“BR” is the period from January 2014 to June 2014) and after reforms (“AR” is the 
period from October 2016 to March 2017). “Diff” is the difference between “AR” and “BR”. NetAssetsft is equal to the total value of a fund’s 
securities plus other assets less liabilities. ELMft is the expected loss of a fund which is a proxy for the credit risk of a fund (see appendix B1 for 
calculation). WLiqft is weekly liquidity calculated as percentage of a fund’s total assets invested in weekly liquid assets. Weekly liquid assets include 
cash, US treasury securities, government agency securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or less, and securities that convert into cash within 
five business days. WALft is the Weighted Average Life, calculated as average days to maturity weighted by the investment weight of each security. 
Spreadft is calculated as the difference between the gross yield of the fund’s assets and the 1-month Treasury bill rate. ExRatioft is the expense ratio 
of a fund calculated as the difference between gross yield (a fund’s portfolio yield) and net yield (the yield paid to a fund’s investor). NetYieldft is 
the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of fund classes as reported on N-MFP form. This represents the difference between the gross yield 
of portfolio less management fee. GovtNY̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ t is the average net yield of government funds each month. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  Institutional  Retail Institutional- Retail 
  BR AR Diff BR AR Diff BR AR Diff 
Median (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
NetAssetsft ($ bn) 1.18*** 0.87*** -0.31 1.49*** 0.92*** -0.58** -0.32* -0.05 0.26 
WLiqft (%) 33.89*** 57.86*** 23.97*** 30.46*** 44.98*** 14.52*** 3.43*** 12.88*** 9.45*** 
WALft(days) 70.00*** 31.00*** -39.00*** 67.00*** 54.00*** -13.00*** 3.00 -23.00*** -26.00*** 
ELMft (bp) 5.23*** 7.14*** 1.91*** 5.28*** 6.49*** 1.21** -0.05 0.65 0.70 
Spreadft (bp)  8.72*** 29.94*** 21.22*** 10.72*** 37.12*** 26.40*** -2.00*** -7.17*** -5.17*** 
NetYieldft 1.00*** 58.00*** 57.00*** 1.00 37.00*** 36.00*** 0.00 21.00*** 21.00*** 
NetYieldft - GovtNY̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ t -0.03 28.02 28.05*** -0.03*** 17.84*** 17.87*** 0.00 10.18*** 10.18*** 
ExRatioft (bp) 14.00*** 28.20*** 14.20*** 15.88*** 45.00*** 29.12*** -1.88*** -16.80*** -14.92*** 
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B5: Liquidity Management at MMFs After Reforms (Bootstrapped Errors)  
This table presents results for panel fixed effects regression before reforms (“BR” is the 
period from January 2014 to June 2014) and after reforms (“AR” is the period from October 
2016 to March 2017). The dependent variable ∆WLiqft is change i.e. first difference of 
weekly liquidity, WLiqft. WLiqft is weekly liquidity calculated as percentage of a fund’s total 
assets invested in weekly liquid assets. Weekly liquid assets include cash, US Treasury 
securities, government agency securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or less, and 
securities that convert into cash within five business days. ELMft is the expected loss of a 
fund and is a proxy for credit risk (see appendix B1 for calculation). ∆ELMft is the predicted 
values of change in expected loss of a fund. We use fitted values of changes in expected loss 
in order to avoid endogeneity issues that could arise due to simultaneity bias resulting from 
possible bidirectional causality of changes in weekly liquidity ∆WLiqft and changes in actual 
expected loss. NetInflowsft is a difference between gross subscriptions and redemptions. We 
use fitted values of changes in net inflows to avoid endogeneity issues that could arise due 
to simultaneity bias resulting from possible bidirectional causality of changes in weekly 
liquidity ∆WLiqft and changes in actual NetInflowsft. The standard errors are calculated by 
using bootstrapped method to correct for regression bias and are clustered by fund. 
Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Institutional Retail 
DepVar: ∆WLiqft (%) BR AR BR AR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
∆ELMft (bp) -1.54** 0.72*** 1.06 0.51 
 (0.68) (0.23) (0.82) (0.33) 
ELMft-1 (bp) 0.18 0.59** 0.48 0.03 
 (0.44) (0.29) (0.75) (0.23) 
∆NetInflowsft (%) 0.25** 0.06 0.16 -0.06 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.29) (0.11) 
NetInflowsft-1 (%) 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.03  
(0.10) (0.09) (0.29) (0.08) 
     
Constant -0.53 -6.15*** -2.46 -1.56 
 (2.49) (2.14) (4.23) (1.39) 
     
Fund FE Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 
Observations 693 284 398 206 
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B6: Liquidity Management at MMFs After 2016 Amendments (Different Lag 
specification for fitted values of contemporaneous variables - 7 lags)  
 
This table presents results for panel fixed effects regressions before reforms (“BR” is the 
period from January 2014 to June 2014) and after reforms (“AR” is the period from October 
2016to March 2017). The dependent variable ∆WLiqft the first difference of weekly 
liquidity, WLiqft. WLiqft is weekly liquidity calculated as percentage of a fund’s total assets 
invested in weekly liquid assets. Weekly liquid assets include cash, US Treasury securities, 
government agency securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or less, and securities 
that convert into cash within five business days. ELMft is the expected loss of a fund and is 
a proxy for credit risk (see appendix B1 for calculation). ∆ELMft is the predicted value of 
change in expected loss of a fund. We use fitted values of change in expected loss in order 
to avoid endogeneity issues that could arise due to simultaneity bias resulting from possible 
bidirectional causality of changes in weekly liquidity ∆WLiqft and changes in expected loss, 
ELMft. NetInflowsft is a difference between gross subscriptions and redemptions. We use 
fitted values of ∆NetInflowsft to avoid endogeneity issues that could arise due to simultaneity 
bias resulting from possible bidirectional causality of changes in weekly liquidity, ∆WLiqft 
and changes in net inflows, ∆NetInflowsft. The standard errors are clustered by fund. 
Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Institutional Retail 
DepVar: ∆WLiqft (%) BR AR BR AR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
∆ELMft (bp) -0.99** 0.60** 1.05* 0.81 
 (0.48) (0.29) (0.63) (0.58) 
ELMft-1 (bp) 0.32 0.64*** 0.39 0.15 
 (0.26) (0.23) (0.36) (0.28) 
∆NetInflowsft (%) 0.28** 0.14* 0.37 -0.02 
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.25) (0.17) 
NetInflowsft-1 (%) 0.09 0.11 0.31 0.06  
(0.12) (0.08) (0.29) (0.17) 
     
Constant -1.18 -6.26*** -1.92 -2.27 
 (1.38) (1.67) (2.01) (2.19) 
     
Fund FE Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 
Observations 693 284 398 206 
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B7: Shareholders’ Response to 2016 Amendments (Bootstrapped Errors) 
This table presents results for panel fixed effects regressions before reforms (“BR” is the 
period from January 2014 to June 2014) and after reforms (“AR” is the period from October 
2016 to March 2017). The dependent variable is NetInflowsft, calculated as a difference 
between gross subscriptions and redemptions of a fund. ELMft is the expected loss of a fund 
and is a proxy for credit risk (see appendix B1 for calculation). ∆ELMft is the predicted 
values of changes in loss of a fund. We use fitted values of change in expected loss in to 
avoid endogeneity which could lead to simultaneity bias resulting from possible 
bidirectional causality of NetInflowsft and changes in expected loss. WLiqft is the weekly 
liquidity calculated as total weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total assets. 
Weekly liquid assets include cash, US treasury securities, government agency securities with 
remaining maturities of 60 days or less, and securities that convert into cash within five 
business days. ∆WLiqft is the predicted values of the changes in the weekly liquidity of a 
fund. We use fitted values of ∆WLiqft to avoid endogeneity issues that could arise from 
possible bidirectional causality of changes in weekly liquidity, ∆WLiqft and net inflows, 
NetInflowsft. We additionally control but do not report the following variables: NetYieldft 
which is the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of fund classes as reported on 
N-MFP form. This represents the difference between the gross yield of portfolio less 
management fee. ExRatioft which is the expense ratio of a fund calculated as the difference 
between gross yield (a fund’s portfolio yield) and net yield (the yield paid to a fund’s 
investor). Sizeft calculated as the log of total net assets of a fund. The standard errors are 
calculated by using bootstrapped method to correct for regression bias and are clustered by 
fund. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Institutional Retail 
DepVar: NetInflowsft (%) BR AR BR AR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
∆ELMft (bp) -0.22 -1.17*** -0.47 -0.40 
 (0.52) (0.45) (0.72) (0.48) 
ELMft-1 (bp) -0.40 -0.45 -1.18** -0.28 
 (0.62) (0.32) (0.59) (0.27) 
∆WLiqft (%) 0.10 -0.03 0.13 -0.00 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.17) 
WLiqft -1 (%) 0.04 -0.16** -0.08 -0.02 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) 
     
Constant -2.78 0.96 5.34 -11.98 
 (6.93) (8.80) (7.98) (8.62) 
     
Fund FE Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.01 
Observations 606 291 359 209 
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B8: Shareholders’ Response to 2016 Amendments (Dynamic Panel) 
This table presents results for panel fixed effects regressions before reforms (“BR” is the 
period from January 2014 to June 2014) and after reforms (“AR” is the period from October 
2016 to March 2017). The dependent variable is NetInflowsft, calculated as a difference 
between gross subscriptions and redemptions of a fund. ELMft is the expected loss of a fund 
and is a proxy for credit risk (see appendix B1 for calculation). ∆ELMft is the predicted 
values of changes in loss of a fund. We use fitted values of change in expected loss in to 
avoid endogeneity which could lead to simultaneity bias resulting from possible 
bidirectional causality of NetInflowsft and changes in expected loss. WLiqft is the weekly 
liquidity calculated as total weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total assets. 
Weekly liquid assets include cash, US Treasury securities, government agency securities 
with remaining maturities of 60 days or less, and securities that convert into cash within five 
business days. ∆WLiqft is the predicted values of the changes in the weekly liquidity of a 
fund. We use fitted values of ∆WLiqft to avoid endogeneity issues that could arise from 
possible bidirectional causality of changes in weekly liquidity, ∆WLiqft and net inflows, 
NetInflowsft. We additionally control but do not report the following variables: NetYieldft 
which is the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of fund classes as reported on 
N-MFP form. This represents the difference between the gross yield of portfolio less 
management fee. ExRatioft which is the expense ratio of a fund calculated as the difference 
between gross yield (a fund’s portfolio yield) and net yield (the yield paid to a fund’s 
investor). Sizeft calculated as the log of total net assets of a fund. NetInflowsft-1 is also 
included to control for possible persistence of net inflows. The standard errors are clustered 
by fund.  Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Institutional Retail 
DepVar: NetInflowsft (%) BR AR BR AR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
∆ELMft (bp) -0.37 -1.17*** -0.58 -0.39 
 (0.47) (0.40) (0.62) (0.44) 
ELMft-1 (bp) -0.60 -0.45* -1.30** -0.27 
 (0.41) (0.23) (0.49) (0.21) 
∆WLiqft (%) 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) 
WLiqft -1 (%) 0.05 -0.16*** -0.06 -0.00 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
NetInflowsft-1 0.14*** 0.01 0.28*** 0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
     
Constant -1.67 0.97 3.58 -11.89** 
 (4.59) (6.29) (5.19) (5.22) 
     
Fund FE Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.26 0.15 0.08 
Observations 606 291 359 209 
 
144 
 
B9: Shareholders’ Response to 2016 Amendments (Different Lag specification 
for fitted values of contemporaneous variables - 7 lags) 
This table presents results for panel fixed effects regressions before reforms (“BR” is the 
period from January 2014 – June 2014) and after reforms (“AR” is the period from October 
2016 – March 2017). The dependent variable is NetInflowsft, calculated as a difference 
between gross subscriptions and redemptions of a fund. ELMft is the expected loss of a fund 
and is a proxy for credit risk (see appendix B1 for calculation). ∆ELMft is the predicted 
values of changes in loss of a fund. We use fitted values of change in expected loss in to 
avoid endogeneity which could lead to simultaneity bias resulting from possible 
bidirectional causality of NetInflowsft and changes in expected loss. WLiqft is the weekly 
liquidity calculated as total weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total assets. 
Weekly liquid assets include cash, US treasury securities, government agency securities with 
remaining maturities of 60 days or less, and securities that convert into cash within five 
business days. ∆WLiqft is the predicted values of the changes in the weekly liquidity of a 
fund. We use fitted values of ∆WLiqft to avoid endogeneity issues that could arise from 
possible bidirectional causality of changes in weekly liquidity, ∆WLiqft and net inflows, 
NetInflowsft. We additionally control but do not report the following variables: NetYieldft 
which is the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of fund classes as reported on 
N-MFP form. This represents the difference between gross yield of portfolio less 
management fee. ExRatioft which is the expense ratio of a fund calculated as the difference 
between gross yield (a fund’s portfolio yield) and net yield (the yield paid to a fund’s 
investor). Sizeft calculated as the log of total net assets of a fund. The standard errors are 
clustered by fund. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Institutional Retail 
DepVar: NetInflowsft (%) BR AR BR AR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
      
∆ELMft (bp) 0.02 -0.68* -0.91 -0.07 
 (0.43) (0.39) (0.60) (0.42) 
ELMft-1 (bp) -0.33 -0.28 -1.25*** -0.14 
 (0.42) (0.27) (0.46) (0.21) 
∆WLiqft (%) 0.19* -0.07 0.03 0.25 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.17) (0.15) 
WLiqft -1 (%) 0.09 -0.13*** -0.11 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) 
     
Constant -4.41 -4.19 6.92 -13.83** 
 (4.18) (5.75) (5.62) (5.83) 
     
Fund FE Y Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.09 
Observations 583 278 346 201 
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Chapter 5 A New Performance Indicator for Money 
Market Funds 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Since October 2016, institutional MMFs, which serve a more volatile shareholder 
base than retail MMFs, have floated their net asset value (NAV) and operated 
separately from the more stable retail funds. This has stripped money-like features 
from institutional MMFs. This is a new characteristic that has not been studied 
extensively before. It is interesting to explore how floating NAV affects the risk-
taking of funds and the response of shareholders to it. This chapter specifically 
focuses on exploring the drivers of NAV, the impact of floating NAV on risk-taking 
of funds and investors’ response to floating NAV. 
This paper fills a gap in the literature since it is, to the best of our knowledge, the 
first to explore how floating NAV for institutional prime funds influences the 
characteristics of the funds after their complete segregation from retail prime funds. 
Utilizing a unique dataset, we explore how shareholders of money market funds react 
to floating NAV. We also explore how portfolio characteristics influence the NAV 
of funds.   
Our contributions to the literature are as follows. First, we contribute to the 
existing performance-flow literature of money market funds (Sirri and Tufano 1998; 
Koppenhaver and Sapp 2005; Chernenko and Sunderam 2014) which established a 
positive relationship between yield and net inflows. A key novelty of our paper is 
that we identify a new indicator of performance, the floating NAV, which is now 
used particularly by institutional investors. We show that MMFs with higher floating 
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net asset value attract more inflows. In fact, they actively shift their investments to 
funds that offer higher potential for capital gains as compared to other MMFs. So, 
MMFs have an incentive to increase their net asset value. 
Second, we add to the literature that deals with factors influencing returns of 
money market funds. Domian and Reichenstein (1998) argue that a fund’s return is 
determined by the size of the expense ratio. Koppenhaver (1999) shows that along 
with expenses, portfolio characteristics also affect returns. We explore the factors 
that influence the newly introduced source of return, capital gains from floating 
NAV, which has not been studied before. We find that portfolio risk and the higher 
weighted average of a fund has a positive effect on NAV. But, a higher proportion 
of liquid assets leads to lower NAV. These results imply that to offer higher capital 
gains a fund must hold a riskier portfolio mix.  
Third, our study contributes to the literature on the impact of the introduction of the 
floating NAV on money funds and investor behaviour. Some studies focus on the 
effect of floating NAV on runs. Gordon and Gandia (2014) and Witmer (2016) 
suggest that it does not eliminate run-like behaviour while Hanson et al. (2015) argue 
that it successfully removes strategic motives to run. Other studies investigate its 
influence on the risk-taking behaviour of funds. For instance, Hanson et al. 2015 
argue that it does not remove ex-ante risk-taking incentives. Parlatore (2016) studies 
the consequences of the adoption of a floating NAV among other new regulations 
using a tournament model. The paper states that adopting floating NAV for the whole 
industry could boost the total supply of liquidity because investors would be attracted 
to MMFs as they can earn returns from floating NAV. But the risk should be kept 
low by restraining asset price volatility. La Spada (2018) also proposes a novel 
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tournament model to study whether competition over relative performance generates 
reach for yield in a low risk-free rate environment. La Spada conducts empirical 
analysis over the January 2002 to August 2008 period to confirm the predictions of 
the model relating to risk-taking of MMFs. The paper argues that requiring 
institutional prime MMFs to adopt a floating NAV, could lead institutional prime 
MMFs to take on more risk in a low policy rate environment. Furthermore, for stable 
NAV funds, if the regulator externally imposes a cost on MMFs that break the stable 
NAV, the model predicts that this would reduce the risk taking of all MMFs. These 
studies are based on the period prior to the actual implementation of the new SEC 
rules and are lacking empirical analysis after the reforms. The only paper that 
performs empirical analysis after reforms is Li et al (2018), who document the impact 
of the NAV flotation introduced for institutional funds. They find that during the 
months around and just after the reform took effect, institutional funds engaged in 
less risk-taking than retail funds by decreasing interest rates, liquidity and credit risk. 
This resulted in lower yields and NAVs and less volatile NAVs. But this difference 
faded through 2017 when institutional funds increased their risk-taking to pre-reform 
levels. Li et al. (2018) focus on the evolution of risk-taking of MMFs during reforms. 
By contrast, we explore risk-taking incentives of MMFs after reforms. Using actual 
floating NAV data, we empirically show that the introduction of floating NAV has 
two competing effects on risk-taking of money market funds, one risk-increasing and 
the other risk-limiting. On the one hand, to attract investors, a fund must increase 
portfolio risk. This suggests that floating NAV has not altered incentives to chase 
risk. On the other hand, to keep investors, a fund must select the portfolio mix 
148 
 
cautiously to limit NAV volatility because investors withdraw from funds whose 
NAV fluctuates excessively.  
Fourth, we expand the existing literature about runs on constant NAV money 
market funds which find that runs are more intense for less liquid funds (Wermers 
2011; Jank and Wedow 2015), funds with higher sponsor risk (Schmidt et al. 2016) 
and higher credit risk (Chari and Jagannathan 1988; Jacklin and Bhattacharya 1988; 
Chernenko and Sunderam 2014). In addition, these studies show that the funds that 
cater to institutional investors (Wermers 2011; Schmidt et al 2016; Chernenko and 
Sunderam 2014) undergo stronger run episodes. The 2016 Amendments mandate 
that institutional investors cannot invest in constant NAV funds anymore, so we 
explore the possibility of instability in such funds. We show that investors in constant 
NAV funds (i.e. retail investors) actively track the shadow NAV of their fund and 
tend not to remain in funds that have a more volatile shadow NAV. This is because 
of the risk of such a fund to breach the par value threshold and result in loss of 
principal. This implies that the constant NAV (retail) funds after complete 
segregation from institutional funds may still be subject to runs when in distress.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the regulatory 
landscape of this study. Section 5.3 describes the data. Section 5.4 presents the 
empirical analysis and results.  Section 5.5 concludes. 
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5.2 Regulatory Landscape 
 
During the global financial crisis and sovereign debt crisis, prime money market 
funds proved vulnerable to financial shocks and are now considered to add fragility 
to the financial system. During these events, institutional prime funds were more 
likely to undergo heavy redemption pressure than retail prime funds. This is because 
institutional investors have larger investments at risk and better access to resources 
for monitoring fund performance (Schapiro 2012). Moreover, they understand that 
they can lower exit costs if they redeem before others should liquidity dry up 
(McCabe 2010). Consequently, rule 2a-7 was amended in 2014 (amendments 
became effective in October 2016) to attenuate run risk among institutional funds. 
Before the reform, a fund could have both retail and institutional share classes. 
The new rules have fully segregated institutional funds from retail funds, which 
means that a single fund can offer shares to either retail31 shareholders or institutional 
shareholders, but not both. Since their inception, MMFs have operated under a 
special provision in rule 2a-7 which allowed them to maintain a stable NAV of $1.00 
by using the amortized cost method to value individual securities and the penny 
rounding method to value fund shares. This has changed for institutional funds, 
which are now required to trade at floating net asset value. This means that a fund 
must use market-based values of their securities to value their portfolio so that the 
daily share prices of the funds now fluctuate with the market. This change addresses 
the first-mover advantage that institutional investors usually gain at the expense of 
                                                          
31A retail money market fund, under 2016 Amendments, is defined as a fund that has policies and 
procedures which would limit beneficial investors of the fund to natural persons (SEC 2014). 
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retail investors, during a crisis. Sceptics remain unconvinced about the ability of 
floating NAV to have much effect on the risk of runs (Gordon and Gandia 2014; 
Witmer 2016). They claim that the incentive to withdraw early from a fund remains 
the same or might even lead to pre-emptive runs. The way events unfold in a distress 
period remains yet to be seen. Government and retail money market funds continue 
to use the amortized cost method and/or penny rounding method to maintain a stable 
NAV.   
The new rules have consequences for shareholders of MMFs. Before the SEC 
reforms following the global financial crisis, all MMFs were higher yielding 
investments than bank deposits while retaining deposit-like features such as same-
day redemption and preservation of capital. Now, shareholder redemptions in 
institutional prime funds trading at floating NAV may incur a gain or a loss in capital. 
This led to shareholders shifting their money from prime to government funds. 
However, many of these funds remained institutional funds. It is of great interest to 
observe the behaviour of the investors who choose to remain in institutional prime 
funds. We limit out analysis to prime money market funds because these are the 
funds that are affected more by the reforms and are considered to be a source of 
instability. 
 
5.3 Data Description 
 
We create a unique dataset comprising detailed portfolio holdings of US prime 
money market funds which are filed monthly with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. These filings are publicly available from the SEC EDGAR database.  
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The amendments to rule 2a-7 that were introduced in May 2010 require MMFs 
to file a monthly report on the N-MFP form, which includes a detailed schedule of 
portfolio holdings of money market funds, starting from November 2010. From April 
2016, the reporting of additional information is required under the new version of 
the form (N-MFP2). Our sample includes information from both versions of the 
form. Both forms provide information about fund-level variables like total net assets, 
type of fund, gross yield, net yield and monthly shareholders subscriptions and 
redemptions. In addition, for each security held, these report issuer name, amount of 
principal, type of instrument, yield, legal maturity date and the CUSIP number. The 
N-MFP2 form additionally reports daily and weekly liquidity, floating net asset 
value, target net asset value and type of shareholder base. 
Our final dataset ranges from January 2013 to April 2018. Most of the analysis 
focuses on the after-reform period which starts from the compliance month, October 
2016, and ends in April 2018, which is the latest date the data was avaiable at the 
time of analysis. In figures, we utilize the before-reform period  which starts from 
January 2013 and ends July 2014, the month of the announcement of 2016 
Amendments. The number of months is selected to get before- and after-reform 
periods of equal length. We conduct our analysis by analysing retail prime money 
market funds and institutional prime money market funds separately. The funds that 
report themselves as “retail exempt” funds are called retail prime money market 
funds and the remaining funds are institutional prime money market funds. 
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5.4 Empirical Results 
 
The institutional funds have floated their NAV since October 2016. Retail funds 
still maintain a constant NAV. For institutional investors, the floating NAV has 
introduced previously non-existent risk of losing the principal. So, post reform, 
institutional investors must be more cautious of the NAV of the MMF portfolio like 
any other mutual fund investor. Many funds have converted into government money 
market funds, which have no such requirement. Others have decided to stay in the 
prime money market funds. Our analysis focuses on exploring the behaviour of 
investors that have remained in the prime fund industry. We explore institutional 
prime funds’ performance-flow sensitivity based on a new measure of performance, 
the floating NAV. In addition, we identify factors that influence the magnitude and 
fluctuations in NAV.  
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 reports summary statistics for prime funds in the before-reform (BR) 
period, from January 2013 to July 2014, and after-reform (AR) period, from October 
2016 to April 2018. Panel A presents statistics for institutional prime funds. In our 
sample, we have 149 institutional prime funds before reforms which drop to 77 funds 
after reforms. After reforms, the median institutional fund has approximately $1.39 
billion in total net assets, but the distribution is positively skewed with a mean of 
$7.36 billion. Furthermore, the median fund’s NAV moves upward by one basis 
point from their target NAV, which is a small movement considering that these funds 
are using floating NAV. Panel B reports statistics for retail prime funds. Our data 
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includes 94 retail prime funds before reforms and 41 retail prime funds after reforms. 
The median retail prime fund manages about $0.89 billion of net assets with average 
net assets of $5.87. This indicates the presence of some very large funds. The median 
retail fund’s NAV movement is very similar to that of institutional funds. We plot 
the distribution of NAV changes to explore its characteristics. Figure 5.1 shows the 
box and whiskers plot of the distribution of NAV changes for institutional prime 
money market funds in the before-reform and after-reform periods. Before-reforms 
the NAV remains within a narrow range, moving only one basis point in each 
direction. However, there are several outliers indicating that some funds took on 
more risk and let their NAV fall by up to 18 bps. After reforms, the distribution of 
NAV changes becomes wider with values ranging from –4 bps to +8 bps, which is 
to be expected because funds use floating NAV and can let their values move away 
from the target NAV without fear of having to break the buck and liquidate a fund.  
We see that the majority of times funds’ NAV moves upward while there are some 
funds whose NAV moves downward. This drop in NAV happens only for 25 percent 
of the funds during the early months after switching to floating NAV. Interestingly, 
as more time goes by since the introduction of floating NAV, especially since 
January 2018, about 50 percent of the funds have negative movements in NAV which 
may indicate that funds are becoming less concerned about downward NAV 
adjustments. 
Retail prime funds need to keep a constant NAV even after the 2016 
Amendments. Like institutional prime funds they have a very narrow range of 
movement in (shadow) NAV (Figure 5.2) before reforms. But they are characterized 
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by several instances of relatively large NAV variations, where in some cases it drops 
by –23 bps. Still they stay well above the –50 bps threshold of acceptable movement 
in NAV breaching which requires a fund to break the buck and possibly face 
liquidation. After reforms, retail funds, in line with institutional funds, also have 
wider NAV distribution where NAV moves between -4 bps to +8 bps. However, 
there is a reduction in outliers. This more liberal movement could be due to the 
complete segregation of retail prime funds from institutional funds. However, 
because of several changes in MMFs taking place simultaneously, there might be 
other factors contributing to the reduction in outliers. In any case, retail prime funds 
have a more stable shareholder base than before, which gives them an opportunity to 
take on more risk without adverse consequences.  
Finally, we observe that before reforms institutional prime funds have higher 
volatility in NAV than retail prime funds.32 However, after reforms, institutional 
prime funds restrain NAV fluctuations. This indicates that they are more cautious 
about the extent of the movements in the NAV as they must now float the NAV, and 
higher deviations could lead to investor withdrawals.  
5.4.2 Drivers of NAV 
We start our analysis by investigating the portfolio characteristics that influence 
the net asset value of a fund. This would inform the actions that an institutional fund 
                                                          
32  To ensure that this is empirically verifiable, we calculate differences in averages of NAV volatility 
between retail and institutional prime fund, before and after reforms.  On average, before reforms 
institutional prime funds have 0.15 basis points higher volatility than retail prime funds, whereas after 
reforms they have 0.21 basis points lower NAV volatility (NAV volatility is calculated as rolling 
standard deviation of a fund’s NAV over a fixed window of the past six-months). 
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can take to rein in the floating NAV and keep it within an acceptable range for 
investors. We estimate the following monthly panel fixed effects regression, 
NAVMft = αf   + β1 FlowVolft-1+ β2 Spreadft-1+ β3 WALft-1 + β4 Sizeft-1 + 
       β5 FFSizeft-1 + β6 NetYieldft-1 + εft                                     eq. (1) 
 
where the dependent variable NAVMft is the difference between actual NAV and the 
target NAV as a percentage of target NAV, which captures the potential of a fund to 
generate a capital gain/loss. αf are fund fixed effects to control for unobserved fund 
characteristics. The extent of unpredictable investors’ redemption patterns can 
influence a fund’s NAV because to meet unexpected withdrawals a fund must sell 
its portfolio of securities, which affects its net asset value (Nanda et al. 2000; Chen 
et al. 2010). Unpredictable redemption behaviour is captured by FlowVolft, which is 
flow volatility calculated as the 6-month rolling standard deviation of NetInflowsft. 
NetInflowsft is the difference between monthly subscriptions and redemptions as a 
percentage of the lagged total net assets of a fund. Spreadft is a fund’s portfolio gross 
yield net of the average government money market funds’ gross yield, a proxy for 
portfolio risk. We include a measure of portfolio maturity, WALft, which is the 
weighted average life, calculated as average days to maturity weighted by the 
investment weight of each security. In some regressions, we include WLiqft instead 
of WALft. WALft and WLiqft are highly correlated so they are not used together to 
avoid multicollinearity issues. WLiqft is weekly liquidity calculated as percentage of 
a fund’s total assets invested in weekly liquid assets. Weekly liquid assets are cash, 
US Treasury securities, government agency securities with remaining maturities of 
60 days or less, and securities that convert into cash within five business days. We 
control for the size of a fund and its family, that is a group of funds owned by the 
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same manager. Sizeft is the log of total net assets of a fund. FFSizeft is the log of total 
net assets of a fund family. We add net yield to assess its relationship with capital 
gains. NetYieldft is the yield earned by funds’ shareholders, calculated as the value-
weighted average of the 7-day net yields of fund share classes as reported on N-MFP 
form. All variables are lagged by one month. We cluster standard errors by fund.  
Table 5.2 contains the regression results for eq. (1). In Column 1, the coefficient 
of Spreadft is positive and significant indicating that institutional prime funds with 
riskier portfolios have more potential for capital gains. Similarly, the funds with 
longer maturity securities have bigger NAVMft and therefore higher capital gains. 
On the contrary, the funds with more liquid portfolio (Column 2) have lower 
NAVMft because the funds with higher proportion of very short-term securities do 
not move up as compared to the ones with longer maturities. These results imply that 
the funds must invest in riskier securities to increase the floating NAV of their funds 
to boost their performance. The funds that belong to bigger fund families tend to 
have lower NAVMft. This could have two explanations. First, it could be that the 
funds that belong to bigger fund families have a more cautious attitude towards 
excessive risk-taking to avoid bad reputation in case the market value of a portfolio 
security goes down. Second, they could have invested in riskier securities whose 
market value has plunged.  
Interestingly, the funds with higher NetYieldft have lower NAVMft possibly 
because the funds are using the increases in floating NAV as an alternative form of 
compensation. So, if a fund is providing larger capital gains they seem to pay lower 
yields to the investors. This has consequences for expense ratios charged by funds. 
Usually the funds waive their management fee to offer higher yields, but if the 
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investors subscribe to funds because of potential for capital gains they could charge 
higher expenses while still attracting inflows. However, this potential for funds to 
earn a higher fee is limited because the returns from net yield is much higher than 
that from capital gains. But the investors could opt for funds offering higher capital 
gains for deferred tax purposes.  
In Column 3, retail prime funds with riskier portfolio have higher NAVMft, 
however, this significance is not robust and disappears in Column 4 when we control 
for liquidity of a fund. They do not seek to increase their risk and portfolio maturity 
to increase their NAV because they trade at a stable share price and therefore cannot 
attract retail investors by differentiating themselves on capital gains. Like 
institutional funds, retail funds with more liquid portfolios have lower NAVMft.  
Overall, we document that net asset value of a fund is influenced by portfolio 
characteristics such as portfolio risk, average portfolio maturity and fund liquidity. 
To increase NAV, in order to provide higher capital gains, a fund must increase its 
portfolio risk, hold less liquid longer maturity assets which could put a fund in 
distress in a time of crisis.  
5.4.3 Risk from Floating NAV 
The extent of fluctuation in floating NAV is of importance to investors because 
it is an indicator of the stability of a fund’s performance. Greater NAV volatility 
means higher risk of incurring a capital loss. Therefore, it is valuable to investigate 
the factors that influence the NAV volatility.  
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We estimate the following panel fixed effects regression,   
NAVVolft = αf   + β1 FlowVolft-1+ β2 Spreadft-1+ β3 WALft-1 + β4 Sizeft-1 + 
       β5 FFSizeft-1 + β6 NetYieldft-1 + εft                                  eq. (2) 
  
where the dependent variable NAVVolft is NAV volatility calculated as rolling 
standard deviation of NAV over a six-month fixed window. It is a proxy for the risk 
of loss from investing in a floating NAV. Our main explanatory variables are flow 
volatility, FlowVolft and portfolio risk, Spreadft, defined as before. The uncertainty 
in redemptions of shareholders can lead to more volatility in net asset value. Riskier 
portfolio can influence the volatility of portfolio value as evident from our previous 
findings. We control for weighted average life, WALft fund size, Sizeft fund family 
size, FFSizeft and net yield, NetYieldft of a fund which are defined as before. As in 
the previous specification, in some regressions, we include WLiqft of a fund, while 
avoiding to use WALft and WLiqft together to avoid multicollinearity issues. We 
include fund fixed effects in all regressions and cluster standard errors at fund level.  
Table 5.3 shows the estimation results for eq. (2). We find that both institutional 
and retail prime funds with higher flow volatility have more NAV volatility. This is 
because the funds with higher unpredictability in net inflows must sell their securities 
on short-notice, which affects the net asset value, and therefore leads to higher 
unpredictability in the NAV of a fund. Greater unpredictability in NAV denotes 
elevated risk of capital loss. This means that in the event of a crisis, when investors 
redeem ferociously it would deteriorate the value of NAV further, which would lead 
to more outflows, hence creating a feedback loop. Furthermore, institutional prime 
funds that carry more portfolio risk, Spreadft have greater variability in NAV because 
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the market value of riskier securities fluctuates more, leading to greater risk of capital 
loss. To restrict the risk of capital losses institutional funds must rein in their risk-
taking and seek to create a more stable shareholder base by taking appropriate 
measures. In the next sections we investigate factors that influence the behaviour of 
shareholders, to learn more about the steps a fund must take to retain shareholders. 
5.4.4 Shareholders’ Response to Floating NAV  
For institutional investors, the floating NAV has introduced a previously non-
existent opportunity for capital gains and a possible risk of incurring losses on 
redemptions. So, we next examine the response of shareholders to movement in 
NAV and the risk of losing principal associated with possible negative changes in 
NAV. We run the following panel fixed effects regression: 
NetInflowsft = αf   + β1 NAVMft-1 + β2 NAVVolft-1 + β3 NetYieldft-1 + β4 Wliqft-1 + 
   β5 ExRatioft-1   + β6 Sizeft-1 + β7 FFSizeft-1 + β8 NetInflowsft-1 + εft   eq. (3) 
 
where NetInflowsft is calculated as a difference between monthly subscription and 
redemptions as a percentage of lagged total net assets of a fund. αf represents fund 
fixed effects. Our main explanatory variables are movement in NAV, NAVMft and 
NAV volatility, NAVVolft. NAVMft captures the potential of a fund to produce a 
capital gain/loss. NAVVolft is a proxy for the risk of capital loss from investing in a 
floating NAV. We use it to test the response of investors to funds whose NAV 
changes a lot. We control for other factors that might impact the investment decision 
of investors such as net yield, NetYieldft, weekly liquidity, WLiqft, size of a fund, 
Sizeft and fund family size, FFSizeft. We also include ExRatioft, which is the expense 
ratio of a fund calculated as the difference between the gross yield and the net yield 
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of a fund. We include the lagged dependent variable, NetInflowsft to control for 
persistence of net inflows (Domian and Reichenstein 1998; Christoffersen and Musto 
2002). Standard errors are clustered by fund. 
Table 5.4 presents the regression results for both retail and institutional prime 
funds. Column 1 shows the results for institutional prime funds. The coefficient of 
NAVMft is positive and significant. NAVMft is a measure of the potential of a fund 
to offer capital gains on an investment. An increase in NAV results in capital gains, 
while decrease in NAV could lead to loss in the value to principal invested. We find 
that money market funds with higher NAVMft attract more inflows. This implies that 
the institutional investors i) seek to invest in funds that offer higher capital gains, ii) 
and use NAV to assess the performance of funds. These results add to the existing 
literature on performance-flow relationship by documenting a new performance 
measure that the investors seem to have adopted to differentiate money market funds. 
This relationship between flow and floating NAV has not been studied before. As 
expected, the funds with higher yield, NetYieldft have more net inflows, NetInflowsft, 
which is a well-established relationship in previous studies (Christoffersen 2001; 
Christoffersen and Musto 2002; Kacperczyk and Schnabl 2013; Chernenko and 
Sunderam 2014). NetYieldft continues to be the primary indicator of performance
33 
and explains higher degree of variation in net inflows as compared to movement in 
NAV, NAVMft which makes sense because the returns earned from NAVMft stay 
within a very narrow range.   
                                                          
33 In unreported univariate regressions, we find that R-squared for NetYieldft is higher than that of 
NAVMft. 
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The floating NAV can lead to losses. So, we investigate how investors react to 
the volatility of NAV. A fund with higher volatility in NAV presents increased risk 
of capital losses. As expected, the coefficient of NAV volatility, NAVVolft is 
negative and significant indicating that a fund with higher NAV volatility tends to 
have lower net inflows. The investors avoid the funds that might drive their capital 
to take a plunge.  The investors are watchful of the risks associated with the floating 
NAV. This behaviour is consistent with the literature that recognizes that 
institutional shareholders have greater capital at risk, therefore they tend to monitor 
the risks and returns of a fund portfolio (Schapiro 2012). Overall, this shows that 
while the investors are searching for higher returns they are doing so with caution 
and weigh the risks associated with the prospective gains from the floating NAV.  
Our control variables have expected signs and significance. We find that the 
lagged weekly liquidity, WLiqft is negative and highly significant which is consistent 
with Jank and Wedow’s (2015) findings that MMFs with more liquid assets tend to 
have lower inflows. This is possibly because the investors, once confident about the 
safety of the funds, tend to withdraw from funds with higher liquidity because that 
results in lower yields. Next, the coefficient of expense ratio, ExRatioft is negative 
and significant.  This shows that institutional investors are sensitive to the cost of 
investment in the money market funds. The institutional investors withdraw money 
from the funds that have higher expense ratios because this leads to lower yields. 
Further, we control for size of a fund, Sizeft and its family, FFSizeft. Both coefficients 
are insignificant showing that the investors do not regard size of a fund or its sponsor 
as a major factor in their investment decisions. We also include lagged dependent 
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variable to account for persistence of NetInflowsft. The coefficient is positive and 
significant showing persistence in fund net inflows. 
In Column 2, we repeat the analysis for retail prime funds. The coefficients of 
NAVMft and NAVVolft are not significant indicating that the funds do not take the 
value of NAV into account when making investment decisions. This is 
understandable as the retail prime funds trade on a target NAV of $1.00, even if the 
shadow NAV (i.e. fair value of portfolio divided by number of shares, as reported on 
N-MFP form) is higher or lower than the target NAV. Unlike institutional funds, 
retail funds do not have significant inflows with higher NAVMft. This is expected 
because retail funds keep using stable NAV. Therefore, investors redeem the 
principal at stable NAV and have no possibility of capital gain. However, these 
investors are attracted to higher yielding funds as seen from a positive and significant 
coefficient of NetYieldft. Because retail investors do not have a possibility of loss 
when they trade, NAV volatility, NAVVolft does not have a significant impact these 
funds. Next, the control variable WLiqft is negative and significant indicating that 
retail investors withdraw their money from the funds with higher proportion of liquid 
assets, which is plausible because this leads to lower yields. Interestingly, in contrast 
to institutional counterpart, the coefficient of ExRatioft is positive and significant 
demonstrating that the retail investors tend to invest more in funds with higher 
expense ratios.  
One explanation could be that the retail investors, having lower resources to track 
a fund’s portfolio, put more confidence in the funds with higher expense ratios 
because such funds are deemed to be managed actively (Morningstar 2015). We also 
include lagged dependent variable to account for persistence of NetInflowsft. As 
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expected, the coefficient is positive and significant showing persistence in fund net 
inflows. 
In short, institutional investors seek funds with higher capital gains but avoid 
funds with higher propensity for incurring capital losses. This behaviour is not 
observed in retail prime funds who do not have option to earn capital gains from their 
investments in money market funds. 
5.4.5 MMF Shareholders Seek Capital Gains 
We next investigate whether investors actively shift between prime funds based 
on capital gains incentives - an action consistent with chasing higher yields. In other 
words, if a fund changes its NAV so that its percentile rank becomes higher than 
others, would it attract more inflows? La Spada (2018) finds that rank-based 
performance is a key determinant of fund flows to MMFs. We expect this to hold 
true for capital gains as a measure of performance. If so, a fund has incentive to 
increase its NAV by engaging in higher risk-taking to increase its NAV to make the 
fund more competitive, which would eventually translate into wider systemic risk.  
We test this using the following monthly panel fixed effects regression: 
NetInflowsft = αf   + β1 ∆NAVRankft-1 + β2 (∆NAVRankft-1 × NAVVolft-1 + 
            β3 Cft-1 + εft                                      eq. (4) 
 
where main explanatory variable is ∆NAVRankft, calculated as month-over-month 
change in the percentile rank of a fund’s NAVft. This change in percentile ranking 
captures the shift in NAV, relative to all prime funds at the same time. As evidenced from 
the previous section, investors respond negatively to volatility in NAV. Therefore, 
we interact the changes in percentile rank with NAV volatility, (∆NAVRankft-1 × 
164 
 
NAVVolft-1) to control for the funds that increase their percentile rank in combination 
with higher volatility in NAV. As before, NAVVolft is the net asset value volatility 
calculated as the rolling standard deviation of a fund’s NAV over a fixed window of 
the past six months. In all regressions, we control for, but do not show, the variables 
represented by Cft which includes NAVMft, NAVVolft, NetYieldft, Wliqft, ExRatioft, 
Sizeft, FFSizeft, and NetInflowsft calculated as before. 
We also include interaction of changes in NAV with date fixed effects to ensure 
that the results are being driven by the changes in the rank of NAV and not by some 
unidentified time trend.  
Table 5.5 presents the results. Column 1 shows that the institutional investors 
respond positively to lagged changes in the percentile rank of NAV of a fund. The 
institutional investors actively shift their investments to funds that offer higher 
potential for capital gains as compared to other MMFs. This is consistent with the 
well-known fact that the institutional investors are more likely to watch markets and 
react by moving large amounts of money in and out of funds (Bair 2013; Scharfstein 
2012). This reinforces our previous findings that there is a significant flow/NAV 
sensitivity in institutional prime funds. This indicates that the institutional investors 
are using floating NAV funds as an investment vehicle instead of just a cash 
management tool. However, they do so cautiously and avoid the excess risk as seen 
from the negative and significant sign of lagged interaction term, ∆NAVRankft-1 × 
NAVVolft-1.  
Since the funds with higher NAV attract more inflows, they have an incentive to 
hold riskier securities to increase NAV which could eventually lead to increased 
fragility. To offer higher yields a fund can either take on more risk or alternatively 
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charge less expense ratios. Whereas, to increase the NAV of a fund to offer higher 
capital gains a fund must rely almost entirely on increasing portfolio risk. In the event 
of a crisis, the funds that invest in riskier securities to increase NAV will experience 
a higher drop in NAV, which would potentially trigger runs. This motivation to take 
risk is however limited by the fact that the funds with higher capital gains in 
combination with higher volatility in capital gains (as proxied by NAV volatility) 
tend to lose investors. This means that funds have a reason to keep their NAV in a 
narrow range to boost investor confidence. Together, this means the funds must 
elevate risk to boost NAV-based performance but do so in a controlled fashion by 
ensuring reduced volatility in portfolio value to attract investors. This could induce 
stability in a fund portfolio.  
Column 2 shows results for retail prime funds. All the main explanatory variables 
are insignificant indicating that the retail investors do not consider the rank-based 
NAV performance in their investment decisions. These funds have stable NAV and 
therefore the investors do not benefit from any increases in the NAV of the fund at 
the time of redemptions.  
In summary, we establish that institutional investors, consistent with their yield-
seeking behaviour, look to invest in funds with higher capital gains actively which 
could encourage funds to invest in risky assets which in crisis periods could lead to 
distress.   
5.4.6 Drivers of Flow Volatility  
Institutional funds are known to have higher flow volatility because these funds 
deal with sophisticated investors who are highly information sensitive and react to 
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news by moving money faster and more frequently. After complete segregation of 
institutional funds from retail funds the buffer of stable money sourced from 
individual investors is completely removed. Therefore, it is of interest for 
institutional funds to know the factors that might prove useful to reduce the flow 
volatility of a fund. We run the following panel fixed effects model: 
FlowVolft = αf   + β1 NAVMft-1 + β2 NAVVolft-1 + β3 NetYieldft-1 + β4 Wliqft-1   + 
    β5 ExRatioft-1   + β6 Sizeft-1 + β7 FFSizeft-1 + εft                            eq. (5) 
 
where the dependent variable flow volatility, FlowVolft is the rolling standard 
deviation of net inflows, NetInflowsft, calculated as fixed window of past 6-month 
observations. NAVMft, NAVVolft, NetYieldft, Wliqft, ExRatioft, and Sizeft, are 
defined as before.  
Column 1 in Table 5.6 shows that the institutional funds with higher NAV have 
lower flow volatility suggesting that the funds that offer higher capital gains have 
lower unpredictability in their inflows. In other words, investors stay invested in 
funds with more potential for return. Similarly, NetYieldft is positive and significant 
reinforcing the results that the funds with higher performance have a more stable 
shareholder base. Together, this shows that the funds can decrease the volatility in 
their flows by paying investors a higher yield and giving them loftier capital gains. 
Retail prime funds, on the other hand, can stabilize their inflows by offering higher 
yields (Column 2). Having a higher NAV does not significantly impact the flow 
volatility of retail funds because their share trade at stable NAV and therefore 
investors do not consider it in making investment decisions. But they do watch for 
volatility in NAV which leads to higher unpredictability in the inflows, because if 
the NAV goes below a certain threshold a fund can “break the buck” which would 
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result in loss of principal. Interestingly, the coefficient of WLiqft is positive and 
significant indicating that the funds with higher liquidity have higher flow volatility 
possibly because it leads to lower yields.  
Overall, we see that institutional funds can bridle unpredictability in net inflows 
by incentivizing the investors to stay invested in them by differentiating on yield and 
capital gains.  
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This paper finds that the floating NAV may be used by institutional money 
market fund investors as a new performance indicator to inform their investment 
decisions. This carries additional information with respect to the funds’ yield, the 
traditional performance measure. Consistent with their yield-seeking behaviour, we 
show that institutional investors seek to hold funds with higher capital gains. They 
actively shift their investments to funds that offer higher potential for capital gains 
as compared to other MMFs. However, they do so cautiously and avoid investing in 
funds with excessive NAV fluctuation. Still, this incentivizes funds to increase their 
floating NAV, to boost their performance and attract more net assets. To do so, funds 
must keep liquidity low and invest in longer maturity/riskier securities. But this 
higher risk could lead to a higher likelihood of distress during crisis periods. A 
relevant topic that is unexplored in this paper and remains of interest for future 
research is whether the introduction of floating NAV helps mitigate the risk of runs 
in institutional prime funds. We could not address this point because we investigate 
a period in which financial markets have been calm. Therefore, we could not directly 
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investigate the response of institutional investors during market stress, when 
operating under floating NAV. 
Figures 
Figure 5.1: NAV Movement in Institutional Prime MMFs 
 
The figure is box and whiskers plot for size of NAV Movement for US institutional prime funds. 
NAV Movement is calculated as the difference between actual NAV and target NAV as a percentage 
of the target NAV. The left-hand side panel is for before-reform (BR) period from January 2013 to 
July 2014. The right-hand side panel is for after-reform (AR) period from October 2016 to April 2018. 
Rectangles show the interquartile range (IQR), which represent the 25th to 75th percentile, and the 
horizontal line in the middle of the rectangle is median. The ends of the lines below and above the 
rectangle represent the minimum and maximum values from Q1 − 1.5 * IQR to Q1 and from Q3 to 
Q3 + 1.5 * IQR, respectively. The observations falling outside of this range, are outliers denoted with 
a dot. 
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Figure 5.2: NAV Movement in Retail Prime MMFs 
 
The figure is box and whiskers plot for size of NAV Movement for US retail prime funds. NAV 
Movement is calculated as the difference between actual NAV and target NAV as a percentage of the 
target NAV. The left-hand side panel is for before-reform (BR) period from January 2013 to July 
2014. The right-hand side panel is for after-reform (AR) period from October 2016 to April 2018. 
Rectangles show the interquartile range (IQR), which represent the 25th to 75th percentile, and the 
horizontal line in the middle of the rectangle is median. The ends of the lines below and above the 
rectangle represent the minimum and maximum values from Q1 − 1.5 * IQR to Q1 and from Q3 to 
Q3 + 1.5 * IQR, respectively. The observations falling outside of this range, are outliers denoted with 
a dot. 
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Tables 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics  
 
This table shows summary statistics for before-reform (BR) period from January 2013 to July 2014 
and after-reform (AR) period from October 2016 to April 2018. Family TNA is the total net assets of 
a fund family. Fund TNA is the total net assets of a fund. NAVMft is the difference between actual 
NAV and target NAV as a percentage of the target NAV. NAVVolft is NAV volatility calculated as 
rolling standard deviation of NAV over a six-month fixed window. NetInflowsft, calculated as a 
difference between gross subscriptions and gross redemptions of a fund. FlowVolft is rolling standard 
deviation of a fund’s NetInflowsft over a six-month fixed window.  WALft is Weighted Average Life 
calculated as average days to maturity weighted by the investment weight of each security. WLiqft is 
the weekly liquidity calculated as total weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total assets. 
Weekly liquid assets include cash, US Treasury securities, government agency securities with 
remaining maturities of 60 days or less, and securities that convert into cash within five business days. 
Spreadft is a fund’s portfolio gross yield net of the average government money market funds’ gross 
yield.  NetYieldft is the yield earned by funds’ shareholders, calculated as the value-weighted average 
of the 7-day net yields of fund share classes as reported on N-MFP form. ExRatioft is the expense 
ratio of a fund calculated as the difference between gross yield and net yield of a fund.  
Panel A: Institutional Funds BR (Jan 2013 - Jul 2014) AR (Oct 2016 - Apr 2018) 
VARIABLES Mean Median SD N Mean  Median SD N 
Family TNA ($ bil) 24.83 2.010 49.69 2,666 59.52 46.06 63.27 1,138 
Fund TNA ($ bil) 6.182 1.143 10.99 2,666 7.306 1.389 13.27 1,138 
NAVMft (bp) -0.201 0.000 3.829 2,411 1.407 1.000 2.460 998 
NAVVolft (bp) 0.355 0.408 0.518 2,407 0.541 0.432 0.621 976 
NetInflowsft (%) -0.394 -0.662 9.188 2,651 1.339 0.000 13.96 1,131 
FlowVolft (%) 7.029 5.061 6.350 2,663 9.465 7.091 8.206 1,115 
WALft (days) 65.70 68.00 24.40 2,668 36.91 41.00 27.19 1,138 
WLiqft (%) 36.91 34.09 16.14 2,357 57.55 47.14 22.07 1,138 
Spreadft (bp) 8.079 9.158 6.806 2,668 20.67 27.46 11.18 1,138 
NetYieldft (bp) 3.054 1.000 4.988 2,668 89.86 97.04 42.88 1,134 
ExRatioft (bp) 13.48 15.00 8.077 2,668 19.66 19.15 14.82 1,134 
Number of funds    149    77 
         
Panel B: Retail Funds BR (Jan 2013 - Jul 2014) AR (Oct 2016 - Apr 2018) 
VARIABLES Mean Median SD N Mean  Median SD N 
Family TNA ($ bil) 31.88 1.844 56.07 1,683 64.77 20.81 72.22 723 
Fund TNA ($ bil) 7.990 1.490 15.54 1,683 5.874 0.890 12.41 723 
NAVMft (bp) -0.499 1.000 4.456 1,682 1.752 1.000 3.105 715 
NAVVolft (bp) 0.343 0.408 0.466 1,687 0.670 0.548 0.468 709 
NetInflowsft (%) -0.602 -0.325 5.937 1,680 0.379 -0.297 9.061 732 
FlowVolft (%) 3.953 2.766 4.341 1,687 6.170 3.825 6.260 728 
WALft (days) 65.63 67.00 22.87 1,687 51.26 55.00 25.00 736 
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WLiqft (%) 34.47 31.46 15.72 1,358 46.85 43.24 12.31 735 
Spreadft (bp) 10.36 11.45 5.833 1,687 23.87 27.46 8.228 736 
NetYieldft (bp) 1.914 1.00 3.021 1,429 77.38 78.73 40.38 733 
ExRatioft (bp) 16.54 16.78 6.214 1,429 42.20 44.00 20.31 733 
Number of funds    94    41 
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Table 5.2: Drivers of Floating NAV 
 
This table shows results of monthly fund fixed effects regressions after the 2016 Amendments from 
October 2016 to April 2018. The dependent variable is movement in NAV, NAVMft calculated as the 
difference between actual NAV and target NAV as a percentage of the target NAV. FlowVolft is 
rolling standard deviation of a fund’s net inflows over a six-month fixed window.  Spreadft is a fund’s 
portfolio gross yield net of the average government money market funds’ gross yield.  NetYieldft is 
the yield earned by funds’ shareholders, calculated as the value-weighted average of the 7-day net 
yields of fund share classes as reported on N-MFP form. WLiqft is the weekly liquidity calculated as 
total weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total assets. Weekly liquid assets include 
cash, US Treasury securities, government agency securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or 
less, and securities that convert into cash within five business days. WALft is Weighted Average Life 
calculated as average days to maturity weighted by the investment weight of each security. Sizeft is 
the log of total net assets of a fund. FFSizeft is the log of total net assets of a fund family. Our data 
contains outliers, so we winsorize all variables at 1st and 99th percentile. We cluster standard errors 
by fund. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  Institutional Retail 
DepVar: NAVMft (bp) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
FlowVolft-1 (%) -0.011 -0.008 -0.043 -0.039 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.028) (0.027) 
Spreadft-1 (bp) 0.056*** 0.045*** 0.038** 0.024 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.021) 
WALft-1 (days) 0.015**  0.012  
 (0.006)  (0.008)  
WLiqft-1 (%)  -0.026***  -0.028** 
  (0.007)  (0.013) 
Sizeft-1  -0.040 -0.033 -0.854 -0.854 
 (0.252) (0.262) (0.515) (0.512) 
FFSizeft-1  -0.974* -1.011* -0.166 -0.210 
 (0.528) (0.518) (0.259) (0.275) 
NetYieldft-1 (bp) -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.032*** -0.034*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
     
Constant 24.354** 27.568** 24.637* 28.008** 
 (11.221) (10.799) (13.150) (12.973) 
     
Fund FE Y Y Y Y 
Adj R-squared 0.197 0.210 0.534 0.542 
Observations 966 966 696 696 
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Table 5.3: Risk from Floating NAV 
 
This table shows results of monthly fund fixed effects regressions after the 2016 Amendments from 
October 2016 to April 2018. The dependent variable is movement in NAV volatility, NAVVolft is 
NAV volatility calculated as rolling standard deviation of NAV over a six-month fixed window. 
FlowVolft is rolling standard deviation of a fund’s net inflows over a six-month fixed window.  
Spreadft is a fund’s portfolio gross yield net of the average government money market funds’ gross 
yield.  NetYieldft is the yield earned by funds’ shareholders, calculated as the value-weighted average 
of the 7-day net yields of fund share classes as reported on N-MFP form. WLiqft is the weekly liquidity 
calculated as total weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total assets. Weekly liquid 
assets include cash, US Treasury securities, government agency securities with remaining maturities 
of 60 days or less, and securities that convert into cash within five business days. WALft is Weighted 
Average Life calculated as average days to maturity weighted by the investment weight of each 
security. Sizeft is the log of total net assets of a fund. FFSizeft is the log of total net assets of a fund 
family. Our data contains outliers, so we winsorize all variables at 1st and 99th percentile. We cluster 
standard errors by fund. Significance levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 Institutional Retail 
DepVar: NAVVolft (bp) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
FlowVolft-1 (%) 0.010** 0.011** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009) 
Spreadft-1 (bp) 0.006*** 0.004** 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) 
WALft-1 (days) 0.001  0.002  
 (0.001)  (0.003)  
WLiqft-1 (%)  -0.003  -0.003 
  (0.002)  (0.009) 
Sizeft-1  -0.078 -0.080 0.059 0.058 
 (0.052) (0.050) (0.095) (0.097) 
FFSizeft-1 0.065 0.060 -0.022 -0.028 
 (0.075) (0.074) (0.164) (0.160) 
NetYieldft-1 (bp) 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Constant 0.337 0.741 -0.508 -0.102 
 (1.555) (1.572) (4.047) (3.862) 
     
Fund FE Y Y Y Y 
Adj R-squared 0.0746 0.0802 0.186 0.184 
Observations 967 967 697 697 
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Table 5.4: Shareholders’ Response to Floating NAV 
 
This table shows results of monthly fund fixed effects regressions after the 2016 Amendments from 
October 2016 to April 2018. The dependent variable is NetInflowsft, calculated as a difference 
between gross subscriptions and gross redemptions of a fund. NAVMft is the difference between 
actual NAV and target NAV as a percentage of the target NAV. NAVVolft is NAV volatility 
calculated as rolling standard deviation of NAV over a six-month fixed window. NetYieldft is the 
yield earned by funds’ shareholders, calculated as the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields 
of fund share classes as reported on N-MFP form. WLiqft is the weekly liquidity calculated as total 
weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total assets. Weekly liquid assets include cash, 
US Treasury securities, government agency securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or less, 
and securities that convert into cash within five business days. ExRatioft is the expense ratio of a fund 
calculated as the difference between gross yield and net yield of a fund. Sizeft is the log of total net 
assets of a fund. FFSizeft is the log of total net assets of a fund family. Our data contains outliers, so 
we winsorize all variables at 1st and 99th percentile. We cluster standard errors by fund. Significance 
levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 Institutional Retail 
DepVar: NetInflowsft (%) (1) (2) 
    
NAVMft-1 (bp) 0.024*** -0.027 
 (0.008) (0.215) 
NAVVolft-1 (bp) -0.102*** 0.686 
 (0.029) (1.191) 
NetYieldft-1 (bp) 0.058*** 0.140*** 
 (0.017) (0.024) 
WLiqft-1 (%) -0.134*** -0.128** 
 (0.030) (0.060) 
ExRatioft-1 (bp) -0.083** 0.152*** 
 (0.040) (0.027) 
Sizeft-1 -0.910 -1.442** 
 (0.562) (0.712) 
FFSizeft-1 -0.163 0.715 
 (0.434) (0.445) 
NetInflowsft-1 (%) 0.202*** 0.145* 
 (0.051) (0.076) 
   
Constant 28.184*** 6.684 
 (8.407) (9.563) 
   
Fund FE Y Y 
Adj R-squared 0.2084 0.1786 
Observations 960 694 
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Table 5.5: Shareholders of MMFs Seek Capital Gains 
 
This table shows results of monthly fund fixed effects regressions after the 2016 Amendments from 
October 2016 to April 2018. The dependent variable is NetInflowsft, calculated as a difference 
between gross subscriptions and gross redemptions of a fund. ∆NAVRankft, calculated as month-
over-month change in the percentile rank of a fund’s NAVft. NAVVolft is NAV volatility calculated 
as rolling standard deviation of NAV over a six-month fixed window. The controls included in the 
regressions but not shown for brevity are as follows: NetYieldft is the yield earned by funds’ 
shareholders, calculated as the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields of fund share classes 
as reported on N-MFP form. WLiqft is the weekly liquidity calculated as total weekly liquid assets 
of a fund as a percentage of its total assets. Weekly liquid assets include cash, US Treasury securities, 
government agency securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or less, and securities that convert 
into cash within five business days. ExRatioft is the expense ratio of a fund calculated as the 
difference between gross yield and net yield of a fund. Sizeft is the log of total net assets of a fund. 
FFSizeft is the log of total net assets of a fund family. Our data contains outliers, so we winsorize all 
variables at 1st and 99th percentile. We cluster standard errors by fund. Significance levels are 
indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Institutional Retail 
DepVar: NetInflowsft (%) (1) (2) 
    
∆NAVRankft-1 (bp) 0.374*** -0.538 
 (0.111) (0.335) 
∆NAVRankft-1 × NAVVolft-1 -0.040*** 0.142 
 (0.012) (0.094) 
   
Constant 32.726 -12.520 
 (22.159) (24.241) 
   
Fund FE Y Y 
Controls Y Y 
Adj R-squared 0.213 0.156 
Observations 1,023 693 
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Table 5.6: Drivers of Flow Volatility  
 
This table shows results of monthly fund fixed effects regressions after the 2016 Amendments from 
October 2016 to April 2018. The dependent variable flow volatility, FlowVolft is rolling standard 
deviation of a fund’s net inflows over a six-month fixed window.  NAVMft is the difference between 
actual NAV and target NAV as a percentage of the target NAV. NAVVolft is NAV volatility 
calculated as rolling standard deviation of NAV over a six-month fixed window. NetYieldft is the 
yield earned by funds’ shareholders, calculated as the value-weighted average of the 7-day net yields 
of fund share classes as reported on N-MFP form. WLiqft is the weekly liquidity calculated as total 
weekly liquid assets of a fund as a percentage of its total assets. Weekly liquid assets include cash, 
US Treasury securities, government agency securities with remaining maturities of 60 days or less, 
and securities that convert into cash within five business days. ExRatioft is the expense ratio of a fund 
calculated as the difference between gross yield and net yield of a fund. Sizeft is the log of total net 
assets of a fund. FFSizeft is the log of total net assets of a fund family. Our data contains outliers, so 
we winsorize all variables at 1st and 99th percentile. We cluster standard errors by fund. Significance 
levels are indicated by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 
  Institutional Retail 
DepVar: FlowVolft (1) (2) 
    
NAVMft-1 (bp) -0.03*** -0.67 
 (0.01) (0.43) 
NAVVolft-1 (bp) -0.04 3.31*** 
 (0.03) (0.64) 
NetYieldft-1 (bp) -0.05*** -0.06*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
WLiqft-1 (%) 0.04 0.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
ExRatioft-1 (bp) 0.01 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.06) 
Sizeft-1 -0.84 -1.82* 
 (0.82) (0.99) 
FFSizeft-1 1.18 0.51 
 (4.16) (1.07) 
   
Constant 2.21 31.16 
 (90.79) (33.22) 
   
Fund FE Y Y 
Adj R-squared 0.14 0.40 
Observations 966 696 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Future Research 
 
6.1 Conclusions  
 
This thesis investigates the changes in the MMF industry after the introduction 
of 2010 and 2016 Amendments to rule 2a-7 which governs US money market funds. 
Specifically, we look at the following: (1) minimum liquidity requirements; (2) 
“know your investor” requirement; (3) liquidity fee and redemption gate; (4) and 
floating net asset value.  
We find that the liquidity requirements have compelled funds to hold a safer asset 
mix and endure high redemption pressure. This was evident during the sovereign 
debt crisis, when the funds withstood the redemption pressure easily and had unused 
liquidity after servicing redemptions. This liquidity hoarding has put downward 
pressure on portfolio returns thwarting the ability of funds to survive and 
differentiate on yield especially during a zero-interest rate environment. Moreover, 
in response to “know your investor” requirement, the funds have become acquainted 
with the redemption behaviour of their investors and adjust liquidity if expecting 
higher outflows. We find that investors do not respond to liquidity but to the credit 
risk of funds during distress, indicating that they are more concerned about 
preserving their capital.  
The assessment of MMF industry after the 2016 Amendments shows that, to 
avoid liquidity fee, redemption gates and floating NAV, prime MMFs have migrated 
to government funds which do not have such requirements, indicating that investors 
prefer the money-like features of MMFs.  We find that the riskier institutional prime 
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MMFs had the higher probability of migrating to government funds, probably to 
avoid dealing with the stricter regulations for institutional funds. Post-reform, the 
remaining institutional prime MMFs behave prudently by changing their portfolio 
composition dramatically and have become very active in managing their liquidity 
in response to the changing risk profile of their portfolios i.e. any increases in credit 
risk are accompanied with increases in liquidity to ensure the comfortable servicing 
of investor redemptions. Because of losing attractive money-like features 
institutional prime funds forego more fee to provide positive returns and maintain 
their competitiveness.  Whereas, retail prime MMFs behave very differently from 
institutional prime MMFs. Unlike institutional prime funds, the riskier prime MMFs 
were less likely to convert to government MMFs and have become more relaxed in 
management of liquidity, possibly because of the removal of market discipline 
previously imposed by the presence of institutional investors in the shareholder mix 
of retail prime MMFs.  
We examine the reaction of institutional prime MMFs to the introduction of 
floating NAV since October 2016. We find that shareholders use floating NAV as a 
new performance indicator and utilize it to make investment decisions. We show that 
shareholders seek to invest in funds that offer higher capital gains. In fact, they 
actively transfer their money to funds who grow their percentile rank of capital gains. 
But they remain watchful of the volatility of floating NAV and shun the funds with 
unstable NAV. We document that funds with higher average portfolio maturity, 
higher credit risk and lower weekly liquidity grow their floating NAV more. 
Together, our results suggest that institutional funds have an incentive to differentiate 
179 
 
 
themselves on capital gains to build asset size. To do so, they must hold a riskier 
portfolio mix which could leave a fund prone to distress.   
In summary, the thesis shows that the various rules introduced by SEC reforms 
have countervailing effects. Some requirements like minimum liquidity levels, 
weighted average life ceiling and the “know your investor” rule seem to induce 
stability in MMFs albeit having some limitations. Other requirements such as 
liquidity fee, redemption gates and floating NAV requirement have mixed results.  
 
6.2 Main Contributions 
 
     Our main contributions to the existing literature are as follows. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the only study to investigate the changes in the MMF industry 
after the 2010 reforms using before and after reforms data. We observe that, after 
reforms, the MMFs have a safer asset mix and they seem to be more resilient as 
compared to the pre-reform period.  
     Second, we extend the analysis of Jank and Wedow (2015), who look at liquidity 
and inflows for German funds in a crisis. With our sample of US prime MMFs we 
evaluate the role of daily and weekly liquidity in mitigating outflows if the portfolio 
is perceived to carry considerable credit risk. In the context of the sovereign debt 
crisis, we use the level of Eurozone bank holdings as a credit risk proxy. When the 
sovereign debt crisis worsened in 2011, credit default spreads of Eurozone banks 
increase sharply. This caused concerns about the solvency of Eurozone banks which 
led to massive withdrawals from exposed funds. We find that higher daily and 
weekly liquidity do not compensate for higher credit risk in a crisis. In this sense, 
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investors appear to have over-riding concerns about the preservation of capital even 
when the funds are better able to meet redemptions.  
     Third, we show that after the 2016 Amendments retail and institutional prime 
MMFs have become very different in their liquidity positions, maturity structure, 
competitiveness and risk management behaviour. 
     Fourth, we investigate the factors that influenced funds to convert from prime to 
government funds in response to the 2016 reforms. We find that institutional prime 
MMFs that held more credit risk were more likely to convert to government funds to 
preserve their money-like features, while risky retail prime MMFs do not tend to 
switch.  
     Fifth, we show that institutional prime MMFs have become more active in risk 
and liquidity management after the introduction of redemptions gates, liquidity fee 
and floating NAV. They maintain higher liquidity and tend to increase their liquidity 
actively as they increase the credit risk of their portfolio. On the other hand, retail 
prime MMFs have become more relaxed in their liquidity management. 
     Finally, we investigate how floating NAV has influenced the liquidity and risk 
management of institutional prime MMFs, what are the factors that influence NAVs, 
how floating NAV has influenced the risk-taking incentives of MMFs and the 
response of investors to this new requirement.  We find that investors are attracted 
to higher NAV funds, but they run from funds with higher NAV fluctuations. So, a 
fund must increase risk to boost capital gains in order to attract investors, whereas to 
retain investors, it must ensure less volatility in NAV.  
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6.3 Implications  
 
     The changes in MMFs that have been discussed have implications for 
shareholders, regulators and money market funds. For instance, we show that funds 
have higher liquidity and have become more resilient to stress. Moreover, we show 
that institutional funds after segregation from retail funds have become more active 
in their liquidity management and tend to hoard liquidity as they increase their risk.  
This means that investors can be more confident about their investments in MMFs 
because these funds hold a higher safety cushion and are equipped to service 
redemptions. However, investors must still remain cautious about the risk-taking 
incentives of MMFs because these might have increased after the introduction of 
floating NAV for institutional funds. Retails investors should also keep up with the 
evolution of risk in fund portfolio because these funds seem to have become more 
relaxed in their liquidity and risk management after the discipline imposed by the 
presence of institutional investors has been removed. 
     Our results show that having higher daily and weekly liquidity does not 
necessarily compensate for higher credit risk of a fund’s portfolio during a crisis. In 
fact, investors seem to have over-riding concerns about the preservation of capital 
even when the funds are equipped to meet redemptions. So, in order to reduce the 
likelihood of heavy redemptions during a crisis, MMFs must ensure their portfolio 
risk is kept low, in addition to having higher liquidity levels.  
This paper sheds light on changes in the MMFs industry and contributes to the recent 
debate on their new regulation. Some requirements like minimum liquidity levels, 
weighted average life ceiling and the “know your investor” rule seem to induce 
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stability in MMFs albeit having some limitations. Other requirements such as 
liquidity fee, redemption gates and floating NAV requirement have mixed results. 
For instance, the new SEC regulation, which took effect in October 2016, by 
requiring institutional prime MMFs to adopt a floating NAV may have provided 
institutional prime MMFs with more incentives to chase yield and invest in riskier 
securities. The resulting increase in NAV would attract investors, especially in a low 
interest rate environment. At the same time, the transparency of inherent risk of 
MMFs communicated through floating NAV seems to have a risk reducing impact. 
6.4 Limitations and Future Research  
 
We recognise that this thesis has limitations. The analysis of this thesis is based 
on a research design that does not make it possible to clearly determine a causal 
effect between regulatory changes directly related to MMFs and observed changes 
in MMF behaviour due to multiple confounding effects. For instance, other reforms 
aimed at banks and financial markets such as Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act may 
have indirectly caused some of the changes documented in the thesis. That said, we 
do believe that the reforms we have studies, which were aimed specifically at MMFs, 
have influenced the industry more profoundly than other factors. Furthermore, 
despite the above limitations, the analysis we have provided offers important insights 
into the MMF industry that represent a meaningful contribution to our understanding 
of the new MMF landscape.  
There are various ways to further develop the findings presented in this 
dissertation. We briefly mention some potentially interesting directions that could 
expand the study and provide additional contributions to the literature.  
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In chapter 3, we examine how liquidity floor introduced by 2010 Amendments 
have influenced prime MMFs risk and the reaction of shareholder to this 
requirement. Future research could investigate more in detail the limitations of 
higher liquidity in financial markets. As money market funds are required to hold 
more liquid assets, banks and corporations will face higher borrowing costs.34 This, 
combined with new SEC reforms that have made prime MMFs less attractive to 
investors due to, for example, the introduction of discretionary redemption 
suspensions, may have serious consequences for the availability of affordable short-
term credit to the private sector. The wider implications of these radical changes in 
the credit markets remain to be explored. 
In chapters 4 and 5, we explore the way 2016 Amendments (especially liquidity 
fee, redemption gates and floating NAV) have altered the MMF industry. A relevant 
topic that is unexplored in this thesis and remains of interest for future research is 
whether the introduction of floating NAV helps mitigate the risk of runs in 
institutional prime funds. We could not address this point because we investigate a 
period in which financial markets have been calm. Therefore, we could not directly 
investigate the response of institutional investors during market stress, when 
operating under floating NAV. A related extension would be to see whether liquidity 
fee and redemption gates lead to pre-emptive runs. 
 
 
                                                          
34 See “US money market fund reform: an explainer. New rules are already impacting the $2.7tn 
industry”, Financial Times, October 14, 2016. 
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